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ABSTRACT
This study examines the process of gender policy reform. It seeks to explain how and
when gender policy reform takes place in Venezuela across time. The study entails observations
gender policy reform during specific periods of Punto Fijo democracy (1958-1998) characterized
by democratic consolidation and deconsolidation, and during the transition towards a new type of
hybrid democracy, the Chávez era (1999-2007). The policies considered are the ones addressing
women’s equality at home and at work, reproductive rights, women’s economic rights, and
political participation. The analysis shows that the likelihood of gender policy reform depends on
the combination of certain institutional configurations that provide women access to the
decision-making process of the state, but most importantly to women’s groups’ capacity to
organize a broad coalition of women from civil society and from within the state apparatus
behind a reform and push for it by using frames based on international agreed norms that
legitimized their struggle. In addition, the analysis reveals the negative influence of religious
groups with decision-making power on the process of gender policy reform.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
How does gender policy reform come about in the context of regime change? In other
words, what pushes the state to make gender policy reform? When and how? Women, through
their participation in social movements and organizations, have played an important role in the
process of achieving democratic transitions in Latin America (Álvarez, 1990; Escobar &
Álvarez, 1992; Foweraker, 1995; Friedman, 1998; Oxhorn, 1995). Notwithstanding their
contribution to democratization, during the process of consolidation of democracy, women’s
organizations have been marginalized as political parties become the only channels of statesociety interaction (Álvarez, 1990; Friedman, 1998, 2000; Jaquette, 1994; Waylen, 1994; Rai
and Lievesley, 1996 in Fitzsimmons, 2000; Jelin, 1990; Radcliffe and Westwood, 1993).
We might expect, then, that women’s groups would have a lesser impact on legislative
gender reform in democratization as a result of their relative political marginalization. In fact,
there is some evidence showing that under dictatorship women have been able to advance more
rights than under democracy, owing to dictators’ interests to modernize the state thus making
legal and constitutional changes to conform to international standards (Htun, 2003). Under
democracy, gender policy reform in Latin American countries has occurred, in part, as a result of
international influence on the democratic state to conform to the demands and goals of the
United Nations Decade for Women and the World Conference on Women (1975- 1985) (Lind,
1992; Stoltz Chinchilla, 1992). Nevertheless, liberalization in gender issues has occurred both
during dictatorship and democracy (Htun, 2003), making it difficult to draw a definitive
conclusion as to the impact of regime type.
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Current events in Venezuelan politics make it a case of democratic deinstitutionalization
that has, paradoxically, contributed to the advancement of women’s rights. Venezuela constitutes
a fascinating case of a democratic transition in a regime considered until recently one of the
longest lasting democracies in the region (McCoy and Myers, 2004; Friedman, 2000), and an
example of a stable democracy due in part to an ideal party system that was designed to contain
conflict (Levine, 1973; Karl, 1987; Hellinger, 1984; Ellner, 1993; Friedman, 1998). According to
Ellner (2003), the turmoil of the 1990s took scholars by surprise and faced them with the fact
that economic and social problems had slowly been eroding the legitimacy of the political
system.
The pacted transition in 1958 allowed the political parties to become the only channels of
representation between state and society. And in spite of the praise by scholars of Venezuela’s
party system institutionalization, its “overinstitutionalization” and rigidity (Mainwaring, 1999 in
Ellner 2003; Levine and Crisp, 1995; Crisp, 1997 in Ellner, 2003) led to the exclusion of civil
society actors and their capacity to participate in the process of decision-making (Ellner, 2003).
Accordingly, women’s groups were marginalized as in the rest of Latin America during
democratic institutionalization (Friedman, 1998, 2000) and excluded from effective participation
in the decision-making processes that could improve their lives. Venezuelan democracy, in
general, suffered the consequences of the overinstitutionalization of a strong party system, after
the transition, that led to a “freezing” of democracy (Brewer Carías, 1988 in McCoy and Myers,
2004; Karl, 1987; López Maya et. al, 1989; Salamanca, 1995).
The process of political and administrative decentralization that started in 1989 attempted
to overhaul a system that had been declining from the beginning of the 1980s, due in part to
decreasing oil prices and the consequent negative impact on Venezuelan’s living standards. Civil
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society groups formed in the 1970s and 1980s were crucial during this time of crisis in
mobilizing support from other groups and forming networks to put pressure on the state
institutions to decentralize (Salamanca, 2004). In turn, the process of decentralization was the
most important factor contributing to the growth of new groups of civil society as well as for the
recognition of these groups as legitimate actors of the public sphere (García-Guadilla, 2003).
The implosion of Venezuelan traditional political organizations in 1998 (started by the
deinstitutionalization of the political party system in 1993) left a vacuum that civil society
organizations --including women’s organizations-- and the media have attempted to fill
(Salamanca, 2004:94). Studies that describe the origin, evolution, and politicization of civil
society in the transition from Punto Fijo democracy to the Chávez era emphasize the changes in
state society-relations (García-Guadilla, 2003; Salamanca, 1995, 2004). Using different
theoretical analysis, both García-Guadilla and Salamanca show the transformation of a civil
society from one that was basically anti-party during its emergence in the 1970s in that they
sought autonomy from the political parties, and targeted the state in demand for public services
at the same time that it became the provider of social services, to one that was able to reinvent
itself and emerge at the margins of the model and finally become an important political actor
seeking to influence the state. However, no analysis of women’s groups is presented as part of
civil society groups that have had an impact on state policy apart from a few recent studies on
women’s participation in recent legal reforms (Jiménez, 2001 and Rojas, 1999 in Espina and
Rakowski 2002; Rakowski, 1998; 2003).
While the story of the Venezuelan women’s movement illustrates the cooption of
political parties and the subordination of women’s issues to the parties’ agenda, it also shows the
adaptation of women’s groups’ strategies to the political opportunities available during the
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process of regime institutionalization, deinstitutionalization, and change. However, as Friedman
(1998; 2000) points out, Venezuelan women, as part of civil society, have remained invisible to
students of Venezuela except for their concern with women’s lack of success in achieving
political leadership (Martz, 1966 in McCoy and Myers, 2004; Coppedge, 1994; Ellner, 1998 in
McCoy and Myers, 2004) or the more general discussions of women’s organizing in civil society
(Salamanca, 1995).
Apart from the recent work on women’s activism focused on gender reform
aforementioned, Friedman’s work’s (1998; 2000) examines the impact of regime change --from
authoritarian to democratic-- on the demobilization of Venezuelan women’s groups and the
innovative strategies used by Venezuelan women’s groups to overcome the obstacles for
women’s political participation. In addition, there is some research that looks at women’s
mobilization and political participation during dictatorship and after the democratic transition
(Carosio, 1991; Petzoldt and Bevilacqua, 1979; Friedman, 1998); the campaign to reform the
Civil Code in 1982 (Palumbo, 1988); and the creation and role of the CONG --Coordinator of
women’s NGOs (Coordinadora de Organizaciones No-Gubernamentales de Mujeres)
(Castañeda, 1996; 1998; Espina, 1994; 2000). Most works address the women’s movement and
its contribution to advancing women’s legal equality in Venezuela while little work exists on the
relationship between women and the Venezuelan state and how changes in that relationship have
impacted the perceived advance in gender policy reform.
Bearing in mind that regime type alone does not appear to explain gender policy reform,
and that the consolidation of democracy has actually negatively impacted women’s political
participation in many cases, I expect to find increased capacity of women to achieve gender
policy reform when institutions are less entrenched and may be in a state of flux, such as in the
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context of democratic deconsolidation and regime transition. Therefore, I examine women’s
group’s strategies under different institutional arrangements in order to explain gender policy
reform.
In other words, my interest is not which type of regime offers more support for women’s
issues, but rather the impact of changes in state institutions that may be more or less amenable to
women’s access to decision-making processes that impact gender policy and advances women’s
rights. Additionally, I will assess the way in which women have adapted their organizational
strategies to the opportunities and constraints of the political landscape (Tarrow, 1998:109).
In considering the questions of when and how policy reform happens, I will look at
specific institutions of the democratic state, throughout different phases of democracy:
institutionalization, deinstitutionalization, and transition, that open in a deliberate effort by the
state to address women’s issues and how women’s groups take advantage of political
opportunities, or create them, in an attempt to impact state legislative reform on women’s issues.
Therefore, this study adds the study of deconsolidation of democracy and gender policy
reform to the existing literature on the impact of the transition to democracy and the process of
democratic consolidation. My focus is on changes in gender policy reform that have taken place
since the 1970s in Venezuela in order to determine how and when they happened in the context
of the three periods described above. Consequently, I evaluate how institutional factors such as
the institutionalization of the party system, its subsequent collapse, the decentralization process,
changes in state-Church relations, and regime transition influence gender policy reform.
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Women and the State in Latin America
The literature on women’s political organizing in Latin America reflects political changes
in the region. During the 1980s and 1990s, research on women’s organizing focused on the
impact of women’s organizing on achieving democratization. Some studies have also focused on
how the transition to democracy affected women’s organizing in Latin America and how new
democracies can be more “women-friendly” in ways similar to democracies in most western
democracies.1 Subsequently, research on women’s organizing turned to the changes --mainly
decline-- in women’s mobilization and changes in the relation between the state and women
(Fitzsimmons, 2000). There is general agreement among scholars of women’s movements about
the weakening of women’s mobilization and political participation during consolidation of
democracy (Álvarez, 1990; Friedman, 1998, 2000; Jaquette, 1994, 2001; Waylen, 1994; Rai and
Lievesley in Fitzsimmons, 2000; Jelin, 1990; Radcliffe and Westwood, 1993). In fact, some note
that Latin American social movements in general have become the casualties of the transition
after the political parties’ take over (Jaquette, 1994). In regards to why this occurs, Friedman
(1998) argues that “the institutionalization of politics during democracy impedes the forms of
organizations that women develop during authoritarian regimes and thus their political
incorporation into democracy” (p. 88).
Escobar and Álvarez (1992) have also observed the impact that political parties, the
power of the state over civil society, the existence of formal democratic corporatist channels for
interest representation, and the pervasiveness of clientelism have had on the emergence,
development, and political and policy effectiveness of particular types of social movements’
organizations. One body of literature deals with the obstacles faced by women’s organizations in
order to mobilize and impact state policy. Research on women’s organizing in Latin America
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shows that obstacles to women’s continued mobilization include class issues (Matear, 1997);
economic and cultural subordination (Fernández, 1997); machismo (Stephen, 1997 in
Fitzsimmons, 2000); the subordination of gender issues to larger issues such as revolution in the
context of regime change (Bush and Mumme, 1994), and the agency of women’s groups and
organizations (Wieringa, 1995 in Fitzsimmons, 2000).
Comparative studies of women’s organizing under the transition from authoritarianism
and under democracy have found that leadership is still in the hands of men (León, 1994). In
spite of democracy, few women hold leadership positions (Martz, 1995; Coppedge, 1994); while
women’s participation in formal political institutions and workplace also remains limited
(Craske, 1993 in Radcliff and Westwood, 2003). In terms of the impact that regime has had on
policy change, some authors state that the greatest achievements in women’s issues seemed to
have taken place under authoritarianism (Álvarez, 1997 in Friedman 2000) while others assert
that liberalization in gender issues has occurred both during dictatorship and democracy (Htun,
2003).
Arguments regarding the negative influence of the political parties on women’s
movements state that in some cases political parties infiltrate the movements, creating divisions
that lead to their demise (Álvarez, 1990, Barrig, 1994 in Friedman, 2000; Chuchryk, 1995 in
Friedman, 2000; Foweraker and Craig, 1990 in Friedman, 2000). Segments of women’s groups
are absorbed by the party and the parties’ issues take precedence over women’s issues (Jelin,
1990; Jaquette, 1994; Waylen, 1994). Moreover, political parties set up women’s bureaus but
their issues are subordinated to parties’ priorities as well (Álvarez, 1986; Kirkwood, 1986 in
Friedman 2000; Friedman, 1998). Nonetheless, the results have not always been the same;
studies also show that parties of the Left in Peru, Chile, and Brazil have helped social
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movements expand after the transition to democracy (Álvarez, 1990; Schneider, 1992, Escobar
and Álvarez, 1992, Eckstein, 2001).
An important aspect of the impact of democratic institutionalization on women’s
movements and/or groups is what Drogus and Stewart-Gambino (2005) call the
institutionalization of feminist politics and that has been fully documented in Venezuela by
Friedman (2000), Espina and Rakowski (2002), García Prince (2005) and García Ramírez
(1999); in Brazil, Chile and Argentina by Htun (2003); in Brazil and Chile by Drogus and
Stewart-Gambino (2005); and in India by Desai (2002). This refers to the incorporation of
professional feminist activists into the state apparatus through the creation of state bureaucracies
for women and women’s advisory commissions (usually dependent on the executive branch).
The creation of state bureaucracies or commissions constitutes an important way in which
women’s groups have been given access to some policy-making process that has had a direct
influence on legal gender reform.
Moreover, changes in the international context such as the women’s conferences since
1975 and the United Nation’s decade of women (1976-1985), international norms, conventions,
and treaties on women’s rights as human rights are considered among the most influential factors
explaining the liberalization of gender issues in Latin America in the 1980s through the process
of international advocacy networks that contributed to the implementation of these norms by
pushing target actors to adopt new policies (Htun, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Htun and
Jones, 2002). For instance, as a result of the IV Conference on Women in Beijing 1995 many
Latin American countries introduced gender quotas in the electoral lists to conform to the
international requirements of promoting gender equality through increased women’s political
participation in political parties and elected positions (Eckstein, 2001; Merz Repem, 2005).
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However, norm influence and implementation have varied across the region depending
on the nature of the issues and on the institutional characteristics particular to every country such
as the role of the Catholic Church, the existence of strong civil society organizations, the
institutionalization of political parties, and executive and legislative commitment to gender
policy (Waylen, 1994; Friedman, 2000; Htun, 2003).
There are several single-case studies of gender-related policy adoptions in Latin America
and other regions that show how research done in academic feminist circles using the legal
international framework for human rights developed since the late 1980s, and later the legal
international framework for women’s rights has positively influenced the liberalization of gender
laws in many Latin American countries (Baldez, 2001; Friedman, 1998, 2000, Desai, 2002;
García Ramírez, 1999, 2005; Merz Repem, 2005; García Prince, 2005; Heredia de Salvatierra,
2006).
In addition, Htun’s comparative study (2003) of cross-national variation in gender policy
in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile during the transition from dictatorship to democracy finds that
common to the three countries was the drive for modernization of military governments. The
reforms were led by special commissions of experts behind closed doors. Especially in Argentina
and Brazil the rights of women advanced greatly during dictatorship. She concludes that different
configurations of state institutions, differences in issues, and the existence of elite issue networks
(and their fit with the state) contributed to the success (or failure) in the passing of legislation
concerning women’s issues.
Htun’s study indicates that regime type does not explain state policy reform in gender
issues because although under military rule women’s rights were expanded (divorce was
legalized in Brazil), democracy did not have the expected immediate liberalizing effect on
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divorce in Chile especially due to the opposition from the Catholic Church.2 In addition, abortion
was not legalized in any of the three countries under study regardless of regime type due to the
strong influence of the Catholic Church on women’s issues and traditional values held by many
women.
Similarly, in a study by Molyneux (2001) on socialist Nicaragua, this author finds that
when the revolutionary government took power in 1979, it pledged to implement legal reforms to
achieve gender equality. However, on the issue of abortion, the socialist regime retained a
conservative position; in fact, abortion was not legalized nor the pre-revolutionary codes
amended (p. 60). Among the reasons that explain the failure to liberalize women’s reproductive
rights in Nicaragua were the entrenched resistance of the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, the
political parties, groups to the right of the FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional), and
even supporters of the Sandinistas.

Women and the State in Venezuela
The crisis of Venezuelan democracy since the late 1980s has been the focus of several
studies that point to the political parties, the party pacts, the dominating executive branch, and
the political economy of oil as the main culprits (Brewer Carías, 1988 in McCoy and Myers,
2004; López-Maya et al, 1989; García Guadilla, 1992; Salamanca, 1995, Karl, 1987, 1997;
Naím, 1993; Crisp, Levine, and Rey, 1995). Other analysts emphasized the need for
democratizing political parties and other aspects of Venezuelan politics (Ellner, 1993; Coppedge,
1994; Kornblith and Levine, 1995; Goodman et al, 1995; McCoy et al., 1995) and the negative
effects produced by the lack of adaptation of the political parties to the economic challenges of
the 1980s and 1990s (Ellner and Hellinger, 2003) as well as the rigid culture of cooperation
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(Jácome, 2000 en McCoy, 2000; McCoy, 1999, 2000). In general, the literature showed the
parties’ long-standing cooptation of independent organizations of civil society and the existence
of non-democratic channels of access to the executive power as well as the rigid and
exclusionary nature of the political system.
Interestingly, in spite of the fact that Venezuela’s transition to democracy (known as the
Punto Fijo democracy) took place in 1958, it was not until the 1970s that scholars considered it
to have achieved democratic institutionalization, following a decade of guerrilla insurgency and
military barracks uprisings (Crisp and Levine, 1998). Nevertheless, only a decade later, the
political system started a process of deconsolidation that, in spite of several efforts to revamp it,
culminated in a regime transition during the end of the 1990s, in what has been defined as the
“unraveling of Venezuelan representative democracy” and the movement from a limited
democracy to a hybrid regime that combines pluralism and authoritarianism, representative and
direct democracy, and capitalism and statism (McCoy and Myers, 2004:2).
Structural, institutional, and cultural factors have been used to explain the causes of the
demise of the Punto Fijo democracy. Some scholars have recognized the lack of explanatory
power of one approach only and instead have argued for the need to use different theoretical
approaches. Conclusions drawn from recent studies assert the explanatory value of structural and
cultural variables, but emphasize the importance of institutional variables in explaining how the
crisis of Punto Fijo democracy unfolded and prevented the normalization of the Bolivarian
democracy (McCoy and Myers, 2004:292).
As stated before, studies that present the impact of state institutions vis-à-vis civil society
groups, the urban poor and social movements during the Punto Fijo democracy and in the recent
post-pact period (Salamanca, 2004; Canache, 2004; García-Guadilla, 2003) often omit the impact
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of these transformations on women’s groups. Therefore, by seeking answers to how and when
gender policy reform takes place, this research attempts to contribute to the study of the impact
of the process of democratic institutionalization, deinstitutionalization, and change on women’s
groups’ organizing, adaptation strategies and the subsequent impact on gender policy reform in
Venezuela.

Gender Policy Reform in Venezuela: A Case Study
The impact of oppression of the authoritarian regimes in Venezuela resulted in various
types of women’s organizing based on class interests (Friedman, 1998). The political
opportunities structures of the dictatorship (1948-1958) were characterized by a repressive
security apparatus and a clandestine opposition in which women mainly carried out the
infrastructural duties of the opposition or exposed the regime’s abuses thus making an important
contribution to the fall of the dictatorship. Women were members of community- based groups
such as Juventud Comunista (through the feminist committee of the Communist Youth) and the
first young women’s organization --Unión de las Muchachas de Venezuela (Venezuelan Young
Women’s Union)- was founded in 1951 by one of the most important Venezuelan feminists since
the 1940s, Esperanza Vera (Espina and Rakowski, 2006).
Nevertheless, women were primarily in charge of transmitting messages, setting up
meetings, finding safe houses, taking care of the mail, and so on, while they were excluded from
the important decision-making and organizational activities of the opposition, because of their
identification with the private sphere. Women’s relative marginalization, then, meant that they
were not ready to take advantage of the opportunities of the new democratic regime (Friedman,
2000).

13

The new democratic regime was characterized by a party-led pacted democracy that
excluded the Left, in which many feminist like Esperanza Vera and Argelia Laya were active,
and marginalized women as a group as well as their issues. The leadership of the political parties
ordered women to stop organizing since their activities were perceived as a threat to the “pact”
(Friedman, 1998). In contrast, the pact incorporated the labor and peasant sectors and rewarded
them with legislation, representation, and party posts.
Notwithstanding the decrease in women’s mobilization, the creation of women’s agencies
inside the state bureaucracy contributed to the institutionalization of feminist politics and
influenced the way Venezuelan women’s groups organized during Punto Fijo democracy as they
were unable to work with the parties, and thus turned to the state.
In addition to the weakening, marginalization, and co-optation of the women’s movement
in Venezuela by the political parties (a phenomenon also observed by scholars in other Latin
America countries), machismo3 has been found to be a major obstacle in the participation and
impact of women’s groups in Venezuelan politics. In her study on Venezuelan women’s
organizing, Friedman (2000) asserts that Venezuelan political structures and discourse are
gendered (that is, biased against women). The author charts 60 years of women’s organizing in
Venezuela--1936 to 1996--and argues that, as in other Latin American countries, in Venezuela,
political parties co-opted women’s movements and took complete control of the political arena
during the process of democratization and institutionalization of democracy (1958-1984). Her
study concludes that in the case of Venezuela, women’s mobilization and political participation
decreased with the deepening of democracy and increased with the deconsolidation of
democracy (1984-1990).
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More recently, these findings have been confirmed by the work of leading Venezuelan
feminists on women’s groups organizing (Espina and Rakowski, 2002; García Ramírez, Rosillo,
and Valdivieso, 2005; Espina, 2007; Espina and Rakowski, 2007).
Accordingly, the present study builds on Friedman’s work until 1996 and the recent work
of Venezuelan feminists from academia, but considers the dynamics between women’s groups
strategies to impact gender policy reform and changes in institutional configurations taking place
during the periods of regime institutionalization, regime deinstitutionalization, and regime
transition, from representative democracy to a hybrid regime, “a transition path not observed
before” (McCoy and Myers, 2004).
Using Venezuela as an exemplary case for studying how and when the state makes
gender policy changes contributes to our understanding of the dynamics of the interaction
between state and society across Latin America and the ways in which the state regulates family
and gender relations: the relationship between the state and women’s groups; changes across
time; and how do those changes translate into state reform on gender issues. More specifically,
what institutions affect the capacity and strategies of women’s groups to influence (or fail to
influence) state gender policy reform.
I use the political opportunity approach as a complementary approach to institutional
analysis that considers the macro-political and takes into account the political context in which
the social movement emerges or acts (Tarrow, 1994; Foweraker, 1995); that is, the way in which
regime structures and state responses provide opportunities for social movements to act
effectively.
The political opportunity approach takes into account the following elements: a) the
openness of political institutions; b) the availability of allies for the movement; c) conflict
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between elites; and d) the impact of political alignments. According to Friedman’s (1998; 2000)
work on women’s groups in Venezuela, the openness of the political institutions and the
mechanisms used by elites are considered among the most important for the emergence of the
movement. Additionally, the effect of the political environment on the development of social
movements is crucial in understanding the success (or failure) that women’s movements have
had in advancing women’s rights under democracy (Drogus and Stewart-Gambino, 2005).
An institutional analysis that combines the mechanisms available to women to access
state decision-making processes can provide insights into what pushes the state to make gender
policy reform. The following section describes the case study in detail and the methodology to
asses some propositions derived from the literature and generate hypotheses from the
Venezuelan case regarding the institutions and strategies that are most important for gender
policy reform in future comparative research. This case study involves qualitative research that
seeks to explain state gender policy in Venezuela across time. It entails observations of state
policy changes in gender issues during specific periods of Punto Fijo democracy (1970-1998)
and during the transition to the Chávez era (1999-2006).
The women’s groups I look at are organized women’s groups from civil society at the
national level that have adapted to the context, needs and issues of the changing political system.
I evaluate these groups’ perception of the laws on women in terms of their quality and capacity
of advancing women’s rights as well as their perception of the overall process of gender reform.
The reason why I choose organized women’s groups is to avoid the methodological problem of
measuring the impact (or unintended impact) of grassroots or any other women’s movement on
legislation. Apart from the fact that some of these groups have recently emerged since 2000, I
would be making spurious correlations or speculations if attempting to establish a direct
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correlation between their work at the community level and the passing of gender legislation at
the national level. However, by looking at nationally-organized women’s groups from civil
society whose work can be traced across the whole time period under study here, I will be able
to compare and contrast forms of activism (and impact) before and after (and during) the peak of
activism and how they shaped and were shaped by institutional changes.
Finally, because this study suffers from a limitation: geographic restriction (McAdam et
al., 1996), I will be aware of institutional changes that have taken place in other countries in the
region and the responses given by women’s groups pushing for legal reform to provide some
comparative perspective with the hypotheses derived from the case study in order to be able
make generalizations of the results.
Accordingly, the study focuses on two independent variables: 1) changes in state
institutions during the periods of institutionalized democracy, deinstitutionalization of
democracy, and regime transition to hybrid democracy; 2) changes in Church-State relations
across the periods analyzed in relation to women’s coalition-building aimed at reform. The
intervening variable -- women’s groups’ strategies of unification and framing-- examines
changes in women’s groups’ activism, types of organization, and goals during the periods
mentioned above.
This study examines four propositions drawn from the literature reviewed above, two
institutional and two strategy-related in order to investigate, through a process-tracing
methodology across three political stages in Venezuelan history, the interaction of political
structures and women’s strategies to determine their relative strength in explaining gender policy
reform:
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1. Access of women’s groups to decision-making processes increases the
likelihood of state gender policy reform. Women’s groups’ access to decisionmaking processes can take different forms: through party bureaus, state
bureaucracies, autonomous commissions, and elected female politicians. Each
form provides space for women’s issues and their strategies; each form provides
different opportunities for policy reform depending on the institutional context.
The likelihood of gender policy reform increases when institutions are more open.
2. Church-State relations directly influence state gender policy reform in the
following ways: Conflict between Church and State is more likely to produce
legislative action on controversial gender issues because it creates room for
reformers (or reformist coalitions) to impact legislation without the state blocking
the reform. On the contrary, periods of Church-State cooperation are less likely
to lead to discussion of (and drive support for) controversial gender issues, and
when discussed they are eventually defeated because of lack of governmental
incentive to support reform and risk the Church’s political ire.
Through the different phases of democratization, changes in political structures have
shaped women’s activism, thus, women’s groups’ strategies to impact gender policy outcomes
have taken different forms. It is well known that the higher the framing capacity of women’s
groups, the better their chances of impacting reform on gender issues because of their ability to
build support from public opinion and public officials:
3. The disaggregation of women’s issues, the exclusion of divisive issues, and the
use of international legal instruments increase the possibility of policy change.
Proposals made on specific issues (e.g. domestic violence) while leaving out
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divisive ones (e.g. abortion) and based on internationally agreed norms by states
promotes the participation and support of all women’s groups and public officials
and increases the prospects of gender reform.
4. Greater unity among women’s groups increases the prospects of state gender
policy reform. The influence of a coalition of women’s groups from outside and
within the state proves beneficial in gathering the support of the groups’ allies in
and outside the state for gender reform.

Independent Variables
1. Opening and closing of state institutions: The opening and closing of state institutions refer
here to the degree of flexibility of political institutions to allow diverse actors to access the state
decision-making process and actively participate in the process of policy reform. Open
institutions are characterized by flexible, adaptable, and decentralized structures that lead to
inclusive practices of state decision-making process. In contrast, closed institutions are
characterized by rigid, centralized structures that lead to exclusionary practices of the state that
concentrate the decision-making process in the hands of a few. I consider party bureaus and state
bureaucracies and advisory commissions as political structures that could either allow or block
women’s participation in the decision-making process of gender policy reform.
Examples of opening and closing of state institutions in Venezuela include: a) the
closedness of political parties during institutionalized democracy (1970- 1988) ; b) the openness
occurring with the process of decentralization implemented as means to revamp the political
system in the process of democratic deinstitutionalization (1989- 1998); and c) the institutional
changes taking place during regime transition from a limited representative to a participative
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form of democracy that began with the writing of a new Constitution in 1999 (1999-2006).
I examine the way women were incorporated into party bureaus, state bureaucracies, and
advisory commissions, appointed to political positions, or elected female politicians as means to
achieve leadership positions or participate in the decision-making processes. I also analyze the
impact that the processes of decentralization and deinstitutionalization of the political parties had
on the type of activism and strategies used by women’s groups in order to influence gender
policy reform. Finally, I consider the effect of regime transition on women’s organizing and
capacity to influence gender policy reform beginning with the writing of a new constitution in
1999.
2. Church-State relations: This relationship is understood here in terms of conflict (or the lack
thereof) between Church and State that increases (or decreases) the chances of organized groups
to achieve policy reform on gender issues. In order to measure changes in Church-State relations
across time, I examine the Catholic Church’s perception of the government’s policies as
expressed in newspaper editorials and academic writings and the government’s support for the
Church manifested in state funding of Catholic education and projects and lack of opposition to
the Church’s hierarchy.

Intervening Variables
3. The framing capacity of women’s groups: This refers to the way women’s groups identify
problems in women’s issues and negotiate on the way to impact change thus guiding their action
in order to mobilize supporters and demobilize opponents for their cause. The use of frames
legitimizes the activities and campaigns of activists or members of a social movement (Snow &
Benford, 1998 in Snow and Benford, 2000). On the one hand, the disaggregation of gender
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issues helps create proposals that take into account the fact that certain issues tend to attract
support for reform (as in the case of gender equality) while others create factions among
supporters because of the divisive nature of the issue (as in the case of abortion). On the other
hand, the use of international legal instruments by women’s groups to base the proposals on
gender issues increases the legitimacy of their request and increases the likelihood of reform. In
order to analyze the impact of the framing capacity of organized women’s groups, I look at the
content of their proposals in terms of the way women’s issues are presented and their
relationship with the international legal framework for women’s rights and their ability to draw
support from most women’s groups and public officials.
4. Greater unity among women’s groups is measured as the result of strategies like coalitionbuilding or network creation or maintenance used by women’s groups in order to more
effectively influence state gender policy reform. I consider examples of coalition-building efforts
by organized women to draw broad support from most women’s groups (including women
within the state apparatus) in order to impact state gender reform. I also examine instances of
network creation or maintenance by women’s groups built among organized women outside the
state and women inside the state apparatus to influence state gender policy reform.

Dependent Variable
Change in state gender policy: Gender policy reform in this study refers to the enactment
of laws that protect or advance women’s rights and their impact on public policies for women. In
order to measure change in state gender policy, I examine the enactment of key laws such as the
1982 reform of the Civil Code; the 1990 Organic Labor Law; the 1993 Law of Equal
Opportunity for Women; the 1997 Suffrage and Political Participation Law; the 1998 Law
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against Violence on Women and the Family; the 2002 Organic Law of Social Security; the 2006
Organic Law on the Right of Women to be Free from Violence; and the proposals for reform of
the Penal Code introduced in 2004 and 2007.
In addition, I consider, where available, data deriving from the public policies produced
by gender legislative reform. Impact data refers to the implementation of the women’s labor
benefits, the penalization for violence against women measured in the numbers of court cases on
violence against women as well as institutions and programs created to address violence against
women, the recognition of women’s household job as an economic activity and the right of
housewives to social security measured by the number of women receiving such benefits, the
impact of the implementation of women’s quotas as a means to increase women’s political
representation within political parties measured by the number of women nominated for office
and elected , and the status of abortion.

Sources of Evidence
The study entailed the collection of qualitative data through primary sources: interviews
with feminists, written memoirs, and their publications in two important academic women’s
journals Revista Venezolana de Estudios de la Mujer (RVEM issued by the research center
CEM) and Otras Miradas (issued by the research group GIGESEX).4 The interviews conducted
orally and in writing involved three important feminist activists who have participated in the
process of preparation of proposals for the different laws enacted along the periods of study. The
feminist women studied are professional women founders of women’s advocacy and service
groups since the 1990s; others are university professors and founders of important women’s
studies centers in Venezuelan universities. In the cases where I was unable to interview
important feminists, I used their academic articles published by CEM and GIGESEX which
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provided an invaluable source of their personal experience in the process of elaboration,
legislative approval, and promulgation of the laws under study here, as well as their opinion on
the quality of the laws and the impact of the latter on public policies that protect and advance
women’s rights as well as their shortcomings.

Timeframe
First, I look at changes in state institutions during the period of apparent institutionalized
democracy from 1970 to 1988. During the transition to democracy in 1958, a pacted transition
set the new rules of the game in economic and political issues and political parties become the
only channels of representation of societal demands. For most of this time period institutions like
traditional political parties controlled most social actors and thus the state was only accessed by
traditional political parties and their allied interest groups. It was from 1970 onwards that
Venezuelan democracy was considered consolidated and civil society groups began to emerge in
response to the penetration of political parties and the lack of effectiveness of the state to provide
social services (Salamanca, 2003).
Second, I examine the period of democratic deinstitutionalization (1989-98) and the
initial opening of the institutions marked by the process of decentralization of the political
institutions of the state after 1989 and the impending collapse of the party system in 1993 and
their impact on the emergence of new societal groups, particularly women’s groups who sought
to differentiate themselves from political parties.
Finally, I evaluate the transition to the Chávez era in 1998 and the institutional changes
that have taken place until 2007 which include the rise of anti- party, personalistic rule, the
writing and passing of a new Constitution in 1999, the initial opening of institutions to new and
old actors of society followed by a recentralization of power and the closing of institutions.
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Comparative Perspective
Through the literature review I have been cognizant of important changes in gender
policy reform in different countries; I provide an institutional analysis of such changes as well as
women’s responses and strategies to impact gender policy reform in order to find similarities or
differences in the process of gender reform in Venezuela and other countries. In the conclusion, I
reflect back on them and on the applicability of the hypotheses derived from this case study to
other cases. In this sense, the case of Venezuela serves as an instance to assess propositions made
by previous studies and contributes to our understanding of what political structures best
contribute to gender policy reform.
The study is organized the following way. Chapter Two describes the institutions of the
period of institutionalized democracy (1970-1988) characterized by the existence of a stable twoparty system, elite consensus, and controlled access to the state by society actors exercised by the
political parties, all features of a rigid and centralized decision-making process within a
democratic regime. The political parties blocked women’s access to decision-making positions
because of the rigidity of their structure. In contrast, the creation of state bureaucracies, advisory
commissions, and appointed women to decision-making positions provided organized women in
civil society an opportunity to collaborate with women inside the state apparatus to influence
state reform. The chapter describes the process of reform of the Civil Code in 1982 as an
important achievement in gender policy reform which includes the equality of rights and duties
for men and women inside marriage. The successful reform is believed to be the result of a
concerted effort by organized women across party and class lines to impact state gender reform.
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Chapter Three describes the continuation of the process of decentralization that began in
1984 and was characterized by an opening of state institutions that provided actors of civil
society more access to the decision-making processes and more participation as evidenced by the
increase in social mobilization during this period. The chapter evaluates the collapse of the party
system beginning in 1993 that marked the end of elite consensus and controlled access to the
state by political parties, all features of a fluid and open system that gave way to the transition in
1998 to a hybrid form of democracy. The importance of the decentralization process and the
deinstitutionalization of the party system are analyzed in the light of their influence on the type
of activism by organized women as well as changes in the strategies used to impact state gender
policy reform. Special attention is given to the work of organized women’s groups outside the
state and within state bureaucracies and advisory commissions created to advance women’s
rights as well as on the movement of women from the arena of civil society to the bureaucratic
apparatus of the state and on its influence on gender legislation.
The laws considered in Chapter Three are the 1990 Organic Labor Law; the 1993 Law of
Equal Opportunity; the 1997 Law of Social Security; the 1997 Suffrage and Political
Participation Law; and the 1998 Law against Violence on Women and the Family. In each case, I
examine the nature of the laws and their impact on policies that benefit women. I emphasize the
women’s perception of the whole process by using evidence from personal interviews and
academic articles written by the Venezuelan feminists who have participated in the process of
gender policy reform.
Chapter Four examines the period of regime transition that started with the presidential
elections in 1998; this year marked the transition to a more “participative” kind of democracy
that theoretically provided more opportunities for women’s access to the state and influence in
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state policy change. The writing and passing of the 1999 Constitution represented a turning point
in the history of Venezuelan democracy and the possibility of new actors taking center stage.
Women’ groups, divided since the last part of the previous period, come together to push for the
inclusion of a feminist agenda in the 1999 Constitution. This chapter looks at changes in the
relationship between organized women’s groups and the state and the latter’s strategies to impact
state legislation. In addition, it provides evidence of the impact of the political polarization of the
transition on organized women’s groups and their ability to build networks of collaboration with
newly emerged groups to push for a feminist agenda. The institutionalization of feminist politics
by law is finally achieved with the creation of the women’s institute INAMUJER in 1999. In
addition, since 2004, this period presents examples of women’s groups unification and
collaboration across class and party lines in spite of social and political polarization to push for
the passage of the 1999 Organic Law of Social Security, the reinstitution of the preventive
measures of the 1998 Law against Violence on Women and the Family and the passage of the
2006 Organic Law of the Right of Women to a Life Free of Violence; the application of article
144 of the 1997 Suffrage and Political Participation Law of the proposals for the inclusion of
50/50 political participation in the party lists; and finally the proposals for reform of the Penal
Code made by the Venezuelan Broad Women’s Movement and the ESE group.
In spite of the positive impact that increased participation by women has had on the
gender policy reform, the regime seems to be closing progressively during consolidation as
power has become centralized in the executive, which not only controls access to the state, but
determines the legitimacy of social actors with the right to participate in the decision-making
process of the state.
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Venezuelan women, as a group or individually, have had great influence on the passing
of gender legislation since the 1990s; however, the entrenched interests of some groups with
decision-making power, such as the political parties and the Catholic Church have proved to be
stumbling blocks in the process of advancing women’s rights specifically, and gender equality in
general. Chapter Four offers an examination of the status of abortion in the 1999 Constitution
and the Penal Code in the light of what is perceived as the changing relationship between Church
and State during this period. Thus, I look at changes in the Catholic Church and the Venezuelan
state in the last period from 1999 to 2007. Changes in state policies in areas such as education,
state subsidies to private schools, the appointment of bishops, and gender issues serve as a
background to map changes in state’s and Church’s perception of each other and society. In turn,
these transformations are analyzed in terms of their impact on gender reform by looking at the
issue of abortion. Although in different degrees, centralization of power and the influence of the
Catholic Church clearly hinder the advance of women’s sexual and reproductive rights.
Similarly, the failure to implement Article 144 of the Suffrage Law of 1997, which
establishes a 30 percent quota for women’s political participation, in the 2000 and 2004 elections
demonstrates women’s failure to be recognized as important actors of civil society. Thus,
Venezuelan women have before them a long and difficult road in the process of increasing their
political participation and effectively impacting state gender reform. The chapter offers some
concluding remarks by discussing Venezuelan’s women’s efforts to maintain their activism by
the end of the year 2007 and their perception of the future of feminism and the feminist agenda
in Venezuela in the context of an apparent split among women’s groups that seek legal reform or
access to state resources.
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In Chapter Five, I look back at the question of when and how the state makes gender
policy reform and asses the relative strength of the different forms of institutional mechanisms
and women’s strategies and their impact on gender policy outcomes in an effort to confirm or
refute the propositions derived from the literature and to generate hypotheses from the
Venezuelan case to be tested by future comparative research. The configurations of state
institutions during regime institutionalization, regime deinstitutionalization, and regime
transition that seem to have more weight in explaining successful gender policy reform are the
state bureaucracies and advisory commissions and the political appointments --and elections--of
women to political decision-making positions.
In the same way, women’s group’s strategies such as building broad coalitions of women
(or networks) and targeting the state with proposals based on the international legal framework
on human rights and women’s rights help explain successful gender policy reform as the state
legitimizes its power by fulfilling its international commitments and translating them into
national legislation. However, until this day, traditional and religious values that permeate the
state institutions, such as the influence of the Catholic Church in the process of decision-making
inside the state, remain powerful impediments in the process of advancing women’s sexual and
reproductive rights. Notwithstanding, women’s organizing in Venezuela evidences the
commitment and ability of women’s groups to come together, in spite of polarization and
partisan differences, in order to push for what they consider a minimum feminist agenda
whenever there is an opportunity for reform or the possibility of creating it.
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Chapter 2
THE INSTITUTIONS OF INSTITUTIONALIZED DEMOCRACY (1970-1988)
The 1958 Punto Fijo Pact that marked the second transition to democracy in Venezuela
created one of the most stable democracies in the region after its first decade of challenges.
Characteristics of this pacted democracy were elite consensus and social participation controlled
by and channeled through the political parties (Crisp and Levine, 1995, Monaldi, et al., 2006). A
strong party system was accompanied by a strong currency and economic growth. The state was
centralized and paid for agreements made through the parties with oil revenues (Crisp and
Levine, 1995).
According to Ellner and Hellinger (2003), many scholars attributed the stability of the
democratic regime to the following institutional factors: a) the institutionalization of a two-party
system with similar ideology; b) political leaders committed to the democratic game and who
learned from the negative impact of the exclusionary practices during the Trienio5 that led to
their overthrow and the military coup that brought to power Pérez Jiménez’s dictatorship in 1948
until 1958; c) disciplined political parties strengthened by a system of proportional representation
for all elections; d) political parties with a multi-class composition and a growing middle-class,
sustained by oil-revenues, represented by the main parties Acción Democrática (Democratic
Action) and COPEI (Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente: Partido Social
Cristiano- Committee of Independent Electoral Organization: Social Christian Party). This
characteristic made parties very institutionalized with links to every group in society: labor,
peasants, neighborhood movements, intellectuals in academia, and so on; and e) party discipline
that allowed the two main parties AD and COPEI to have a highly centralized structure with an
open political system that allowed for government coalitions and shifting alliances with no
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permanent losers. In spite of the apparent openness of the system, some groups like the Left, in
which many women were active, were excluded while others were granted privileges in
exchange for political support (the Catholic Church, organized labor, and business).
In addition, although social mobilization was high, it was controlled by the political
parties, the only mediators between state and society. Due to the organizational strength of the
political parties, which infiltrated every social group, including women’s groups, it was difficult
to be politically active without expressing partisan affiliation or making the group’s interests
more salient than those of the party (Friedman, 2000). In addition, Church-State relationship
during this period was cooperative in terms of their mutual support which meant that discussion
of women’s issues that clashed with the Church’s interests were put aside or simply never
discussed.
During the process of consolidation of democracy the stability of the political system and
the legitimacy of the political class became the primary concerns of the elites; women’s issues
were thus put aside. Due to the fact that the institutionalization of a stable two-party system from
1970 until 1993 that came to be known as Partidocracia 6 guaranteed stability, but excluded
important groups of civil society, the latter organized to push for a deepening of democracy as
the system became inefficient (García-Guadilla, 2003).
The dependence on oil imposed a limit on the economic model Venezuela would develop
from the 1970s onward, but also slowed the development of institutional effectiveness. With
each new president Venezuela sought to use oil to reconstruct, strengthen, and reinvent
Venezuela’s institutions (Lombardi, 2003).
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The Policy-making Process of Institutionalized Democracy
In terms of the policy-making process, the impact of institutions on the number, type, and
quality of the laws can be determined by a close look at three institutional features: a) the role of
the executive power in initiation of laws; b) the role of the legislature in the policy-making
process; and c) the commitment of the political parties to consensus and cooperation. The nature
of these features in Venezuela during the period (1970-1988) was characterized by a centralized,
rigid, closed political system. According to Monaldi et al. (2006), the legislative initiative did not
come from the legislature in practice, but from the executive power. During the period from
1959 to 1987 the Congress approved an estimated 27 laws per year with an average of 85%
coming from the executive while only 13% were initiated by the legislature (Monaldi et al.,
2006). An important aspect of the decision-making process was that the legislature played only a
marginal role in the approval or passing of the laws, because the laws were discussed outside of
Congress among the cogollos7 of the political parties and they usually depended on the interests
of the groups involved or affected (Monaldi et al., 2006; Mascareño et al. 2006). This reinforced
the idea that the legislature was not the actual locus of decision-making but rather the locus of
decision legitimatization (Mascareño, 2004 en Monaldi et al., 2006) which in the end played a
crucial role in the policy-making process. Finally, the commitment of the political parties to
cooperation and consensus allowed for the passage of laws that benefited the distribution of oil
revenues among those who showed support for the system, but also laws that would contribute to
the process of developing the country. This centralized, “pacted” form of decision-making did
not benefit the passage of legislation that would address women’s issues as evidenced by the
little progress made during this period in terms of liberalizing laws on women’s rights.
Especially because the pact included the Catholic Church hierarchy in the decision-making

31
process it prevented the discussion of issues – such as decriminalization of abortion-- that
clashed with the entrenched interest of Catholic Church and conservative political elites.
An important alternative to the traditional policy-making process was the creation of
advisory commissions by the state (Crisp, 2000). These commissions served for groups within
the commission to introduce legislative reforms. According to Crisp (2000), the make up of these
commissions did not change significantly across time with changes in the party in power which
evidences the ideological similarity between AD and COPEI during the Punto Fijo period. On
the downside, although the creation of advisory commissions allowed women to participate in
the policy-making process, they were always underrepresented as a group because other groups
such as parties, labor (CTV-Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela, Confederation of
Venezuelan Workers), and business (Fedecámaras- Federación de Cámaras y Asociaciones de
Comercio y Producción de Venezuela, Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Production of
Venezuela) were a majority in the commissions. In fact, according to Crisp’s (2000:27) the
classification of the nature of the commissions into producer, regulatory, planning, service
provider, and promoter of the private sector, evidences that it was hard to find one where women
would be highly represented in order to advance women’s rights. One of the obstacles for women
to actively participate in politics stemmed from the nature of the semi-corporatist model of state
administration that focused on the class function of the group capable of access to the state;
women were just women (Kornblith and Levine, 1995) and unlike functional groups, identity
groups faced more obstacles for their incorporation into institutions that had not been designed to
meet their needs. Regardless of the little effect the commissions on gender policy reform,
women’s groups’ participation in these commissions during this period (1970-1988) had an
important influence on their organizational capability and perception of the policy-making
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process and outcome. Women used the creation of advisory commissions as a political
opportunity to access the state; they supported the state’s decisions in diverse areas and in turn
were awarded increased participation.

Women from Civil Society
According to Salamanca (2003; 2004), the term civil society was not very common until
the 1970s; the model of state-society relations characterized by Salamanca as “limited
associational pluralism” greatly influenced the type of civil society that emerged during the
Punto Fijo period in the 1970s. Civil society was characterized as anti-party, autonomous from
the state, voluntarily formed, nonprofit, and organized (p. 95).
Associational life during the 1970s was not only linked to the party, but controlled by it
(Crisp and Levine, 1995). The extreme centralization of the model that left the decision-making
process in the hands of a few (Martz, 1966, Coppedge, 1994; Kornblith and Levine, 1995)
became the source of discontent of new civil society groups that came to challenge the political
parties in the 1980s (Crisp and Levine, 1995; Salamanca, 2004) in order to obtain access to the
state with the aim of proposing changes in the rules of the game. Common to the new groups of
civil society was their strategy of unification around issues such as participatory democracy,
decentralization, and the use of the media to carry out these objectives (García- Guadilla, 2003).
In contrast to other civil society organizations, women’s groups, which had had a history
of organization during the Pérez Jimenez dictatorship, used their ability to organize and form
different kinds of women’s organizations: neighborhood associations, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), academic and research groups in universities, popular organizations, and
governmental organizations that sought to address women’s issues or push for legal reform on
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gender issues. The Círculos Femeninos Populares (Popular Women’s Circles) and the women
lawyers’ organization AVESA illustrate the kind of autonomous organizations founded in the
late 1970s and 1980s to provide education to poor women as well as legal service and counseling
to women on sexual and reproductive rights and violence against women.
Organized women comprised a variety of groups that do not conform to Salamanca’s
(2004) description of most civil society groups because of their ability to work with the state. At
the beginning of the transition to democracy, women’s incorporation into the political parties
through the women’s bureaus gave them recognition as legal subjects, but not access to the
decision-making process (Salamanca, 2004). As a result of the high degree of centralization and
institutionalization of the political parties, women’s groups’ incorporation through bureaus
reinforced the ability of political parties to penetrate society. The bureaus were always weak and
unfunded, however, and reflected the traditional tasks of the private sphere such as hosting
meetings, making coffee, and running raffles (Friedman, 1998; 2000). Moreover, it was hard for
women to achieve leadership positions within the party since that required unrestricted support
for the party, which created conflicts with the obligations of women’s private lives (Friedman,
1998:119). Furthermore, party rivalry among women had prevented women from the parties of
the pact, AD and COPEI, to work together with the parties of the Left, excluded by the pact
(Friedman, 1998, 2000). Some of the organized women from the 1970s went into different
organizations as the groups slowly dissolved as a result of the marginalization of political parties
and partisan rivalries among them.
Many of the women who had been active in organizing since the dictatorship continued
making efforts at uniting women outside of the parties in view of the negative effect that
partisan rivalries had on advancing a common agenda; “ women never stopped meeting

34
altogether” (Friedman, 2000: 135). Because women had not been successful reorganizing outside
the political parties, they decided to do it by creating links with the Communist party (PCV) in
1971 and later with the other two main political parties AD and COPEI after the political party
PCV (Venezuelan Communist Party) left the armed struggle and became legal. Women from the
PCV together with other women from AD with whom they had maintained contact gathered to
evaluate the condition of Venezuelan women in 1967 and celebrated the First Seminar on the
Evaluation of Women in 1968, where the idea of creating a broad women’s movement emerged.
They started meeting to read about feminism and study the important feminists of the time in the
United States and France. The Movement for the Liberation of Women (El Movimiento para la
Liberación de la Mujer –MLM) emerged from those meetings and acted rather secretly since
“feminist” positions were opposed by the leaders of the PCV as well as by the other political
parties8. Other feminist groups of this period like the Women’s League (la Liga de Mujeres)
challenged the use of “women as an object” by sabotaging the Miss Venezuela beauty pageant in
1972 (Espina, 2003)9.
Women sought direct access to the state in order to avoid party co-optation by taking
advantage of the women’s agencies created by the state; the institutionalization of feminist
politics had a great influence in advancing women’s rights. Nonetheless, as Friedman (2000)
concludes, institutionalization was not the entire solution to the problem of gender
discrimination; women’s collective action around issues of interests to most women proved
necessary and crucial for gender policy reform.
Women’s groups were among those groups that became very active during the 1980s and
united forces to impact state policy, as evidenced below with the movement for the reform of the
Civil Code, and even participated in public demonstrations alongside other groups from civil
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society (PROVEA, 1989) protesting against the negative impact of structural adjustment policies
and the increase of poverty (García-Guadilla, 2003).
Within the literature on democratic consolidation, there are two competing views in terms
of the representativeness of the Venezuelan party system and the subsequent crisis of democracy
in the 1980s. Some scholars argue that there was a complete absence of representation that
triggered the demands of marginalized groups (Hellinger, 1991; Hillman, 1994; Karl, 1987);
others assert that the crisis of the 1980s was the result of changes undergone by civil society that
were unmatched by the state institutions (Crisp and Levine, 1998:31), that is, that the demands of
the society were not responded to by the state. These authors specifically refer to changes in the
relationship between a fluid civil society and rigid state institutions that resulted in the
emergence of a civil society that was pushing for the deepening of democracy. In other words,
although state institutions became with time exclusionary and non-representative of the people,
the former were overwhelmed by the flexibility of the networks of groups of civil society that
little by little gained visibility because of their call for decentralization and participatory
democracy and their shared vision of the Venezuela they sought (García-Guadilla, 2003).
Women’s groups, for instance, managed to form networks of women working in nongovernmental organizations, popular organizations, and the state in order to mobilize women and
influence gender policy reform through the channels created by the institutionalization of
feminist politics. As documented by Friedman (2000), Venezuelan women have fought for their
right to representation in all decision- making arenas by joining forces from inside and outside
the state institutions. Women began to meet in 1968 with the purpose of increasing women’s
representation in the state until finally in 1973 they formed a campaign to urge presidential
candidates to state their positions on the creation of a women’s agency. The Women’s Advisory
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Commission to the Presidency (Comisión Femenina Asesora de la Presidencia, COFEAPRE)
was finally created under the Pérez administration in 1974 and became, according to Friedman
(2000), one of the central institutions of the political opportunity structure that contributed to the
transformation of the way gender relations where reflected in the state (p. 136). The creation and
impact of the COFEAPRE is discussed below in light of its influence on women’s mobilization,
organization, and success in impacting state gender reform.

The Institutionalization of Feminist Politics and International Factors Influencing Women’s
Organizing
The era of the 1970s shows an increased political participation by individual women,
former members of the women’s groups, through pressure campaigns that were especially
supported by two factors: international events such as the United Nation’s Decade on Women
(1975- 1985) that focused on women’s equality, human rights, and development as well as the
institutionalization of feminist politics through the creation of state bureaucracies for women.
The former is regarded by women as one of the most influential factors supporting legal reform
in gender issues in Venezuela and in other countries;10 the latter constitutes an institutional factor
that provided activist women access to the process of policy-making and positively influenced
the process of gender reform in Venezuela during subsequent periods. During this time period
(1970- 1988) we find the creation of COFEAPRE (Comisión Femenina Asesora de la
Presidencia- the Women’s Advisory Commission to the Presidency ) in 1974; the organization of
the first Women’s Congress in 1974 (from which the initiative to reform the Civil Code
emerged); and the creation of the Ministry for Women and Participation and Development in
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1979 as the first examples of institutionalization of feminist politics that had at least minimal
impact on gender policy reform.
The women’s effort at pushing a common agenda produced successful results during the
period from 1970 to 1988 such as the creation of the women’s commission COFEAPRE by
Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1974 after a women’s campaign to urge candidates during the 1973
presidential election. 11 The COFEAPRE successfully accomplished the organization and
celebration of the first Venezuelan Congress of Women in 1975 to celebrate International
Women’s Day; the evaluation of the situation of women in Venezuela in turn led to the creation
of the first women’s agenda in the country (García Ramirez, 2005). The congress drew over a
thousand participants and attempted to address four main issues: a)women’s legal position which
contained proposals for reform of the civil and penal codes, a labor law, and the issue of
abortion; b)women’s social situation, which included proposals on day care policies, family
planning, abortion legislation, and state assistance to single mothers and their children; c)women
and development, and d)women at the international level which emphasized international
cooperation among women (Friedman, 2000:148).
Abortion was a controversial issue debated among congress participants. The proposals
included legal reform of the Penal Code in the form of sentence reduction for women accused of
abortion and the creation of an executive-sponsored commission to regulate abortion, but there
was opposition from the contingent of women from the political party COPEI (the Christian
Democratic party) who walked out of the assembly when the issue was brought up (Friedman,
2000:149). During the period of institutionalized democracy, Church-State relationship was good
as the Catholic Church formed part of the Punto Fijo pact and Catholic education prospered
during democracy (Myers, 2004). As expected, the issue of abortion did not emerge until the late

38
1990s demonstrating the Church-State cooperation negatively influenced gender policy reform in
controversial issues such as abortion.
During the Pérez administration in 1975, women from the political party Acción
Democrática (AD) convinced the president to name women from COFEAPRE to prepare a
document and a delegation to attend the United Nations Conference on Women meeting in
Mexico in 1975.The conference successfully achieved the preparation of the Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination at the international level and the declaration of the United Nations
of discrimination as a human right violation in 1979.
In the 1980s, international NGO forums mobilized many women’s groups and facilitated
discussions of women’s inequality in terms of health, education, and jobs, thus putting gender
inequality on the UN’s agenda and proposing the agreed conventions and treaties to be used to
interpret gender inequality and its link to development (García, 1999). Thus, the international
events promoted women’s mobilization and participation globally and created the basis for a
legal international framework to evaluate advances (or setbacks) in women’s rights that was used
by feminist activists in Venezuela as a basis for the struggle of gender policy reform.
For instance, the international conferences supported women’s demands for the creation
of women’s agencies and Executive commitment translated this time in the creation of the
Ministry of the State for the Participation of Women in Development in 1979 by President
Herrera Campins and the political party COPEI (Comité Organizador de Política Electoral
Independiente). The Ministry replaced the COFEAPRE and showed the President’s commitment
to achieve gender equality through women’s incorporation into politics and legal equality
(Friedman, 2000). The Minister, Mercedes Pulido, with the support of the Executive and COPEI
gathered women from all walks of life to form a united front to push for legal reform as
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discussed below. The focus of the women’s movement that united in the early 1980s was legal
reform and the elaboration of public policies; the 1961 Constitution established in Article 128
that all treaties ratified by the state needed to be approved through a law in order to have value in
national legislation.
Women’s continued efforts at coalition building and networking in order to push for
reform achieved three important reforms from 1980 to 1988. These include the reform of the
Civil Code in 1982, the promulgation of the approbatory law of the Convention on the
Elimination of all kinds of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1982, and the creation
of the Ministry of the Family in 1987.

Achievement of Legal Reform: The Movement for the Reform of the Civil Code
The 1982 reform of the Civil Code stands out for the significance of its achievement in
terms of legislation promoting women’s rights in the family. According to Friedman (1998), the
successful reform of the Civil Code was the result of a campaign by women inside and outside
the state. Women used the strategy of working inside the state agencies instead of across parties
to keep united (Friedman, 1998).
According to Espina and Rakowski (2002), the campaign for the reform of the Civil Code
from 1979 to 1982 was considered a true women’s movement. Women’s groups reunited to
impact state policy in spite of the institutionalized gender biases that had negatively impacted
their activism. This achievement was made possible after forty years of struggle mainly from
individuals such as Argelia Laya, then a city council member from the political party MAS,12
women lawyers from the civil organization FEVA13 (Yolanda Poleo de Báez, Ana Lucina García
Maldonado, Lisbeth Guevara, among others) who had been activists since the 1970s (Espina and
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Rakowski, 2002), the Minister Mercedes Pulido, and other women’s professional groups,
journalists, and politicians (Friedman, 2000:186). Argelia Laya from the MAS had started by
introducing in Congress a petition for reform signed by all council members of the capital
district. 14 FEVA had started a campaign in order to collect the 20,000 signatures needed to push
for the reform of the Code. Esperanza Vera described how the women form FEVA used the II
Forum of Artisan Women organized by the Chamber of Industry Corpoindustria in 1976 to
collect the first signatures to push the reform (Espina, 2006) and later after the initiative went to
Congress, FEVA had gathered over 35,000 signatures (Friedman, 2000:178). Participation of
new groups of women increased leading to public marches and demonstrations that brought
Minister Pulido and the president of Congress to submit petitions for reform. Friedman (2000)
claims that although most support came from the middle and upper classes, poor women were
also incorporated because of their need to achieve the legal equality of their children born out of
wedlock, and their partner’s share of responsibility for their children. The founder of the Círculos
Femeninos Populares (a grassroots organization) was responsible for acting as a link between
poor women in the barrios and the reform movement (Friedman, 2000:186).
The reform of the Venezuelan Civil Code (considered to be the most discriminatory body
of familial legislation in Latin America, (see Friedman, 1993; 2000) is considered among the
major achievements in women's equality in Venezuela because the scope and coverage of the
Civil Code is very broad since it governs contracts, property, obligations, capacity of persons,
marriage, divorce, paternity, guardianship, secured transactions, and succession.
The Civil Code had been previously reformed in 1942 giving women authority over their
children and establishing the shared ownership of property between the couple. The 1982 reform
gave men and women equal rights and duties within the family as well as equality in decision-
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making, and eliminated discrimination of children born out of wedlock by establishing the legal
status of all children. Before the reform, a married woman could not take decisions about her
children, own anything, sell or buy without her husband’s approval and signature. In addition,
children born were not considered legal children recognized by their father and having their last
name. The reform also established the duty of the father to provide stipend for children born in or
out of wedlock. In addition, the process of marriage and divorced were simplified.15
The reform had two sources of opposition, the conservative legal professional members
of the Academy of Political and Social Science (ACPS) and the conservative members of the
COPEI party. Their opposition was based on claims that the reform of the Civil Code would
significantly modify the basic structure of the Venezuelan family, constitute a threat to family
authority, and eliminate the meaning of the family by assaulting the stability of marriage
(Friedman, 2000: 182-183).

Women’s Strategies: Coalition Building and Framing Capacity
Espina and Rakowski (2002: 2) have identified three main women’s groups which
formed alliances in the late 1970s and early 1980s in order to influence legal reform: the
‘political’ group (formed of women in politics from different political parties and organizations),
the “femocrats” (feminists working in the public sector),16 and the women from civil society
(academics, from NGOs-intermediaries,17 professional women -- lawyers, journalists doctors,
artists and craftmakers, union members, autonomous feminists, 18 and from the Popular Women
Circles.19 ”
The strategy used by women in civil society included working outside the state in
writing proposals to be presented in national and international arenas, working inside the state
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with women appointed to political positions and committed to women’s rights as those in the
COFEAPRE and later the Ministry (the political and the femocrats). As expressed by Isabel
Carmona, a long-time activist since the times of Pérez Jiménez, the establishment of a women’s
commission inside the state was not enough if it lacked the “vigilant action of popular
mobilization and the pressure of mass organization” capable of bringing women together around
specific goals (in Friedman, 2000:151). Accordingly, women used the opportunities provided by
the state such as the creation of state bureaucracies and women’s advisory commissions as well
as the support of appointed women to decision-making positions inside the state to push for
reforms in which their expertise acquired in international forums gave them legitimacy as
women and actors of civil society.
The coalition formed to push for the reform of the Civil Code is illustrative of the
alliances among all women’s groups identified above by Espina and Rakowski (2002): the
political women, the femocrats, and the women from civil society organizations. The strategy of
what Friedman (2000) calls institutional and personal appeal, marches, demonstrations, and
pickets together with the creation of a broad-based coalition of women illustrates women’s
organizing during the period of institutionalized democracy and the lessons learned in terms of
previous failed attempts at organizing solely inside or outside the party system. It also
demonstrates that because of the marginalization of women by political parties and as a response
to the alternative forms of access to the state created by state bureaucracies and advisory
commissions, women were able to target the state, the incumbents, and the allies of the
movement inside the state apparatus.
In addition, the strategies used by the women’s groups are similar to those reported in
other Latin American countries. For instance, their incorporation of women to political parties as
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the best means to gain at least limited participation (Waylen, 1994); their push for the creation of
state bureaucracies for women’s issues ; their participation in both political parties and women’s
organizations; or their complete autonomy from the state, but support for women’s rights in spite
of partisan differences (Friedman, 1998). Therefore, as noted in Friedman (2000), women
recognized the approval of the reform of the Civil Code as a product of the struggle of women in
general and not as the “gift of some parliamentarian, political parties, deputies, and senators” (p.
188)
The women’s movement for the reform of the Civil Code is also instructive of the
importance played by the framing capacity of women’s groups. Friedman (2000) provides
evidence that the discourse used by the women leaders pushing for the reform was framed
around the idea of democracy in the family. Women avoided the use of feminism in order to
include all women, as well as the use of a reform for women only since they recognized that a
women’s rights approach would fail to gain the necessary support of men, given that the reform
was already radical enough for the historical moment and the weakness of the women’s
movement (comments of Argelia Laya in Friedman, 2000). In addition to the discourse used by
women, the movement for the reform of the Civil Code also counted with the strategy of direct
pressure on the deputies of Congress by women picketers placed outside of Congress and women
deputies inside of Congress.
Another strategy used by women’s groups was the reference to the international
framework for gender equality included in the demands made to the state to pass national
legislation that protect and advance women’s rights which legitimized women and as actors of
organized civil society. Apart from the reform of the Civil Code, the promulgation of the
approbatory law of the Convention on the Elimination of all Kinds of Discrimination against
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Women (CEDAW) in 1982 confirms the fact that these groups of organized women had access
to information other women’s groups (popular women’s movements) did not and were very
much influenced and supported by international events such as the UN conferences on women
that took place in the 1980s, as well as the NGOs forums and the evaluation of the women’s
decade. As stated above, feminists groups had attended international conferences and meetings
beginning in 1975 with the World Conference on Women in Mexico and were aware of changes
in international norms such as the approval of the CEDAW that changed the definition of
discrimination in 1979 (García Prince, 2005; Facio, 1992) In addition, this group of feminist
women counted with the support of the women in the state allies of the movement; the Minister
for the Participation of Women in Development was instrumental in pushing for the approval of
the CEDAW Convention (García, 2006).Thus, the focus of the women’s movement on legal
reform and the support from the state to liberalizing gender issues can be understood as the result
of two factors: the existence of an international legal framework to which the state had
committed and the requirements of the 1961 constitution (Article 50) as stated above that
specified that all international treaties had the value of a law when ratified by the Venezuelan
state before the approval into law by the legislative power.20
The existence of international human rights and women’s rights norms facilitated the job
of organized women’s groups in pushing the Venezuelan state to include them in the Venezuelan
legislation by emphasizing the international commitments of the state. Among the regional and
international treaties signed and/or ratified by the Venezuelan state during this period are the
following: a)The American Convention of Human Rights in 1969 sponsored by the Organization
of the American States which established the equality of women and men before the law and in
the marriage; b) the International Pact on Civil and Political rights making a commitment to
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guarantee equal rights for the partners within marriage; c) In 1980, Venezuela signed the United
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW of 1979), though it ratified it only in 1982 when it became a law in Venezuela.
The international as well as the regional treaties and their mechanisms for the protection
of women’s rights provided Venezuelan women confidence and support for their demands, but
also informed leaders of relevant changes taking place internationally on women’s issues and
their need to implement them as a way to legitimize the state; the existence of an international
framework for human rights and women’s rights has been documented in other countries as
influential in translating women’ demands into national legislation.21 In addition, international
meetings provided women important arenas to create women’s networks and obtain international
funding as a tool for pressure on the state to legislate on gender issues
A study by Espina and Rakowski (2002) asserts that women’s successful campaign to
reform the Civil Code in 1982 gave them the confidence to act by creating coalitions of women’s
groups from within and outside the state that continued fighting for women’s rights. They
cooperated on an issue by taking advantage of political opportunities they got or created
themselves as a response to a threat. They worked on the basis of consensus and voluntary
participation; avoiding conflict and respecting participants’ decisions not to take part in an
activity.

Women’s Network Building
In 1984, incoming president Jaime Lusinchi from AD closed down the Ministry for the
Participation of Women in Development in a move to shrink the state, but a pivotal member of
the new government, Virginia Olivo de Celli, managed to push for the creation of National
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Woman’s Office (Oficina Nacional de la Mujer) under the Minister of Youth (Friedman, 2000).
The rationale used by Olivo de Celli to justify the creation of this women’s agency was the
recommendation of the Inter-American Commission on Women to have a women’s agency in
the executive branch in order to coordinate the preparation of a governmental report for the 1985
Nairobi meeting of women (Friedman, 2000:198).The National Woman’s Office began the
formation of advisory commissions for policy reform on women’s issues organized by a
Directorate; these commissions greatly consolidated NGO-state cooperation. Interestingly, they
were formed by mixed groups of women: women from civil society, autonomous feminists,
women who worked in government (the political and the femocrats). The women’s groups
included mainly those who had been very active in the movement for the reform of the Civil
Code, namely AVESA, FEVA, and the Círculos Populares Femeninos (Friedman, 2000). Among
the issues that women collaborated on after the reform of the Civil Code were education about
the situation of poor single mothers, increasing women participation in politics, and reform of the
Labor Law (Friedman, 2000).
In 1985, the same group that had participated in the delegation to attend the UN
conference in Mexico in 1975 met in order to write the document they would present in the
Nairobi meeting in 1985; this group became an umbrella organization due to their success in
organizing other women’s NGOs. The CONG (the NGOs Coordinator) was established in March
1985 as a network that unified 25 NGOs. The creation of the CONG was considered a successful
achievement by women in the period from 1985 to 1990 which influenced important gender
reform. The members of the CONG worked on the evaluation of the decade of women and on the
process of reform of important laws passed after 1989, which included the reform of the 1990
Organic Labor Law, the 1993 Law of Equal Opportunity for Women, and the draft project of the
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1998 Law on Violence against Women. They worked with the government through the advisory
commissions created by the Women’s Office. The CONG gathered feminists, professional
women, popular women, and women from left-wing parties; its main feature was that it
maintained its autonomy from the political parties and from one another allowing room for
diversity (Friedman, 2000). Many women from the CONG participated in the directorate of the
women’s advisory commissions which, in spite of working with the state, maintained its
autonomy due to the decentralized nature of the commissions and the variety of women
participating in it (Friedman, 2000).
In 1986, Olive de Celli was promoted into the Vice-Minister of Youth and thus her office
was given a broader mandate; it sponsored women’s offices in some states in the country. Then
in 1987, she was appointed Minister of the Family, a newly created ministry and so Olivo de
Celli transformed the Women’s Office into the Directorate for Women’s Advancement. Women
in the commissions reached 170 members at that time and they worked in groups in order to
provide advice to the Ministry of Family and other associated offices on women’s issues
(Friedman, 2000; García Ramirez, 2005).
The work of the CONG has been amply studied by Friedman (2000) and Espina (1994).
In spite of the fact that the CONG stopped functioning in 1990 as conceived initially, according
to some scholars, some women from the CONG (referred to as the core group) continued to be
active in the struggle against any kind of discrimination of women (Espina and Rakowski, 2002).
Women in the core group asserted that they moved the locus of attention to the state and the
legislature and less to the organizing of women’s groups at the grassroots level. According to
Espina (2003), founder of the CONG, feminist women in the late 1980s continued debating the
issues of the feminists from the 1970s in terms of the kind of group the feminists should form.
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Some women had to choose whether to remain as a group for the organizations of the masses or
to become an opinion group that would study feminism, theorize about feminism, produce films,
novels, books and so on. Regarded as mutually exclusive, in the opinion of feminist activist since
1975, Gioconda Espina decided to remain a feminist from an opinion group (Espina, 2003).
Thus, during the period of institutionalized democracy, and especially due to the party
marginalization and cooptation of women, middle-class women decided to organize in feminists
groups and urban poor women in grassroots organizations; interaction among the groups became
increasingly difficult due to class cleavages.

Issue Difference: Different Opportunities for Reform

During this time period (1970- 1988) other attempts were initiated towards reform in the
areas of labor rights and reproductive rights. A movement for the reform of the Labor Law was
created in a very similar way to the one for the reform of the Civil Code. Various attempts at
reform had been made during the First Venezuelan Congress of Women, a meeting organized by
the Ministry for the Participation of Women in Development in 1974. In the case of the process
of reform of the labor law, women framed the need to reform policies of the workplace because
of the importance of the social function of maternity as well as the need to achieve women’s
equal rights.
According to Friedman (2000) the proposals for reform of the labor law counted with the
support from ex-President Rafael Caldera from COPEI. In addition, a female deputy from the
political party AD was in charge of organizing a workshop attended by women working with the
Directorate of the Women’s Office, the CONG members, the women and children’s section and
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legal consultants of the Labor Ministry, and the business sector represented by Fedecámaras. The
Labor Law was finally passed in 1990 and thus will be discussed in the next chapter in more
detail.
In contrast with the success of the above mentioned, the process of reform of the Penal
Code failed to garner support. The Minister for the Participation of Women in Development had
gathered support from women from political and civil society to prepare a proposal for the
reform of the Penal Code in 1984 (Friedman, 2000) The reform of the Penal Code included the
liberalization of abortion policies such as permitting abortion if pregnancy was the result of rape,
incest, or in cases where the fetus presented malformations. However, the issue of abortion was
put aside because of the opposition by some legislators when the proposals were brought to
Congress (Friedman, 2000:220). In contrast with the broad support behind proposals that were
perceived as encouraging maternity, as in the movement for the reform of the Labor Law, fierce
opposition to liberalizing women’s reproductive rights illustrates resistance to anything that
would radically transform traditional gender relations.

The Process of Decentralization: The COPRE
Notwithstanding the importance of the institutionalization of feminist politics through the
creation of women’s state agencies such as COFEAPRE and the Ministries of women, it is
important to describe the influence that another commission had on the opening of the channels
of decision-making through the decentralization of the political system towards the end of the
period under study; one that involved the radical transformation of the profile of the state and its
public administration (Mascareño, 2004:157). The creation of the Presidential Commission on
State Reform (COPRE, Comisión Presidencial para la Reforma del Estado) in 1984 represented
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an opening for civil society groups to gain access to the state (Gómez Calcaño and López Maya,
1990: 183) and transformed the political system in the following period. Its creation also
indicated the increasing consensus among the political elite that a state reform could not be
postponed any longer in the face of the evident inefficacy and increasing delegitimation of the
public apparatus (Mascareño, 2004:127). Although the COPRE planned to work on different
areas such as political reforms, increased efficiency of the public administration, social policy,
economic policy, justice reform, education, and decentralization, it was the latter around which
the commission sought for consensus from the political parties (Mascareño, 2004).
Thus, the idea of the decentralization of the state became an important issue discussed
among the political and economic elite. The position of the political parties towards
decentralization varied: only MAS (Movement towards Socialism) and MEP (Electoral
Movement of the People) expressed support for decentralization, while COPEI and AD basically
opposed it (Mascareño, 2004). Nonetheless, the commission consulted “more than eight hundred
people and two hundred organizations during 1985, including the provinces” (Blanco, 1986 in
Mascareño, 2004:139).
According to Mascareño (2004), the COPRE was meant to be a commission that would
advance the proposals agreed by the political parties in power, which did not include
democratization of the parties and decentralization, so this caused conflict among the
commission and the political parties. Consequently, COPRE’s President Ramón J. Velázquez
resigned in 1985 due to the parties’ reluctance to real reform. The members of the commission
were aware of the fact that decentralization would allow the masses to have access to increased
political participation and this in turn would increase the legitimacy of the political system. In the
future, the COPRE tried to distance itself from the Executive power and started a process of
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negotiation with the political actors in order to produce proposals that would have some
legitimacy.
The new president of the COPRE, Arnoldo José Gabaldón, worked with members of the
commission from AD, COPEI, independents, and representatives from the regional organizations
in order to advance proposals that were finally approved in 1987 (Mascareño, 2004:127). It was
not without conflict among the main political actors that the issue of the direct election of
governors and the creation of the post of mayor took place. The process of decentralization was
criticized by the main political parties AD and COPEI as too advanced for the Venezuelan
context, and some negotiations were delayed by the incumbent party AD and President Lusinchi.
However, the negotiations coincided with the election year in 1988 and because of the political
and social mobilization spurred by the proposals for decentralization, the government finally
allowed the COPRE the resources needed to increase support for decentralization. AD and
COPEI22 candidates started to show themselves in favor of decentralization and they got a lot of
support from their party members in the provinces.
In addition, economic groups, such as Grupo Roraima that included professional and
business people involved in development projects, expressed support for decentralization
influencing the support from other groups including intellectuals (Mascareño, 2004:151-152).
Finally, the law for the election of governors was approved in Congress in 1988 and in the same
year the reform of the Organic law of Municipal Regime created the post of mayor.
The process of reform initiated in 1984 and presented here through the description of the
COPRE and its policy outcome illustrates two important aspects of the policy decision-making
process characteristic of the period of institutionalized democracy (Mascareño, 2004; Monaldi et
al., 2006). On the one hand, the policy-decision-making process was not done inside the
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parliament, but rather through commissions outside Congress where the actual decisions were
reached and later presented to the members of Congress. In fact, the COPRE commission was
formed in part by deputies and senators of Congress, which evidences the open relationship
between the Executive power and the Legislature --among instances that are apparently
autonomous--as well as the state penetration by the political parties (Mascareño, 2004:153). On
the other hand, in order to advance their group’s interests, the sector or group seeking legislation
change needed to participate in any of the commissions created in order to be able to influence
policy reform. Thus, it seems to explain why groups from civil society regarded the process of
decentralization in particular, and the process of reform of the state in general as the road to
increased political participation and representation and the answer to the deepening of
democracy (Mascareño 2004:156).
Organized women’s groups were among the civil society groups characterized by many
years of organization that directed efforts at the state for decentralization and re-democratization.
The process of decentralization that began in 1984 and crystallized at the end of this period in
1989 positively impacted the process of decision-making carried out inside the Congress. At the
beginning of this period (1970) Congress was controlled by the political parties; at the end of the
period (1988) Congress was no longer controlled by the political parties and more civil society
groups, mainly women’s groups, were able to further their access to the state.
In other words, the process of decentralization weakened the control of political parties
on civil society groups which were then able to mobilize and seek impact on the state. The
environment of reform promoted by the COPRE and the gradual opening of state institutions to
actors other than the local political parties and interests groups facilitated the incipient influence
of women’s groups on the incumbent’s decisions to create state bureaucracies for women.
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Analysis
During the first transition to democracy in 1945, women’s issues received little attention.
In fact, except for the decree of universal suffrage for all citizens over 18, regardless of gender or
literacy, their action was marginalized as the political parties took control of the political arena
(Friedman, 1998, 2000). However, women were able to organize across party lines to work with
young women and women in the schools, slums, and neighborhoods. Their goals included
collective issues such as resistance and rejection of the dictatorship. During the second transition
to democracy in 1958, women’s groups were excluded as a group based on gender identity
(Crisp, Levine, and Rey, 1995) and their links fragmented because most activist women
belonged to communist groups which had been excluded from the pact (Friedman, 1998). Such
fragmentation impeded the types of organizing that Venezuelan women had developed during
the dictatorship. This explains the apparent lack of activism by organized women in the 1970s.
The political structures of the period of institutionalized democracy presented both obstacles and
opportunities for women to access the state in order to influence policy-decision-making, as
outlined in Table 1. Therefore, this period presents the different institutional mechanisms that
combined with women’s groups’ strategies resulted in achievements (and failures) in gender
policy reform. The main legal achievement was the reform of the Civil Code in 1982 while the
proposals for the reform of the Penal Code in regards to the decriminalization of abortion failed
to be discussed in 1974 and failed to pass in 1984.
Table 1 shows how the political context of institutionalized democracy was characterized
by a centralized decision-making process mainly controlled by the institutionalized political

54
parties. Women were provided access to the state through the creation of party bureaus, state
bureaucracies, women’s advisory commissions, and appointed women.

Table 1. Major Institutional Changes, Women’s Activism and Strategies, and Legal Gender
Reform during Institutionalized Democracy
Political Structures
of Institutionalized
Democracy (19701988)
Institutionalization
of political parties

Centralization of
policy-making
process

Institutions
providing access to
the state policymaking process

Political parties:
Party bureaus
Institutionalization
of Feminists
Politics:

1974 COFEAPRE
Church-State
cooperation

1979 -1984
Ministry for
Women
Participation in
Development
1984 The National
Women’s Office
(ONM)
1987 Ministry of
family

Women’s Activism

Women’s
organizations:
neighborhood
associations,
NGOs,
grassroots
organizations
Reform from
within the state
by political
women
1985 creation of
the CONG,
broad network of
all women,
independent
from parties

Women’s
Strategies

Gender Policy
Outcomes

Women’s groups
unified efforts
across class and
party lines

Proposal for the
Penal Code
defeated a the
First
Venezuelan
Congress in
1975

Women target
state: incumbents,
state bodies and
allies in office
Women form
alliances of
political women,
the femocrats and
the women from
civil society

1982 Civil Code
reform approved
Proposals for
the Penal Code
defeated in the
legislature in
1984

Women’s groups
use international
events and norms
to legitimize
reform
Women create
networks of
women from
NGOs, popular
organizations and
the state

Although the party bureaus did not allow women to achieve leadership positions while
the other forms of women’s representation inside the state apparatus became an important
institutional mechanism for political women to achieve leadership positions and to become allies
of the women’s movement in civil society. During this period, the alliances created across party
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and class lines among women included grassroots organization, women’s NGOs, feminists, and
political women as exemplified by the CONG. Women’s strategies included targeting the state
and the incumbents to advance women’s rights, the use of an international framework for
women’s rights being created at the international level, and the ability of organized women to
form women’s networks to push for gender policy reform from outside and inside the state.

The Institutionalization of Political Parties
The institutionalization of the political parties during the period of apparent
institutionalized democracy marginalized women as a group and subordinated women’s issues,
inside the party bureaus, to the party’s interests. The significance of partisan rivalries eroded the
links forged among women during the dictatorship and hindered the kind of organizations that
characterized women’s organizing before the transition to democracy. In spite of the
participation of women through party bureaus created by the political parties, the women’s
movement slowly dissolved and it was only because of the commitment of some women activists
that the unification around a common agenda emerged in the mid-1970s.
Among the main institutional changes that influenced gender policy reform during the
first period under study (1970-1988) was the institutionalization of feminist politics: the creation
of state bureaucracies and women’s advisory commissions that were able to channel the interests
of organized women outside the state and increase the discussion of gender issues inside the
legislature through the participation and support of appointed women in government.
Additionally, party leaders seemed eager to institutionalize women’s interests in exchange for
women’s political support and as a means to legitimize the state. Evidence of this is the regular
assistance of incumbents in creating women’s offices, commissions, and the appointment of
women to state ministries considered to be of interest to women by the different presidents
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throughout this period. In spite of the perceived limited legal reform of this first period, the
institutionalization of feminist politics had a huge impact on the organizational capability of
women’s groups and their perception of the policy-making process and the ways to impact it.

The Decentralization of the Policy-making Process
Due to the high degree of centralization in the process of decision-making and the
institutionalization of party politics during the period of institutionalized democracy, the system
remained stable, but its legitimacy was affected. Therefore, civil society groups regarded the
process of state reform started in 1984 as the road to increased political participation and
representation and the answer to the deepening of democracy in the light of the proposals made
by COPRE to promote citizen participation. The state reform aimed at decentralization mainly
affected the decision-making process which became more inclusive as it weakened the
entrenched power of the political parties and promoted an environment of active participation.
Women’s groups, in particular, welcomed this growing access as they began to organize and
form different kinds of organizations to address women’s issues and fill in the gap left by the
state and push for legal reform.

Church-State Relationship
The Catholic Church was among the interests groups privileged by 1958 Punto Fijo
democracy. Therefore, cooperation between Church and State characterized the period of
institutionalized democracy. In spite of the fact that liberalization of gender issues took place, as
evidenced by the reform of the Civil Code establishing the equality of men and women as legal
subjects, conservative sectors of society influenced by the Catholic Church, members within the
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Academy of Political and Social Sciences (ACPS) and the COPEI party present in the
discussions of the reform, opposed changes that would change the meaning of the family.
Moreover, in order to garner broad-based support, the coalition of women behind the support had
to frame the reform in terms of increasing “democracy in the family.” In like manner, the
discussion on the proposed changes in the Labor law were framed in terms of the “importance of
the social function of maternity” to be able to draw support form a majority of women. In
contrast, discussions on the issue of abortion, silenced since 1974, were again put aside because
of opposition from conservative legislatures influenced by the Catholic Church. In sum, Churchstate cooperation clearly decreased the ability of women’s groups to impact gender policy reform
on issues that conflicted with the Church’s values.

Women’s Groups’ Strategies
The success achieved by women’s groups in some gender policy reform can be attributed
to an organizational strategy also common in other Latin American countries, but especially
successful in the case of Venezuela: the movement from civil society to the government
(Rakowski, 1998; Álvarez, 1999; Espina and Rakowski, 2002). Women activists committed with
the feminist agenda managed to achieve positions of political power within the state bureaucracy
(though not in elected positions) and were instrumental in pushing for reform within the state.
Equally important was the drive of women outside the state, experts on gender issues and with
the ability to unite forces when there was political opportunity available to impact legal reform
on gender issues.
Interestingly, although Venezuelan organized women have agreed that international
norms and treaties have been found to be the most influential sources of gender liberalization in
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Latin America,23 some of the achievements in promoting women's rights are the result of longtime efforts made by women's groups and organizations mobilized during the 1940s in the era of
liberalized authoritarianism. In Venezuela, as in other Latin American countries, the recognition
of international treaties has not been immediately translated into laws that protect women nor has
it transformed legal equality into real equality for women, Instead, the continued efforts of
organized women were necessary to achieve eventual success in the inclusion of international
treaties and conventions into the national legislation and to the creation of public policies
addressing women’s problems.
Therefore, it is important to highlight that apart from the use of the international legal
framework of human rights and women’s rights used to legitimate the women’s struggle and
influence state reform, the efforts of organized women at uniting around a common agenda
seems to have been the key in explaining gender policy reform. I have provided evidence of
women’s unification around the creation of the first women’s commission, the COFEAPRE, the
institutionalization of feminist politics, the attendance to international conferences, the efforts at
coalition building around the issue of legal reform, and the creation and maintenance of networkbuilding among women from inside and outside the state. In other words, it is important to
emphasize that legislation could not have advanced without the coordinated effort of women
outside and inside the state.
In the case of Venezuela, the efforts of organized women’s groups have been based on
such legal international framework for the protection of women’s rights. Women have demanded
the state to translate the principles of gender equality and non-discrimination into national laws
to create a national framework to advance women’s rights in Venezuela. Other gains, such as the
transformation of the patriarchal public discourse, have been the result of efforts by particular
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women in organized groups (the core group) and by the commitment of women in power to a
feminist agenda (Garcia Ramirez, Rosillo, and Valdivieso, 2005).
In sum, during the period of institutionalized democracy in Venezuelan the
institutionalization of party politics, the huge power of political parties over society
organizations (referred to as partidocracia –partyarchy- by Coppedge, 1994), and the
clientelistic channels of access to the state became the main obstacles for the lack of active
participation of Venezuelan women in politics. In addition, as other Latin American scholars
have observed, machismo and the subordination of gender issues to other issues on the agenda
during regime transition became an impediment for the effective influence of women on gender
policy reform (as well as participation). However, organized women decided to impact gender
legislation by using the political opportunities available to women’s groups. They accessed the
state through the availability of state bureaucracies and commissions and built networks of
collaboration among feminist groups and women working inside the state bureaucracy (the
political women and femocrats) to advance women’s rights.24 They informed themselves and
became experts on gender equality by using the international women’s conferences, legal
international instruments, and international norms to push for legislation on gender equality.
This in turn, provides evidence to assert that in spite of the rigidity of institutions like
political parties during the period of institutionalized democracy (1970-1988), women’s groups
were given access to the state and achieved minimal reforms by using the institutionalization of
feminist politics as alternative channels of representations for women’s interests. As Crisp and
Levine (1998) have stated, in the case of Venezuela, the state has not been completely
autonomous from society nor dominant, which makes it difficult to differentiate the line between
state and civil society. In addition, as these authors argue, the Venezuelan state contained, within
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the rigidity of its institutions, channels for participation of organized actors (p.31-32); the
Venezuelan state seems to conform to the type of societal corporatist state described by
Schmitter (1974) in Bush and Mumme (1994) which offers certain incentives for participation
and channels of interest representation as ways to legitimize the state.
Additionally, the reformist environment created by the work of the COPRE may have
also influenced the ability of political and society leaders to change certain state configurations
that allowed organized women’s groups to work with state agencies and commissions on gender
reform issues and succeed, as evidenced by the reform of the Civil Code in 1982. On the
contrary, the close relationship between Church and State did not favor discussion, let alone
reform of the Penal Code, particularly because of the issue of abortion.
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Chapter 3
FROM “DEEPENING OF DEMOCRACY” TO DEMOCRATIC
DEISTITUTIONALIZATION (1989-1998)

The process of decentralization that started in Venezuela in 1989 marked the beginning
of a political transformation that involved the interaction of old and new actors trying to change
the rules of the game. As stated in chapter two, the collapse of the currency in 1983 undermined
the economic pillar of the political system during the Punto Fijo democracy (Crisp and Levine,
1998). The recognition of the increasing deterioration and delegitimation of the political system
from that time onwards materialized in the process of state reform led by the COPRE since 1984
until the approval and passage of the decentralization law in 1988. This year, for the first time in
Venezuelan history, Venezuelans elected governors and mayors through universal and direct
vote during the presidential election in December 1988.
Popular candidate and president elect Pérez, won a second term in 1989 and soon after
coming to office announced a package of neoliberal reforms recommended by the International
Monetary Fund (Ellner and Hellinger, 2003) that sparked a violent response by the urban poor in
Caracas; the social uprising of 1989 became known as the Caracazo. This event put in evidence
the state’s failure to contain protest and reconstruct the pact that had achieved democratic
stability in the past (Crisp and Levine, 1995). Additionally, the social and political systems were
further undermined by cracks in the military institution that led to two coup attempts during 1992
(the first in more than two decades of democracy); and the collapse of the party system
beginning in 1993. The turmoil that characterized this period, beginning with the Caracazo in
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1989, marked a watershed for Venezuela’s history; explanations for this abound, surprisingly,
none looks at how they affected women.

Cracks in the System in the Process of Decentralization
According to Ellner and Hellinger (2003), the chaos of the 1990s took many by surprise
(p. 10), because of the belief, shared by many scholars that Venezuela was exceptional compared
with the rest of Latin America. The period beginning in 1989 was plagued by conflict that
included the urban poor, during the Caracazo, but also street protests led by the middle-class, the
so-called cacerolazos --pot banging--(p. 10). Increased instability led to two attempted coups in
1992 directed by the military. Civilian control of the military weakened with the risk of
democratic breakdown (Monaldi et al., 2006:41). In the past the political parties had managed to
control the armed forces, but during the period (1989-1998) there were two failed military coups
attempted by different factions within the armed forces.
Due to the degree of closure and rigidity of state structures prior to 1990, once the system
started to open with the process of decentralization, new actors took advantage of the
opportunities given to civil society groups to freely associate. The push came mainly from
organized middle-class groups that sought to change the rules of the game. The process of
decentralization attempted to deepen democracy by creating new rules of the game. The reform
of the electoral laws allowed for the direct elections of mayors and governors of the different
states; in addition, it was meant to make the electoral system more representative by the
introduction of uninominal representation in addition to proportional representation. In 1998, the
Congress approved the separation of legislative and presidential elections. This modification was
done by the traditional parties to reduce “the coattail effect that a potential landslide-victory by
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Chávez would produce in the legislature” (Monaldi et al., 2006:43). The congressional elections
were to coincide with the regional and local elections in order for the political parties to build
support from local and regional governments. This led to more fragmentation of the party
system. Changes in the party system now included the emergence of less cohesive and
disciplined parties and this in turn led to less partisan power for the presidents.
The decentralization policies activated federalism after the 1989 direct elections of
governors and mayors. Monaldi et al. (2006:41) point to two institutional elements of federalism
that changed party politics: 1) regional actors with increased competition and more arenas and
possibility of re-election of governors and mayors. The traditional nomination by parties of the
Congress members changed and the parties had to present individual candidates in more than 20
states and 300 municipalities. Increasing the electoral arenas allowed small parties to get
candidates in Congress because of their support in the local governments.
Electoral reforms and changes in electoral rules for different elections since 1993 and
later in 1998 and in 2000 eroded the control that party leaders had on the nomination procedures
and weakened party discipline in the Legislature.
Examples of the rise of a number of new parties inserting themselves into the political
system and building a political party organization are the following: Causa R (Cause R),
Proyecto Venezuela (Project Venezuela), Convergencia-Lapi, Movimiento Quinta República
(MVR- Movement Fifth Republic), Patria Para Todos (PPT-Fatherland for All), and Primero
Justicia (Justice First). The latter started as an NGO and later became a political party; an
example of what Salamanca (2006) calls the politization of civil society organizations (p.94). In
addition, Causa R which emerged from the new labor movement (the new unionism) won the
governorship of Bolivar in 1989. Causa R participated in the presidential elections in 1993 –
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wining 22 % of the votes --won the mayoralty of Caracas in 1992, and the governorship of Zulia
in 1996. These are, among others, some of the examples of the impact that the two
decentralization laws had on the political system. 25 In addition, increased social polarization
characterized this period and influenced the makeup of the political parties. For instance, Causa
R and MVR drew support from the lower class marking the end of the multi-class base of
political parties (Ellner and Hellinger, 2003).
Another important even was the creation of the Fondo Intergubernamental para la
Decentralization-FIDES (Intergovernmental Fund for Decentralization) in 1993. This
autonomous fund for decentralization was created as part of the Ministry of Planning and
Development and later a law for FIDES was passed in 1996 and published in 1997. Its goal was
to further the process of decentralization by promoting the development of the regional and local
governments by the national government.26
The deinstitutionalization of political parties that started in 1993 also decreased the
control that the parties had on the judiciary thus increasing the demands from civil society that
called for increased access to justice and judicial independence, which the Supreme Court
supported. A reform of the Supreme Court was carried out with the support from the World Bank
and the Court tried to become more autonomous and took on an activist role. Monaldi et al.
(2006) assert that an example of the independence of the Court was the impeachment of Pérez in
1993 under charges of corruption and the Court’s decisions that failed to support neither AD nor
COPEI.
Nonetheless, the event that most clearly defined this period of transformation and
deconsolidation of democracy is the demise of the stable two-party system. As a result of the
decentralization process started in 1989, regional leaders of the AD and COPEI parties had
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managed to win the presidential nominations of their parties in 1993: Claudio Fermín (AD mayor
of Caracas), Oswaldo Álvarez Paz (COPEI governor of Zulia), and Irene Sáez (COPEI mayor of
Chacao); these are examples of the incentives created for new leaders to challenge the control of
old party leaders. However, in 1993, Rafael Caldera, founder of COPEI, one of the political
parties that belonged to the Punto Fijo Pact, abandoned the party system and ran as an
independent presidential candidate on an anti-party ticket with the support of a group of small
parties. Scholars agree that Caldera came to represent a break with the past (Crisp and Levine,
1995). Many analysts considered this period the one where the political crisis unraveled (McCoy
and Myers, 2004) as political parties were regarded as not representative and illegitimate
(González de Pacheco, 2003). It was also the end of the pacted democracy and civil
organizations could now access the state without mediators.
Thus, the beginnings of the decade of the 1990s in Venezuela were characterized by
transformation and flux; civil society was evidently influenced by it. García-Guadilla (2003)
calls it the creation of a “new model of society,” (p. 184). Changes during this period seemed to
be coming not only from the state, but from society as well. The decentralization process that had
started with the creation of COPRE in 1984 had given voice to other groups different from the
political parties. Theses groups composed of neighborhood groups, human rights groups, and
cooperatives, among others, sought to create their own mechanisms for access to the state (Crisp
and Levine, 1999). As the parties progressively lost the space that they had controlled as
mediators between the state and society, the state institutions began to open to new groups.
The COPRE had acted as a channel for civil society’s demands and as mediator between
civil society and the state. It achieved the unification of civil society organizations around one
issue: democratization and decentralization of state institutions, and political consensus around
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three important reforms: reform of the Organic Law of Suffrage, reform of the Municipal
Regime Law, and the Decentralization Law (González de Pacheco, 2003: 4).
From 1989 until 1998 the state promoted private initiatives and channeled money to civil
society organizations to carry out social programs and to strengthen their institutions. By 1998
there were 24, 628 organizations (González de Pacheco, 2003). As these organizations provided
social services they wanted to take part in the design of public policies. Some examples of the
work performed by civil society organizations were the community and intermediary housing
organizations; the multi-homes programs; the peace justice programs; and the changes in policies
for the protection of young and adolescents. In the political arena, neighborhood associations
formed by middle-class urban residents since the 1960s and 1970s had coordinated efforts aimed
at reform of the municipal law in 1978. The reform dictated city governments the responsibility
of organizing and promoting the creation of new neighborhood associations (Asociaciones de
Vecinos) (Friedman, 2000). The Escuela de Vecinos27 (Venezuelan Neighbor’s School) created
in 1980 played at major role in spreading information and training on this type of neighborhood
organizations and their activities extended to the national level. Queremos Elegir (We Want to
Elect), a spin-off group of the Escuela de Vecinos, led a petition drive along other neighborhood
associations that collected 140,000 signatures and successfully impacted the reform of the
electoral laws in 1991 and continued pushing for the reform of the Suffrage Law which finally
passed in 1997.
Advocacy organizations were also created. Due to the events of the Amparo and the
Caracazo in 1989, human rights organizations such as COFAVIC and PROVEA became visible
and started monitoring police forces and informing about human rights abuses.
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The Impact of Institutional Changes on Women’s Organizing
The 1990s saw the emergence of many women’s groups. Nevertheless, even though
women’s organizations increased tremendously, changes in the political and economic model
that characterized this transition affected women’s organizing. Friedman (2000) notes how the
form in which women had organized in the previous period by building “conjectural coalitions”
(p. 263) and collaborating across groups and class-lines declined during the 1990s.
Some women’s groups focused on research on women’s issues, others offered service
programs for women that included legal advice, education on sexual and reproductive rights, and
the creation of women’s shelters, among others. Groups created in the late 1970s and late 1980s
continued working in organizing and mobilizing women from the popular sectors (such as the
CESAP) and coordinating the work of women’s NGOs, institutions and associations (such as the
CONG).
As collaboration among women’s groups declined, many women from academia and
professional women were in charge of creating research groups in universities and women’s
NGOs and private associations that would promote legal change in gender policy as well as
provide education and legal advice to women. In the view of feminist women from academia,
university research groups and private professional NGOs were the locus where the struggle for
legal reform took place, at least in its preparatory phases, and where the Venezuelan women’s
movement in general came from (Espina, 2002). Among the most important research groups
founded during this period (1989-1998), there are the CEM (Centro de Estudios de La Mujer,
Women’s Study Center) created in 1992 in the Universidad Central de Venezuela, the CISFEM
(Centro de Investigación Social, Formación y Estudios de la Mujer- Social and Educational
Research Center of Women Studies) a non-governmental organization created in 1992; and the
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GIGESEX a women’s research group created in 1997 in the Universidad de Los Andes. Women
members of these groups participated in the process of gender policy reform by working on draft
proposals of several of the laws passed during this period (1989- 1998) and by offering advice to
state commissions and women inside the state institutes or commissions working on the process
of gender policy reform.
For instance, Gioconda Espina, became a member of the CEM after participating in the
CONG created in 1985 to coordinate more than 25 women’s NGOs; Vicki Ferrara, a member of
the GIGESEX, became the coordinator of the Red Universitaria Venezolana de Estudios de la
Mujer (REUVEM- Venezuelan University Network of Women Studies) which coordinated
meetings among women in academia to discuss women’s issues. Equally important for the
process of gender policy reform during this period was the constant effort of private
organizations conformed of women lawyers, sociologists, psychologists, and journalists, such as
the afore mentioned FEVA (the Venezuela Federation of Women Lawyers), which played a
crucial role in reinvigorating the women’s movement around the reform of the civil code in the
mid-1980s (Friedman, 2000). During the 1990s, FEVA worked on the draft proposal of Title VI
of the Organic Labor Law, the Law of Equal Opportunities for Women (the LIOM), and the Law
on Violence against Women and the Family alongside the CONG until the latter finally dissolved
in 1990 (Espina, 2000).
The civil organizations AVESA and PAFLAM, created in 1985 and 1986, whose goals
have been to provide education on women’s sexual and reproductive health and domestic
violence, offer legal advice to battered women, and promote the creation of university courses on
women as well as the establishment of a program for raped women, increased their efforts at
reaching out to women. Equally important in the area of domestic violence was the work of
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FUNDAMUJER, a non-profit organization created in 1992 to prevent domestic violence against
women; to offer support to the Casa de la Mujer of the Libertador Municipality (a women’s
house) as well as to disseminate information and raise awareness on women’s issues, assist and
educate women on how to prevent domestic violence.
In addition, mobilizing organizations such as CESAP (created in 1973), created a
women’s program for the empowerment of poor women and began the creation of the so-called
Feminist Popular Circles (CFP). Likewise, it launched the initiative, together with other NGOs,
for the creation of women’s houses (Casas de la Mujer) in different states in the country to
provide legal advice, health, and education to poor women. The work of the CFPs is illustrative
of the decline in women’s group’s collaboration across class-lines. Poor women in the CFP
struggled for basic needs with little help from the middle-class activists (Friedman, 2000: 263).
Similarly to the previous period, after 1989, the creation of state commissions served to
channel the demands of different actors of civil society, especially those of women’s organized
women’s groups. In June 1989, some civil society organizations participated in the Comisión
Bicameral Especial (Special Bicameral Commission) to review the 1961 constitution trying to
channel the people’s discontent with the political parties; the CESAP, the Centro Gumilla and
the Public Law Foundation (Fundación de Derecho Público) created a proposal to call for a
National Constituency Assembly (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente) that, despite the lack of
Congress approval at the moment, counted with the support of many people and some party
leaders (González de Pacheco, 2003).The effort of making deep constitutional changes was
crystallized in 1999 with the writing of a new constitution.
In contrast, according to activists feminist women’s organizations in Venezuela, the
creation of the Bicameral Commission for the Rights of Women in 1989 (Comisión Bicameral
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para los Derechos de La Mujer) was a major success for women during this period in terms of
legal reform. The commission had a broad mandate that included the improvement of the
existing laws, the creation of new laws promoting the equality of women, the support for NGOs
working for the defense of women’s rights, and the legal advice of people in need. The life of
this commission, which lasted until 1999,28 was very effective in terms of the gains achieved for
women. Among the most important ones are the passage of the 1990 partial reform of the
Organic Labor Law in its Title VI that refers to the complete protection of pregnant women from
being fired; the 1993 Law of Equal Opportunity for Women; the Approval law of the Convention
Belem do Pará, to prevent, punish, and eradicate violence against women that influenced the
passage of the draft project of the Law on Violence against Women in 1993; the approval of
Article 144 in the 1997 reform of the Suffrage and Political Participation Law to allow for
women quotas for political participation; and the passage of the 1998 Law on Violence against
Women and the Family (García Prince, 2007).

The Impact of Institutional Changes on the Policy-making Process
Institutional changes beginning in 1989 led to changes in the policy-making process. In
contrast with the previous period of a small number of stable actors that used cooperative
arrangements, this period was characterized by multiple actors, high electoral volatility, and
institutional instability (Monaldi et al., 2006:39).Therefore it was hard to generate cooperative
agreements, sustainable reforms, and long-term policy commitments.
Modifications of the legislature’s electoral system of a mixed system that includes a
portion of proportional representation meant that although the system remained proportional, a
portion of the legislators were elected in electoral districts by plurality establishing a personal
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electoral connection between the elected official and the constituency. This weakened the power
of traditional political parties and national party leaders (Monaldi et al., 2006). These changes
also increased party fragmentation and volatility (Venezuela went from being the least
fragmented party system with an ENP29 of 2.6) to being the third most fragmented in Latin
America (after Brazil and Ecuador) with an ENP of 4.7. In terms of party volatility, Venezuela
went from the least volatile to the second most volatile country in Latin America (second to
Peru).
Therefore, according to Monaldi et al. (2006), changes in the policy-making process
during this period included more players, volatile key players, and a more prominent role of the
Legislature and the Judiciary as the role of the political parties and corporatist groups declined.
These changes were accompanied by a decrease in the predominant role of presidents and a
growing key role of regional actors due to decentralization policy (Monaldi et al. 2006:40).
Transaction costs increased, now among more players, more open, in a conflictive arena, making
it hard for the players to commit. However, due to the decline of the political parties, the role of
the legislature increased. Party leaders failed to make deals outside of Congress as before
(among the so called cogollos). So, during this period 26% of all the laws were initiated by the
Legislature, which represented an increase of 50% compared with the previous period in which
85% laws were initiated by the Executive and only 13% from the Legislature.
Apart from the changes mentioned before which included more players, less consensus,
and less power on the part of political parties, other changes that took place within the
Legislature are, in my opinion, the most important for the ability of women to impact state
gender reform. These included less disciplined and more specialized legislators. This meant that
those legislators who were now elected through direct vote could become more specialized in
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issues that their constituencies demanded (Paravisini, 1998 and Crisp, 2001 in Monaldi et al.,
2006). The process itself changed as key legislation had to be negotiated with other actors
outside the political parties including regional actors. This implied that legislators were more
independent from the interests of the parties and even splitting from the parties that nominated
them. In terms of its influence on women, some women activists argue that women’s issues were
now being discussed in the legislature, in addition to the discussions led by research groups in
universities and in women’s NGOs.30 In fact, the discussions on women’s issues inside the
legislature were usually informed by what women in academia and NGOs were able to
contribute through the women’s commissions. The dynamic between the women’s groups and
the legislature is important in terms of the decision-making process because, in general, feminist
women’s perception is that legislators lack knowledge of women issues, even if they are women;
which is one of the causes explaining lack of gender legislation. In other words, according to
many feminists, the reasons explaining what hinders gender policy reform stems from the lack of
knowledge of gender issues by those in parliament along with the lack of commitment with
gender issues of women members of parliament or lack of solidarity with advancing women’s
rights (García Prince, 2005:107).
Equally influential were the changes that took place in the Executive branch. During this
period presidential powers were substantially reduced with the introduction of direct election of
governors and mayors. Presidents lost control of part of the budget (the allotment of resources
sent to the regions) and they were no longer able to dismiss or appoint governors (previously a
strong negotiation tool according to Monaldi et al., 2006:43). As presidential power declined, the
president had less influence in the legislative process, this time only 74 % of legislation was
initiated by the Executive (as compared with 85% in the past).31 Nevertheless, some argue that
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these changes in the executive did not favored women altogether as it seemed to lower Executive
commitment with (and influence on) women’s groups and gender issues.
The Impact of Decentralization on the Institutionalization of Feminist Politics

The process of decentralization in Venezuela started in 1989 and affected social policy in
the 1990s (Navarro, 2000). The reforms included new programs from the state and new
initiatives in the areas of health and education. Before 1989, the state provided all social services
through the centralized administrative structure of the state. A very important characteristic of
the decentralization process was that actors of civil society and the private sectors started
working with or beside the local governors and town councils.32
Paradoxically, although invisible from most analysis of Venezuelan civil society,
organized women’s groups were among the civil society groups that managed to impact state
policy by forming a broad and important women’s movement. As García-Guadilla (2003)
describes in the process of evolution of civil society since 1958 “social organizations and
movements developed new identities, conceptions of citizenship, and social projects that
occupied political spaces and developed new strategies to interact with the state” (p. 179). They
became real actors as part of the process of decentralization beginning in the 1980s and they
finally achieved the inclusion of their demands into the national agenda during the National
Constituency Assembly in 1999 as will be made evident in the following chapter.
Nonetheless, the process of decentralization that had just begun was negatively affected
by the economic crisis that ensued in 1983 and that by 1989 could not be contained anymore.33
The economic crisis was particularly harmful to the women’s commissions that had proved to be
the most influential channel for women to impact gender policy reform. Nonetheless, organized
efforts by women succeed in maintaining the institutional mechanism.

74
After taking office in 1989, Pérez eliminated the COFEAPRE together with the Ministry
of Family and Youth in an effort to shrink the state as part of the neoliberal measures imposed by
the International Monetary Fund (Friedman, 2000; Chávez, 1994).34 However, under the pressure
of women from his party AD, President Pérez re-established COFEAPRE the same year and
added another agency to the Women’s Office in the Family Ministry (Friedman, 2000). In
addition, Pérez named long-time feminist activist from his AD party, Evangelina García Prince,
as the minister of the Family and Youth in 1991. García Prince’s major focus was on policies
addressed at reducing domestic violence, teenage pregnancy, and breast and uterine cancer, as
well as legal reform directed at revising the discriminatory articled of the Penal Code (Friedman,
2000).
Although the second COFEAPRE had a higher status than the previous one, it had also
been established by presidential decree which made it vulnerable to changes in the Executive
branch. The role of the second COFEAPRE was to assess women’s legal, economic and social
conditions, monitor cases of discrimination, and advise state and private agencies on the
formulation of gender-sensitive public policies (Friedman, 2000). In 1992, COFEAPRE and the
Ministry of the Family and Youth were eliminated as part of the austerity measures of the
Washington Consensus. Nevertheless, under pressure from members of the CONG, the Women’s
Council (CONAMU) was created in 1992, as an autonomous commission under the support of
the Presidential Secretariat, whose work was coordinated with that of the other ministers (labor,
education, and family, among others). However, due to the negative impact that the economic
crisis had had on the stability of women’s agencies, women inside and outside the state had
began to work a proposal through the COFEAPRE for the establishment of a women’s agency by
law which would guarantee the continuation of such an institutional benefit regardless of
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changes in the Executive branch. The law finally passed in 1993 Law on Equal Opportunity for
Women (LIOM) creating the Women’s Institute (INAMU), but the implementation of the law
lacked supporters from all sides, women’s groups and the Executive (Friedman, 2000).
Therefore, CONAMU continued working on women’s issues in spite of the law that
called for the creation of INAMU. CONAMU led to creation of decentralized commissions to
carry out the policies of CONAMU, at the local level (municipalities), led to a myriad of
Women’s centers by 1993 in many states of the country in charge of providing services to
women. However, the centers became with time co-opted by the local leaders who used them as
providers of social services that the state could not provide. They reportedly turned centers into
partisan tools of the mayor and his relatives (the mayor’s wife, relatives, and friends); the
mayor’s wives began running the centers as a means to bolster the political careers of their
husbands, or used them in a clientelistic manner by appointing family members as staff of the
centers to pay political debts (Friedman, 2000:259). This author claims that the co-option of the
women’s centers was the result of the process of decentralization and the lack of organization
and willingness of their members to use the centers as means of empowering women. In fact, in
spite of the leadership of the Minister herself, Evangelina García Prince (AD), in creating a
network of women’s NGOs in connection with the women’s centers, the network was not as
active as expected because they lacked organization and commitment. In addition, they were not
autonomous organizations, but rather initiatives imposed top-down from the minister herself
(Friedman, 2000; García Prince, 2000).
In terms of political participation, according to Merz Repem (2005), the direct election of
governors did not have a positive impact on women achieving more positions of decisionmaking such as that of governors in the administrations that followed the decentralization policy.
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It was only when the women’s quotas became a reality in 1998 that women’s political
participation was positively affected, as will be shown below.

The Institutionalization of Feminist Politics and Gender Policy Reform
During the period 1989-1998, the creation of the Bicameral Commission for the Rights of
Women in 1989 was among the main achievements in terms of formulation and passage of
women’s legislation. The commission was created in order to carry out three main activities: a)
improving the existing gender legislation and promoting new laws on gender equality; b)
supporting non-governmental organizations working on the defense of the rights of women,
children and the family, and c) offering legal advice to people (García Prince, 2007). In spite of
the short-lived activity of the commission, which disappeared when the 1999 Constitution
dissolved Congress and created a National Assembly, feminist women attribute to it many of the
legal achievements made during this period.
The important role played by the legislative commission in the passing of legislation on
women’s issues was also the result of the work of organized women, especially women’s effort
and activism directed to presidential candidates as well as Congress in the form of proposals to
be included in the presidential agendas or laws to be discussed in the legislature (García Prince,
2005). As stated before, presidential candidates seemed eager to include women in their
presidential agendas and once in power to create state offices for women in exchange for
political support from women from their parties. In turn, women did not hesitate to put pressure
on presidential candidates in order to fight for what they considered an essential structural
resource: state commissions on women’s issues, women’s agencies, ministries, and offices
(Friedman, 2000). In addition, women organized street protests when necessary to pressure
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Congress or state ministries and offices. In fact, all these commissions created during this period
were considered the result of a concerted effort between organized women in civil society and
women inside the state (García Prince, 2007).
In terms of the achievements by women inside of Congress, the Bicameral Commission
on Women’s Rights illustrates a mechanism created with the purpose of representing women
inside the Legislature, an idea first presented by a women senator in order to monitor women’s
issues (Friedman, 2000). The Bicameral Commission was led by the former Minister of Family,
Evangelina García Prince, and it worked with the proposals advanced in Venezuela, as well as
other Latin American countries such as Mexico, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Chile, among others,
that included an international legal framework on women’s rights. However, in the approval of
specific laws, women’s groups’ participation was crucial in the form of direct lobby and
advocacy of legislators (García Prince, 2005:104). In sum, among the most influential factors
with a positive impact on the debate and approval of laws that protect and advance women’s
rights were the parliamentary commissions; the initiatives emerging form the Executive Power,
which gave extra leverage to the work of the commissions; and the direct action of organized
women’s groups (García Prince, 2005). The following illustrates the success and the challenges
in gender policy reform during 1989-1998.

Labor Rights

In 1990, the passing of the partial reform of the Labor Law in its Title VI brought about
the complete protection of pregnant women from being fired. The reform of this law is believed
to be among the most successful ones because it is consistently implemented.35 Labor legislation
removed the unwarranted discrimination against women while enhancing legal maternity
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protection and extended employer-sponsored child care protection for all children under six
(Friedman, 1998, Friedman, 2000).Title VI on the Labor Protection of Maternity and the Family
of the Organic Labor Law establishes, among other things, that the employer cannot ask a
woman for medical exams to determine if she is pregnant before she is hired (article 381); a
pregnant woman will maintain her job during pregnancy and a year after giving birth (article
384); paid maternity leave include six weeks before giving birth and twelve weeks afterwards
and the right to keep her job after giving birth (article 385); during the breastfeeding period,
women have the right to take two half-and-hour- to one-hour-breaks a day to breastfeed the baby
(article 393).36

The reform was the result of the sponsorship of the Bicameral Commission on Women’s
Rights and the work of organized women outside the state (such as CONG). According to Espina
(1994) and Friedman (2000), the CONG supported the work of the commissions inside the state
and the push for reform from party leaders and female members of the CTV (Venezuelan
Workers Federation) by organizing street protests and picketing in front of Congress every time
there was a debate on the proposed reform to the labor law. Gioconda Espina, founder of the
CEM (Centro de Estudios de la Mujer), a feminist research group in the Universidad Central de
Venezuela, the Area of Women’s Studies at the College of Economics of the same university and
the CONG),37 was among the women involved along with Giovana Merola and Lisbeth
Guerrera, who were members of other feminist groups and organizations (feminist group
Miércoles -- Wednesday, and La Mala Vida magazine38-- the Bad Life, among others).39 Espina
eventually left the feminist group, and continued writing for the magazine and increased her
participation in the CONG in order to include more women under this umbrella organization.
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During this period, organized women participated in workshops on the reform of the
Labor law organized by the Minister of Family and Youth. Gioconda Espina’s work on the draft
project of the Labor law was as crucial for the success of the reform in 1990 as the minister’s
support was instrumental. Nonetheless, some argue that because the law approved did not
achieve the economic protection of domestic workers, working-class women joined workingclass men in order to fight for worker’s rights abandoning the united struggle for women’s
agenda (Wagner, 2005).

According to Friedman (2000), women’s groups in general were not the ones united
behind the process of reform of Title VI of the Labor Law, only feminist activists were.
Therefore, after the law was approved, only organized feminist women were present at the
Second Congress of Women sponsored by the Minister of Family and Youth in 1992 which
gathered 2000 women who brought up topics that had never been discussed before, such as
gendered relationships of power, politics, economics, professional organizations, violence on
women, among others (Friedman, 2000). According to Espina (2000) the Women’s Congress
was an example of the lack of connection between feminists and the majority of Venezuelan
women.

On the one hand, women consider the feminist group to be an elitist group; a core group
of women rather than a real women’s movement (García Ramirez, Rosillo, and Valdivieso,
2005). On the other hand, feminists think that most women are not committed to the “feminist
agenda”

40

and for that reason, what really matters is not whether the group includes all women

in Venezuelan society, but the fact that it includes women whose commitment to the feminist
agenda is real and who can unite to impact gender reform (Espina, 2007).
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Overall, in terms of the process of passage of the labor law, the convergence of interests
and effort of women inside the state and organized women outside the state, proved positive for
the reform to pass. The existence of state bureaucracies and commissions and organized groups
of feminists involved in the process of reform, preparing proposals, presenting them for
discussion inside the legislature and pushing from outside with lobby to Congress and street
demonstrations resulted in the passage of a law whose quality, according to women involved in
the process of reform from the beginning, is considered high because it represents an important
step in advancing women’s rights at work and ending discriminatory practices directed at
women. In regards to the reform of the Labor law, Espina thinks “it is the most important law
because it is consistently implemented. The other laws are not implemented because of lack of
state organs to implement them.”41

Gender Equality

The 1993 Law of Equal Opportunity for Women (also referred to as the LIOM, for its
name in Spanish), its elaboration, legislative approval, and promulgation illustrates another
successful step taken in the promotion of the rights of women since they achieved the right to
vote in 1947. The passage of this law also supported the subsequent changes in gender issues
during the period between 1989 and 1998. García Prince (2005) provides the best updated
analysis of the Law of Equal Opportunity that focuses on its characterization, its impact on
legislation and public policies concerning women, and its deficiencies.

García Prince (2005) recognized the positive impact of the 1989 appointment of a woman
for the post of Minister of the Family and Youth and President of the Second Women’s Advisory
Commission to the Presidency (the second COFEAPRE) by the state. The Law of Equal
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Opportunity for Women was among the goals of the minister and the Commission The law
promulgated by decree of the Congress in 1993 promoted equal opportunities for women and
banned women’s discrimination. It contained seven titles and sixty nine articles that dealt with
gender equality, equality in the access to education, women’s labor rights, as well as women’s
political, economic, and social rights. In addition, Title III of the law called for the creation of
the National Institute of Women established its constitution, objectives, and organization; its
main objective being the planning, coordination, execution, and evaluation of policies and
matters related to women’s conditions (this institute was later transformed in the INAMUJER in
2001). Finally, Title IV allowed for the creation of the National Defender of the Rights of
Women to monitor the application of the laws in women’s rights.

According to García Prince (2007), one of the leading Venezuelan feminists involved in
the process of approval of this law and Minister of Family and Youth at the time, the law was
basically a program, which meant that it was not properly a law about rights, but more about
what the state planned to do to protect women’s rights. In the cases where the law refers to
specific rights (in education, political participation, health, economic rights, and so on), the
definitions are incomplete and vague. It seems to follow the lines of the documents that served as
a base for it: the CEDAW, which describes some rights very broadly, but focuses on the
responsibilities of the states to create them. For instance, the chapters that deal with women’s
equal rights to education (Articles 8, 9, and 10), labor rights (Articles 11 to 17), and political
rights (Articles18 to 24) seem to be only programmatic in the sense that they do not substantiate
the importance of these rights, but rather the obligation of the state to promote them. Similarly,
the articles that refer to the economic rights of women (Articles 25 to 38) focus on the
responsibility of the state to provide women access to the means of production, credits, housing
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and so on, with especial interests on rural women. Feminist activists interviewed for this study
also argued that the law suffered from structural problems that made it impractical; no one
knows about the law and it is never implemented.42 Friedman (2000) asserts that the law was an
unnecessary, ill-prepared law proposed by a feminist adeca who forced it through Congress in an
effort to demonstrate her importance as a women leader. 43

In a detailed report on the impact of the law in Venezuela, García Prince (2007) points to
the vagueness of the law in terms of stating who is the agent responsible for implementing the
law or making it possible for women to achieve the rights it contains. An interesting observation
by García Prince (2007) refers to the identification of the institutes, agencies, and organizations
of the state that are in charge of the implementation of the law; these have either disappeared,
changed names, or been replaced by others. This fact contributes to serious legislative flaws in
the law that together with the lack of reference to the implementation agent, make the law
impractical. In this regard, Espina adds that the LIOM is an example of a common feature of
some women’s laws passed and approved in Congress; “they tend to be unrealistic because of the
lack of knowledge of those involved in the process of decision-making; meaning those who
proposed them and those who approved them.”44 In addition, fifteen years after its approval,
women assert that the law is unknown by the majority of women, which makes it also
ineffective.45

García Prince (2007) summarizes other problems of the law in terms of the following: a)
language, b) conceptualization, and c) interpretation. First, the law contains an andocentric bias
found in the language used in the content of the law, for instance the use of he as the generic
subject throughout the whole text (even when Spanish uses she to refer to women in the singular
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form). Many feminists take issue with the use of male adjectives and pronouns to refer to
women, because Spanish distinguishes between male and female forms of the same adjective/
pronoun46. Second, the law treats pregnancy as equal to illness, and maintains the idea that
pregnancy is a natural condition of women (instead of a right that depends on the will of women
(or women and their partners). Finally, it is plagued with deficiencies in the definitions of the
agents which make it hard to be interpreted by the institutions in charge of implementing it
(which in turn, as mentioned above, are not specified either). Similarly, according to García
Prince (2007) the law is inaccurate in relation to what is understood as “equal opportunities” for
women: the answer varies from the exercise of the rights of women to the guarantee by the state
of the rights of women, to the provision of a complete social security system for women, to the
recognition of women’s equality before the law. In other words, the law is unclear on what is
meant by the provision of equal opportunities for women at the same time that it omits the
political rights of women contained in the CEDAW convention which served as basis for its
proposal.

On the whole, although considered a step forwards in advancing women’s rights and
achieving gender equality, the substantive weaknesses of the LIOM have resulted in a law that
exists on paper, little is known about it, and is unrealistic, which means it would need to go
through a process of revision and reform in order to make it applicable. As will be shown in the
next chapter, the LIOM was partially reformed in 1999 in order to adapt to the changes in the
new administration.
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Social Security

There is consensus among the feminists interviewed for this study in regards to the
Organic Law of Social Security approved in 1997 that few people know about it.47 It was
promulgated by the Caldera administration (from the COPEI party) according to suggestions
made by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Inter-American
Development Bank (Salcedo, 2007). Among the most relevant changes to the law, we find the
privatization of the funds of the social security, increasing requirements to access the service,
and the elimination of the Venezuelan Institute of Social Security (IVSS). However, with the
transition to the new government in 1998 and the writing of the 1999 Constitution, the Chávez
government found the 1997 law to contradict the national interests and the government’s vision
of the social security included in the 1999 Constitution; five vacatio legis48 were applied to the
law until a new law was formulated in 2002; it will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

Political Participation
The reform of the Organic Law of Suffrage and Political Participation in 1997 (Official
Gazette 5.200) opened a new window of opportunity for women to increase their participation in
politics to decision-making positions where women have always been underrepresented. The
women organized to introduce women’s quotas was to take the opportunity of the favorable
political climate of 1997 (Merz Repem, 2005). As described above, the country was working
towards the process political and administrative decentralization. Women’s groups used this
climate and gave the proposal to the state Women’s Council CONAMU that counted with the
support of the Bicameral Commission for Women’s Rights. They also gathered 20,000
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signatures to support the proposal introduced during the discussion of the reform of the law of
suffrage and political participation. The inclusion of Article 144 in the law established a
woman’s quota of 30% minimum in the lists of the political parties of candidates to political
posts at the national, municipal, and parish level. However, as in the case of the Law of Equal
Opportunity for Women, article 144 of the law of suffrage and political participation did not
specify how to include women in the electoral lists, and most women ended up at the end of the
lists with less opportunity to be elected (Merz Repem, 2005). The actual proposals submitted by
organized women during the process of reform contained the inclusion of 50% of women in the
electoral lists of the political parties; however, the legislature approved only 30% (Merz Repem,
2005).
As in other cases where the laws approved have been part of international efforts to
achieve gender equality, the women’s quotas were part of a commitment made by the
Venezuelan state at the IV World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. The goal was to
achieve equal representation of men and women with parity in power. In a follow up study done
in Venezuela by Merz Repem (2005) ten years after the Beijing Conference, she described the
impact that the 30% quota had on the increased access of women to positions of power within
the state institutions as well as other political and social organizations that play a role in the
decision-making process. Merz Repem (2005) evaluated the period from 1995 to 2003 and the
implementation of the 1997 Suffrage and Political Participation Law in the light of the Law of
Equal Opportunity for Women and their impact on the achievement of gender equality in
Venezuela.49
Merz Repem (2005) found that compared to 1995, before the introduction of the quotas,
the implementation of the women’s quotas dramatically increased women’s participation in
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power positions after 1995. Between 1995 and 1998 there were more women in parliament
because of the application of the quotas in the 1998 legislative elections --and there were only 2
women ministers out of 23 ministries appointed by the President. In terms of the political parties,
only AD and MAS included women’s quotas of 20% (30%) and 25%, respectively, while COPEI
refused to change its internal norms. Changes in women’s quotas positively influenced the
participation of women in the Executive Board of the AD and MAS parties.50 In addition Merz
Repem (2005) observed increases of women representation in the posts for Congress, ministers,
and in state and municipal councils. However, the increase cannot be regarded as significant,
according to this author considering the fact that women’s representation decreased in posts such
as mayor, political parties, unions, and as magistrates in the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ).
Moreover, women have usually held ministries with women-related roles (such as ministry of
family, of women, of youth) reinforcing the idea of women’s domestic role; in regards to the
municipal councils, women have been able to hold more posts here because they have been more
involved in the community associations and because the State has had less power at that level.
Put simply, women’s increased political participation at the municipal level and in some
ministries might be explained by the perception of women’s crucial role in the family and
because of women’s involvement in community associations and not by the application of
women’s quotas.
In her study, Merz Repem (2005) concluded that in the light of the two laws passed in
order to increase gender equality (the LIOM and the Organic Law of Suffrage and Political
Participation), the Venezuelan state has shown very little political will to create an egalitarian
society. She affirms that women’s organizations are the ones pushing for legislation reform in
gender issues but their efforts have not been matched by the efforts of the state (2005:142). Her
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results confirm previous studies by Friedman (1998; 2000) and a recent study by Llanos and
Sample (2008): Venezuelan state institutions are still patriarchal in nature and in the particular
case of political parties, they are not only resistant to renovating their leadership, but remain
rigid institutions that represent an obstacle for women’s political participation. Women
interviewed for the study expressed that the lack of implementation of Article 144 of the
Suffrage and Political Participation Law in the 2000 national elections shows the inability of
women to defend their rights vis-à-vis the state institutions; this will be discussed in the next
chapter

Violence against Women
In 1998 the Law on Violence against Women and the Family was passed achieving a
major change: violence against women was regarded as a crime. Nonetheless, the law was meant
to rule on domestic issues of violence against women only. Evangelina García Prince, María
Cristina Parra, and Lisbeth Guevara introduced the draft proposal of the law titled “Domestic
Violence and Sexual Harassment” through the COFEAPRE right before it disappeared in 1989.
Later, when the commission was eliminated, its successor CONAMU, created in 1992,
sponsored a commission made up of several NGOS to improve the draft proposal (Suárez, 1999).

García (1999) argues that women united towards the end of the 1990s to fight against
discrimination, violence (domestic and sexual), and the feminization of poverty, among other
issues. The international legal framework was used as a base for the proposals made by
organized women. The existence of international declarations, treaties, and conventions for the
protection of human rights, gave the women’s movement the infrastructure needed to support
their struggle for the rights of women. Venezuelan women’s movement and women’s NGOs
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worked actively to get the state to ratify and commit to the international instruments (García,
1999). At the international level, the IV Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 and the NGO
forums, whose goals were to evaluate the obstacles for women’s equality in all aspects: decisionmaking, health, education, violence, and human rights, were particularly important in informing
women’s discussions and proposals as well as calling on states to implement affirmative actions
mechanisms for increase women’s participation in all areas mentioned above.

At the national level, the commission appointed by the CONAMU presented the draft bill
to Congress in 1996 and counted with the support of the Bicameral Commission on the Rights of
Women and the CONAMU. Members of the CONAMU and the Bicameral Commission were in
charge of pushing the proposal, and NGOs led a petition drive that collected 20,000 signatures of
citizens who supported the idea that domestic violence was a crime. Because of the fear that, due
to the impending presidential elections of 1998, the discussion and approval of the law would be
left out of the legislative period, a coalition formed to campaign (through the printed media and
communication media in general) in favor of the passing of the law, which was achieved in
August 1998 and entered into force in January 1999. The coalition of women’s groups that
formed around the passing of the 1998 Law against Violence against Women and the Family
included many organizations that had become service providers for women, AVESA, the Liga
Feminista de Maracaibo, the Women’s House Juana Ramírez, the Women’s House in the Federal
District, the CONG, and CISFEM. Theses organizations had made the issue of domestic violence
visible during the late 1980s. In the 1990s, the effort of these groups with the support from
Bicameral Commission, the CONAMU, the women from the political party MAS, and the
FUNDAMUJER, supported the discussion in Congress of the issue of violence. Other groups
that formed part of the coalition behind the reform included the, CIM, FEVA, CEM-UCV,
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CONG, UNCEF, CFP, and the Minister of Justice (Suárez, 1999) and private organizations like
FEVA, AVESA, and PAFLAM. 51
In regards to the process of reform on violence against women, women from the CONG
would work on women’s issues and propose changes and reforms discussed among them that
they would later discuss with the, women working inside the state institutions and committed to
the feminist agenda, the so called femocrats (Rakowski and Espina, 2007). This way of working
illustrates the process of most gender policy reform in Venezuela; the most important locus of
discussion of women’s rights was not the legislature, but the university research groups and the
NGOs of women. In addition, it shows the ability of organized women to build coalitions among
themselves (because of some implicit pact) regardless of political affiliation. Discussion of this
type of forums has been the norm among feminists involved in the process of gender legislation.
Women interviewed for the study claimed that apart from the legislature, women in research
groups in universities, NGOS, political parties, forums in universities such as the Cátedra Libre
Manuelita Sáenz would meet to discuss reforms and proposals on gender legislation.52 The
ability of women’s groups to form coalitions of women to push for legal reform and build
networks among women from inside and outside the state is referred to as the institutionalization
of the women’s movement; which according to Garcia Ramirez, Rosillo, and Valdivieso, (2005)
has allowed women to continue achieving legislative gains for women (p. 130).
In terms of the nature, achievements, and weaknesses of the Law on Violence against
Women and the Family, Suárez (1999) offers a detailed account of the opinion of Lisbeth
Guevara, one of the drafters of the law and Coordinator of the commission assessing CONAMU.
Guevara asserted that the law had a constitutional nature and described it as conciliatory,
preventive, penalizing, and educational (in terms of aiming at controlling and eradicating
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violence) (Suárez, 1999). Among the most important aspects of the law, Guevara mentioned the
treatment of a threat as a crime, the inclusion of preventive measures to protect the victims and
the ability to request the aggressor to leave the house or take the women to a shelter for 72 hours.
In addition, it established the following bodies to receive and process the complaints: the peace
and family judges, the town halls, the prefectures, the police stations, and the Public Ministry. In
addition, article 32 called for the creation of specialized offices to receive complaints (Suárez,
1999).
Among the problems observed by Guevara were the lack of education on gender issues
by those receiving the complaints, the victim’s lack of access to justice due to the high cost of
lawyers, and the lack of personnel who specializes on gender issues. In addition, those receiving
the complaints sometimes did not apply the law and referred the victims to other entities or
disregarded the importance of threats in comparison with signs of physical aggression. Last, but
not least important, is what Suárez (1999) considers a problem that derives not from the political
will of political leaders, but from the weaknesses of the institutional responses to domestic
violence in Venezuela. In spite of the passing of the law and the creation of governmental
organizations (and many non-governmental organizations) to deal with domestic violence, the
stage of implementation was delayed because of the changes in the political leadership of the
country. As with other laws on women (or any other law for that matter), the projects and plans
derived from the law were not transformed into policies due to changes in the leadership of the
state institutions involved in the issue of violence at all levels. In addition, the assignation of
little budget and personnel to implement the law combined with the lack of continuous policies
from one government to the next, and the lack of data available to determine the status of
women, resulted in an implementation phase plagued with inefficiency.
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To sum up, in terms of the legal gains of the 1989-1998 period we can say that it was
very significant in terms of legal change. The reforms achieved shared a collective consensus to
push the state to commit to the international legal framework for women’s rights in order to
impact national legislation. However, only three of the laws passed were the result of a sound
and informed process of law-making by women outside and inside the state (in research centers
and NGOs and in state bureaucracies and commissions): the partial reform of the Labor Law in
its Title VI, the Suffrage and Political Participation Law, and the Law on Violence against
Women and the Family. In contrast, there is consensus among the feminist activists interviewed
for this study, as well as the academic articles written on this topic, in regards to the Organic
Law of Social Security and The Law of Equal Opportunity for Women, in that there is little
knowledge about the laws and they are never implemented. 53 These two laws reflect a common
practice by some women inside the legislature whose interests are not based on the content of
laws that really benefit women, but on their own personal interests thus making proposals of
laws that are either impractical or plagued with deficiencies or by derailing the passage of laws
that are really needed for women to advance their rights. This phenomenon is documented by
Friedman (2000) and referred to as the actions of instrumental feminists; women whose real
interest in promoting gender laws is advertising their own political decision-making power.

Women’s Groups Activism during Democratic Deinstitutionalization

As shown above, during the period of democratic deepening, and subsequent
deconsolidation, key women participated in the process of gender policy reform. Although the
Venezuelan women’s movement has been heterogeneous and plural, organized women made
efforts to maintain a united women’s movement mobilized around a common feminist agenda.
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One characteristic of the Venezuelan women’s movement is the fact that the women leading the
changes have been involved in politics in contrast with other countries where the initiative has
come only from civil society groups outside the state (García Prince, 2003). According to García
Prince, the women who have struggled for advancing women’s rights in Venezuela have been
those involved in the political process of the country, with links to the political parties. In
addition, women from academia, professional women in NGOs, and women in popular
organizations have participated in this struggle working from their different disciplines in
academic and professional circles as well as neighborhood associations. Each group has
contributed to support the process of reform and to push for change.

Women have framed the issue of gender inequality as an issue of human rights that
deserves the attention of the public sector and the creation of public policies by the state. In
addition, women inside and outside the state have lobbied at the national and international level
for the creation of a legal framework that eradicates, prevents, and sanctions the discrimination
of women at all levels. In terms of women’s group’s strategies, their reliance on international
human rights treaties and conventions to push for gender policy reform constitutes an example of
women’s groups framing capacity to mobilize support and legitimize their campaigns.54 During
this period, activist women were successful in identifying the problem of gender inequality
affecting women’s political participation and gender violence as a violation of women’s rights
which materialized in passage of the partial reform of the Labor Law in its Title VI, the Suffrage
and Political Participation Law, and the Law on Violence against Women and the Family.
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In addition, many of the women’s NGOs that participated in the coalition behind the
reform of the Law on Violence against Women and the Family have come to fill the vacuum left
by the State by playing the role of service providers for women; they have provided women
psychological, medical, legal help in the area of domestic violence, sexual violence, and
women’s reproductive and sexual health. In these areas, women’s NGOs were and have been
instrumental in the education and formation of key sectors of society that deal with domestic
violence, sexual violence, and women’s reproductive and sexual health (Muñoz, 2002). Their
work as service providers during this period played a key role in the education of lawmakers and
others involved in the process of gender policy reform as they joined in the advocacy coalitions
to lobby Congress.

Support for this is offered by García Prince (2005), who states that the most popular and
significant women’s groups committed to the development of laws that are gender sensitive are
the women NGOs and the women’s research centers. Among the most important women’s
private organizations we find FEVA (established in 1956 and restructured in 1965), AVESA
(1984), PLAFAM (1986), and FUNDAMUJER (1992). In addition, research centers/groups such
as the CEM and GIGESEX55 also provided service to women in the area of gender violence,
prevention of unwanted pregnancy, promotion of sexual and reproductive rights of women. In
regards to the service provided by these organizations, FEVA (the Venezuelan Federation of
Women Lawyers) has contributed to the legal advice of women in all areas of women’s rights.
AVESA has focused mainly on education to prevent and deal with problems related to sexuality;
it has worked in the area of sexual education, gender violence and reproductive and sexual
health.56 PLAFAM is part of the International Parenthood Federation and focuses on offering
education, medical and legal help to poor people in the area of sexual and reproductive health of
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women, men, and teenagers.57 FUNDAMUJER was created in order to support the work of a
Women’s house in Caracas in the area of gender violence; it has now become an organization in
charge of informing, educating, sensitize the population on issues related to violence against
women. In addition, FUNDAMUJER provides training of professionals dealing with battered
women (social workers, nurses, doctors, judges, and lawyers). Since its creation,
FUNDAMUJER has established links with other organizations (AVESA and CEM) and has
provided advice to state agencies and commissions.58

Finally, the cooperation that existed between women from civil society organizations
(and women’s studies centers) and the state agencies in charge of promoting public policies for
women contributed to the successful passage of important laws advancing women’s rights. As
García Prince (2005) states, parliamentary commissions on women’s rights have played a
significant role in gender reform as they are a significant bridge and connection for women
outside the state to put women’s issues in the legislative agenda for public discussion; these
commissions are really strategic in the struggle for achieving equality as established in the
constitution (p. 108).

Analysis

The process of decentralization, mainly electoral, put in place in 1989 transformed statesociety relations in the 1990s. It changed the rules of the game and opened the door to diverse
actors of civil society to the decision-making process; middle-class women were among these
groups. The period 1989-1998 was characterized by political instability caused by the economic
and political crisis of the system.
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Institutional Variables

The deinstitutionalization of the party system was in part a product of the political and
economic crises; but it was accelerated by the decentralization process. The change in the
electoral rules produced party fragmentation, less cohesive and less discipline parties, and
changes in the number and type of parties. It also weakened the presidential powers and assigned
a greater role to regional party leaders. This, in turn, increased the role of the legislature.
Lawmakers became more specialized and discussion of women’s issues in the legislature became
common.

The creation of institutionalization of feminist politics was a factor that played a crucial
role in achieving gender policy reform as outlined on Table 2. As state-society relations changed,
many women’s groups from civil society sought to access the state; the latter also promoted civil
society initiatives in the areas of health and education. Organized women outside the state began
providing service to women in the areas of sexual and reproductive health and violence against
women. Women from these organizations worked on legal reform and were able to access the
state through the state bureaucracies and advisory commissions on women’s issues; appointed
women were also supportive of the reforms and the process led to successful gender policy
reform.
Nonetheless, changes in the economic model did affect the institutionalization of feminist
politics as the state eliminated a women’s commission and a ministry in order to comply with
IMF policies aimed at shrinking the state. Nevertheless, as shown above, the negative measures
were reversed by efforts from organized women, inside and outside the state, directed at the
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incumbents in order to create new women’s commissions and agencies. Women refused to
accept the loss of such an important institutional resource.
Table 2. Major Institutional Changes, Women’s Activism and Strategies, and Legal Gender
Reform during Democratic Deinstitutionalization
Political Structures
of Democratic
Deinstitutionalization
(1989-1998)
Decentralization of
policy-making
process initiated by
COPRE in 1984
Changes in electoral
rules

Deinstitutionalization
of the party system
Church-State
cooperation

Institutions
providing access to
the state policymaking process
Institutionalization
of Feminists
Politics:
1989 -1999
Bicameral
Commission for the
Rights of Women
1989 COFEAPRE
and added agency to
Women’s Office
Appointment of
women activist to
Ministry of Family
and Youth; elected
female legislator
1992 CONAMU
(commission)
1993 the Institute of
women by the law,
INAMU created by
law (not
implemented)
1994 CONAMU
continues work ( by
presidential decree)

Women’s Activism

Women’s Strategies

Women’s
organizations:
neighborhood
associations,
NGOs,
grassroots
organizations
decline (advocacy,
social service
organizations)
FEVA, AVESA,
PAFLAM,
FUNDAMUJER

Coalition building
among women’s
groups declines;
splits among
women’s groups;

CONG continues
working, some
work among
women’s groups
but dissolves in
1990.
Feminists created
research groups in
universities: CEM,
CISFEM,
GIGESEX
Reform from
outside and within
the state
Main activism for
legal reform by
core group;

locus of gender
legal reform is
feminist groups,
concerted efforts
between women in
academia and
women (political
and femocrats) to
push for legal
reform
Struggle by
women’s groups to
maintain the state
agencies and
commissions on
women (especially
sought to establish
the women’s
agency by national
law)
Women’s groups
use lobby, target
presidents, street
demonstrations,
target the state
use of international
meetings and
proposals to discuss
women’s issues
inside legislature in
terms of gender
equality and
women’s rights as
human rights

Gender Policy
Outcomes

1990 Labor Law
1993 Law of
Equal Opportunity
for Women (that
creates the
INAMU)
1997 Law of
Social Security
1997 Organic Law
of Suffrage and
Political
Participation
1998 Law on
Violence against
Women and the
Family
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During this period, the achievements in of gender policy reform shown on Table 2 were
clearly the product of the existence of political alignments between women outside the state in
feminist circles and NGOs and women inside the state, the political women and the femocrats,
who had been appointed by the Executive to lead the different state bureaucracies created to
work on proposals for new law, implementation of existing laws, and creation of polices to
address women’s inequality. Among the most influential commissions of this period was the
Bicameral Commission for the Rights of Women which served as a mechanism to present draft
proposals inside the legislature as well as to provide support for their passage. In addition, the
similar role of the COFEAPRE and later CONAMU proved beneficial for women’s groups and
their goals in pushing for gender policy reform as additional channels of women’s representation
in decision-making bodies and access within the state. Thus, the above confirms the proposition
that the institutionalization of women’s movement increases the likelihood of gender policy
reform.59

Strategy-related Variables
In spite of an environment for change created by the decentralization process, changes in
the economic and political model affected the women’s movements in the 1990s. Women,
although active in organizing around legal reform, advocacy groups, and service providers,
decreased collaborating among women groups across class and party lines like they had done
before. Evidence of this is the dissolution of the CONG in 1990.60 In other words, organization
around women’s issues continued, but efforts at unifications declined. Therefore, during the
beginning of the period we saw the emergence of new women’s NGOs and women’s studies
centers in universities as well women’s organizations formed in the late 1980s whose purpose
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was to educate, raise awareness, and provide training on women’s issues.61 The split undergone
by the women’s movement during the 1990s left a small group of women to push for gender
policy reform. Espina and Rakowski (2002) have argued that in Venezuela there has not been
what could be called a continuous women’s movement, but rather the continuous effort of a core
group of women committed to their ideas and able to organize and form alliances when there is
an opportunity for gender policy reform.
Women members of this core group who were eager to influence state gender policy
reform started working along side the government thorough the women’s offices and
commission to introduce drafts laws to be discussed the legislature. Some of the proposals were
the result of concerted efforts among women from outside and inside the state. The support from
femocrats was always instrumental for gender policy reform. 62
Common to the successful laws passed during the period 1989 to 1998, namely, the
partial reform of the Labor Law in its Title VI, the Suffrage and Political Participation Law, and
the Law on Violence against Women and the Family we find that in terms of the process, women
outside the state for the most part organized to prepare the proposals to be presented and
defended by women inside the state. In other words, successful gender legislation during this
period in the areas of labor, political participation, and prevention and eradication of violence
can be attributed to what Magdalena León has called the “triangle of power,” (quoted in Garcia
Prince, 2005) meaning the concurrence of direct efforts by women in government, organized
women in civil society, and women in the Legislative power.
In terms of the framing strategies, women heavily relied on the existence of an
international legal framework for human rights to emphasize gender equality and respect for
women’s rights as human rights in order to attract and mobilize supporters, as evidenced in the
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process of reform of the Law on Violence against Women and the Family. In addition, women’s
group’s efforts at unification, coalition building and network maintenance in the process of
gender policy reform contributed to the passage of three of the most important gender reforms of
the period, that is the partial reform of the Labor Law in its Title VI, the Suffrage and Political
Participation Law, and the Law on Violence against Women and the Family.
In contrast, the other two laws analyzed in this period, namely the Organic Law of Social
Security and The Law of Equal Opportunity for Women, remain unknown by many women, and
are impractical, which hinders their implementation. The process of passage of these two laws
was significantly different from the other three mentioned above, since these latter were
introduced by individual petitions in Congress and did not count with the support of a broad
coalition of women, inside and outside the state, to push for their promulgation, let alone their
implementation.
In short, the most important factors influencing gender policy reform in this period seem
to have been the institutionalization of feminists politics in the form of the COFEAPRE, the
Bicameral Commission for the Rights of Women, and the CONAMU that provided channels for
organized women outside the state to introduce draft laws into the legislature that were also
supported by the existence of women appointed to women’s ministries. In addition, the process
of drafting the proposals that took place among organized women in NGOs, academic centers,
and even street assemblies, was crucial in informing the state commissions on the content of the
laws.
Finally, the discussion of the laws and the resulting proposals were positively influenced
by the creation of an international legal framework for human rights, product of international
conferences, treaties, and conventions on human rights and women’s rights, that helped women’s
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groups frame the problem of labor rights, political participation, and violence against women as
issues of gender inequality, discrimination, and violation of women’s rights thus mobilizing
support and legitimizing their campaigns. Therefore, the creation of state bureaucracies for
women combined with the women’s group’s strategies described above help explain success in
gender policy reform.
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Chapter 4
REGIME TRANSITION: THE CHÁVEZ ERA (1998- 2007)

Hugo Chávez came to power in 1998 with the support of a coalition of small parties. The
former paratrooper, and coup plotter, won the election on a populist and nationalist platform and
obtained 56% of the popular vote (still some scholars point to the fact that there was a high
electoral abstention in the 1998 elections). During this period, major transformations pointed to a
redesign of Venezuelan political institutions. Beginning in 1999, the Congress was dissolved and
a referendum passed with 72% of approval votes to create a National Constitutional Assembly to
write a new Constitution. At the end of 1999 a referendum was activated to request popular
approval of the new constitution which was approved leading to presidential elections in
December 2000. The impact of the new rules of the game can be seen on changes that go from a
new type of participative democracy, as proposed in the new Constitution, to the redefinition of
civil society actors and new state-society relations.
Among organized civil society, women’s groups stand out as having successfully
achieved the inclusion of many of their proposals in the 1999 Constitution, and in that respect
contributing to the creation of a more egalitarian society. Notwithstanding the gains achieved by
women and other human rights groups, a great majority felt excluded by what they considered
the discriminating and polarizing practice of the Chávez government.
Consequently, things started going wrong as some civil society organizations began
confronting the government. The first round between the government and civil society
organizations began when the government stopped the social programs of Agenda Venezuela63 in
which several organizations had participated and unified all social assistance coming from the
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Executive under the Fondo Único Social64 (González de Pacheco, 2003). Soon after, the
government announced another strategy: the creation of Plan Bolivar 2000, a plan of social
assistance administered by the Armed Forces (FAN) and carried out by the military and civilians
(the military were not too happy with their new role).65 Chávez called on the military to do social
work due to the lack of support from governorships, Congress and the Supreme Court, which
were in the hands of the opposition. Among the strongest critics of the government’s policies
were the members of the Catholic Church, especially Archbishop Porras, who feared that Chávez
would implement a Cuban-style government in Venezuela. For the Church, a contentious point
of Chavez’s policies had always been Chavez’s militaristic and socialist bent.

Major Institutional Changes during the Transition

One of the most important institutional changes of this period is the writing of a new
Constitution. The 1999 Constitution created five instead of the usual three governmental
branches, or “powers” (Wilpert, 2003). In addition to the legislative, executive, and judicial
powers, the new constitution added an electoral power and a citizen or popular power. The
citizen power is meant to act as ombudsman for the country, assuring the other four powers’
compliance with their functions established in the constitution. The legislature was changed from
a bi-cameral system to a unicameral one by dissolving Congress and naming a National
Assembly. According to Wilpert, (2003), the argument behind this change was that Venezuela
needed a legislature that would be more responsive to the country’s needs by being able to pass
laws more quickly. However, those opposing this measure argued that the change favored the
centralization of the government. In practice, the National Assembly has not been faster in
approving laws than the old legislature. Other important and controversial institutional changes
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were the expansion of presidential powers and the increase of the presidential term from five to
six years and to allow his or her immediate and only reelection. Chávez argued that the extension
of the presidential term would allow him the tasks of rebuilding Venezuela because a single five
year term was not enough (Wilpert, 2003).

In the 2000 national elections Chávez won again with 60% of the votes and Chávez
supporters won two thirds of the seats in the National Assembly. President Chávez was delegated
decree power for one under the Enabling Act passed by the National Assembly in 2000. Towards
the end of 2001, he enacted 49 decrees that sparked fierce opposition from powerful sectors of
Venezuela society, including the Catholic Church, because of the exclusionary nature of the
decision-making closed to actors outside of the government circles. This conflict led to a coup
and counter coup in 2002, an oil strike towards the end of 2002 and the beginning of 2003 and
the activation of a recall referendum on Chávez’ government in August 2004, which he won
again. Overall, after a year of Chávez’s coming to power and significant changes in state
institutions, crisis ensued leading to such a degree of political instability that many feared
democracy was threatened. Political polarization seemed to have reached a point of no return.

According to Ellner (2003) though, political polarization had begun before the 1998
presidential elections as the traditional parties AD and COPEI lost their legitimacy and created
discontent among the population and distrust in the decaying political system. After the
transition, polarization increased as the middle class united behind the not so popular traditional
political parties AD and COPEI to oppose Chávez and both sides started using inflammatory
rhetoric towards his/her opponents (Ellner, 2003). According to Salamanca (2004), the
government targeted the traditional parties, the Catholic Church, and civil society, among other
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groups; civil society groups, including women’s groups, were not able to escape political
polarization (García Ramirez, Rosillo, and Valdivieso, 2005; Espina, 2007), as will be shown
below.

Institutional Opening: Political Opportunities for Women
Opinion about the degree of opening of institutions available to civil society
organizations varies. Some argue that the Convocation of the National Assembly opened a
historic chapter for civil society in Venezuela since many civil society groups managed to
include their proposals in the 1999 Constitution (Salamanca, 2004). Others assert that civil
society groups were not able to participate or even elect enough representatives and/or submit
sufficient proposals in the National Constitutive Assembly. According to García Ramirez (1999)
only 15 women participated in the whole process through different commissions; however, only
one woman formed part of the National Constituent Assembly (ANC) created to write the 1999
Constitution (Combellas, 2003). Interestingly, even the groups whose proposals were included in
the 1999 Constitution claimed that some proposals were forced upon them in spite of their lack
of consensus, for instance, the length of the presidential term, the possibility of reelection, and
the extreme presidentialism. Accordingly, some civil society organizations campaigned against
the approval of the new constitution to be determined by a referendum (Salamanca, 2004).
The issues discussed included the perceived centralization of power around the president
and the government’s discriminatory practices against civil society actors who did not side with
the government. In fact, as Salamanca (2004) stated, the idea of participatory democracy in
theory gave civil society the hope of new forms of participation --more direct forms of
participation (as opposed to the indirect means of representative democracy), but in practice,
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civil society seemed to have lost the right to participate, since the focus was on the individual66
(Salamanca, 2004) and on the condition that he/she supported the government (Espina, 2007).
Therefore, many scholars have agreed with the fact that since 1998, civil society
organizations have become more active politically, however, they tend to disagree about the
causes of this increased mobilization. Some argue that mobilization has increased due to the
threat from the government, thus they have become politicized, however, they often found
themselves unprepared- or unwilling in the middle of the political arena when the parties
collapsed (González de Pacheco, 2003). Others assert that new opportunities have been created
by the Chávez regime, which has mobilized civil society actors and increased their political
participation (García-Guadilla, 2003).
In regards to the political opportunities available for women’s movements, unlike other
civil society groups, Friedman (2000) states that women across civil society, political society,
and the state organized to take advantage of the political opportunities present at a time of crisis
of the democratic system (p.233) as evidenced in the previous period of economic and political
instability. Similarly, but for different reasons, during the beginning of the transition to a more
participative regime in 1998, women organized in order to take advantage of the process of
writing the 1999 Constitution. In fact, during the regime transition in 1999, the CONAMU was
about to be shut down by the journalist in charge of the Presidential Secretariat because of lack
of funds, and women’s groups and the women working in the CONAMU mobilized to convince
the President to create the women’s institute INAMUJER that the 1997 Law of Equal
opportunity for Women, they also proposed long-time activist María León for the post of
Director of newly created INAMUJER (the budget was reduced though) (García Ramirez,
Rosillo, and Valdivieso, 2005; Espina, 2007).
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Women in government (political women and femocrats) called on all women from the
extinct CONG and those who had worked in previous governments to prepare proposals for the
changes in the constitution. Many women in INAMUJER and in the National Constituency
Assembly had been former members of the CONG and knew, based on their success in gender
policy reform during the previous period, that the best strategy to impact gender policy reform
was unity in order to protect the earlier gains and include new ones.

The 1999 Constitution: Proposals and Achievements
García Ramirez (1999), a feminist activist involved in writing the proposals to be
included in the 1999 Constitution, stressed the fact that the propositions should be discussed in
the light of international and national instruments that advance women’s rights (the 1979
CEDAW ratified by Congress in 1982, the 1994 Convention Belem do Pará ratified by Congress
in 1995, the Social and Reproductive Rights established in Cairo in 1994, the 1993 Law on Equal
Opportunities for Women, and the 1997 Law against Women and the Family). Her account of
the detailed proposals indicate that the women’s movement was interested in broadening Article
61 of the 1961 Constitution which established non-discrimination based on sex to add nondiscrimination based on ethnicity, age, physical and/or mental incapacity, sexual orientation,
language, and political opinion, among others. According to García Ramirez (1999), although the
1961 Constitution recognized non-discrimination, discrimination was still present in at least three
aspects: sexual, social, and ethnic. Women were still discriminated against as Article 37 of the
1961 Constitution did not allow for women to pass on her nationality as men could. In addition,
Afro-Venezuelan women, Indian women, homosexuals and disabled people were also
discriminated against.
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The proposals put forward by women also included reforms to Article 65 of the 1961
Constitution that referred to the right of citizens to hold religious beliefs, but pointed to the fact
that no religious ideas should be used to make decisions about how to carry out the duties of a
law or to stop anyone from exercising his/her rights. In addition, it emphasized the need to
ensure the individual’s right to health and education as a means to develop his/her full spirit and
citizenship. In addition García Ramirez (1999) argued that, in terms of education and health, the
Venezuelan state violated the rights of women by discriminating against women through an
educational system that was traditional, full of stereotypes, used sexist texts and pedagogical
practices. On the contrary, women called for educational practices that focused on teaching
children about gender equality, human rights and peace (p. 9).
Similarly, in terms of the reproductive and sexual rights of women, the proposals
established that the State violated women’s rights when decisions about their sexual and
reproductive rights were considered through religious lenses and when religion informed the
decisions of legislators, state officials, and judges. In the proposals, women demanded the
National Assembly to discuss women’s sexual and reproductive rights devoid of religious
believes and pointed to secular character of the State as established in article 65 of the 1961
Constitution it (Ferrara-Bardile, 1999).
Finally, the proposals suggested the distinction of women from children, since this
practice was degrading to women as it portrait them as inferior individuals; it also called for the
diffusion, among citizens, especially women, of the existence of the 1993 Law of Equal
Opportunities for Women. Put simply, the proposals included all elements of what has been
referred to before as the feminist agenda (Espina, 2007).The women’s proposals related to sexual
and reproductive rights (art.76), the recognition of the economic value of the household job (art.
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88) and the provision of social security for the housewife (art. 88)67 were successfully included
in the 1999 constitution. The inclusion of these articles is of major importance for women’s for
two reasons pointed out by feminists: a) Article 76 establishes the protection of maternity and
thus pregnant women from the moment of conception as opposed to the protection of the child
from conception which the 1961 constitution stated, b) Article 88 eliminates the private-public
divide by recognizing women’s work inside the home as adding economic value (FerraraBardile, 2001). The elimination of the phrase “from conception “of article 76 was not possible
due to “infernal pressure of some bishops and the Archbishop of Caracas” (Ferrara-Bardile,
2001:17). The article states then that “…The State will guarantee integral assistance and
protection to maternity, generally, from the moment of conception, during pregnancy, birth and
after giving birth as well as integral planning family methods based on scientific and ethical
values.”68
Another achievement of women in the 1999 Constitution was the incorporation of nonsexist language in the text of the constitution by including the use of the masculine and feminine
versions of all political actors it mentions.69 Two important feminists, Viki Ferrara-Bardile and
Gioconda Espina were members of the Style Commission that oversaw the writing of the
Constitution. Viki Ferrara-Bardile was personally invited by the President of Commission and
Gioconda Espina was appointed by INAMUJER and the Permanent Commission of Family,
Women, and Youth. Their efforts at including non-sexist language in the new constitution were
influenced and legitimized by UNESCO’s resolutions in 1987 and 1989 recommending to avoid
the use of terms that refer to one sex only, calling on all state parties to promote the use of
reference to both sexes, and providing guidelines for the use of nonsexist language by Language
and Documents Service of the UNESCO (1990).70 In addition, - Ferrara-Bardile (2001) mentions
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the influence of the recommendations of the European Council of Ministries in 1990 especially
calling Latin American countries to promote the use of nonsexist language in society at large and
to adapt the language of legal, educational and public administration texts coherent with the
principle of gender equality and promote the use of nonsexist language in the mass media (p. 5).
Accordingly, the inclusion of non-sexist language in the 1999 constitution is considered
by some as evidence that women as well as men can equally participate politically since the
opposite is regarded as making women invisible and a way to actually exclude women (García,
1999, Ferrara-Bardile, 2001; Wilpert, 2003). Besides, feminist support for the use of non-sexist
language in the 1999 Constitution stems form their recognition that language is not innocent and
that the use of sexist language contributes to women’s discrimination (Espina, 2005; Chacon,
2007).71
Another achievement for women was that the 1999 constitution included all international
treaties as having equal standing within the Constitution (art. 21), which means they must be
enforced immediately by the appropriate judicial actor (Suárez, 1999). In terms of women’s
rights, the constitution uses the concept of discrimination as it is conceived in the CEDAW
which means that discrimination implies bias as such and also bias that produces inequality.72
In regards to the process of inclusion of the proposals, Combellas (2003) offers a
noteworthy account on the how and what of the National Constituent Assembly (ANC) created
in order to write the 1999 Constitution, from the point of view of his experience as a former
member of the ANC. I will focus here on the aspects of the process relevant to women. First of
all the process of writing the 1999 Constitution took place in the Deputy Chamber of the
Congress from August until December 1999. It was in the hands of people elected through direct
vote by an open system of candidates. Thus, candidacy was open to civil society, political
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parties, and private individuals, The make up of the ANC was decided through a referendum;
131 members were elected among which there was only one woman (supporter of Chávez). The
proposals on which the ANC members based their discussions were the ones the Bicameral
Commission of the previous administration had compiled in the period 1989-1999. Other
proposals came from President Chávez, from political parties --AD, Proyecto Venezuela,
Convergencia, and from civil association Primero Justicia.73 In addition, a varied group of civil
society organizations including women, human rights groups, environmental groups, and the
Catholic Church, among others, introduced proposals that were discussed in commissions with
open doors in an independent way and with the help of their own advisors. Notwithstanding, the
open, broad, and participative character of the first stage of the discussion; the second stage was
hurried into approval under pressure from the president and the result imposed on the members
of the ANC without the chance to make modifications (Combellas, 2003).

The Impact of Polarization on the Women’s Movement
In contrast with women’s groups’ mobilization and unification during the early 1990s,
the political polarization that began before the 1998 presidential elections, increased in 1999
after the transition and reached a climax in the period 2002-2004. This period was characterized
by increased political polarization and confrontation that affected the women’s movement and
their ability to impact gender policy reform (García Ramirez, Rosillo, and Valdivieso, 2005;
Espina, 2007). The political crisis fragmented “the pacts” that had united women in the past in
spite of partisan differences, but that had become fragile during the later part of the pervious
period as collaboration among women’s groups declined. According to feminist activists,
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political polarization made the women’s movement even more fragile and less effective than in
the previous period (García Ramirez, Rosillo, and Vaidivieso, 2005).
The 1999 transition created news ways of organizing among women, new meeting spaces
and new ways of relating to the state. García Ramirez and Rosillo (2005) argue that the new
“participatory democracy” called for the organization of civil society and in the case of women
this meant organizing at the grassroots level through the use of “meeting places,” thus
overcoming the organizational characteristic of networks of the previous period. Nonetheless,
these new ways of organizing fractured even further the women’s movement. The purpose of
these meeting places was “to relate the women from the base communities to the State in order
to, among other things, rescue the historic memory of Venezuela, create a new network of
solidarity among women, and fight poverty.”74
García Ramirez, Rosillo, and Vaidivieso, (2005) argue that although new organizations
have been created during this period by the government, it has been difficult to get them to
support the fight for the feminist agenda because their efforts are focused on supporting the
political leader, President Chávez, and his political agenda. New women’s organizations include
the Meeting Points created by INAMUJER, networks of women’s users of credits provided by
the women’s bank BANMUJER, women’s land committees, and water committees, women’s
organizations supporting the political parties in support of President Chávez, and the social
programs created for women called “missions.” These latter deserve careful attention here since
they have been created by Presidential decrees under the Enabling Law, and are regulated by
special laws and dependent on the Ministry of Popular Power for Participation and Social
Protection. The Misión Madre the Barrio75 provides support for housewives in critical need;
Negra Hipólita76 is directed to addressing the needs of children, (pregnant) adolescents, adults,
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and disabled people in extreme poverty or homeless. In 2007, the mission Negra Hipólita was
transformed into a foundation.
The state argues that these programs are the means to guarantee and protect the social
rights of citizens as established in the 1999 Constitution (article 86 establishes the right of
citizens to social security, among others). Others argue that these programs have allowed poor
women, previously excluded, to have access to economic, health benefits, education, food, and
credits thus creating a new social fabric and a new political identity to defend the political project
(García, 2005). Yet, creating parallel social programs instead of implementing the existing laws
does not contribute to advancing citizens and in this case, women’s rights. What is needed is the
implementation of the existing laws, such as the 2002 Organic Law of Social Security (which
remains incomplete, and has not been implemented yet since its promulgation) and the
articulation of the existing laws with the new social programs.
On the side of the feminist camp, Espina (2007) and Espina and Rakowski, (2007) are
especially critical of the social programs for women and of the new women’s organizations.
These activists, criticize the populist nature of the missions and how they have transformed statesociety relations, since those benefiting from the social programs are considered “comrades,
fellow citizens, and friends in the struggle” Espina and Rakowski, (2007: 3). In addition Chávez
uses a clientelistic discourse by offering women these programs and so the new women’s
organizations are unable to support the fight for legal gender reform because they are either too
busy supporting and defending the leader’s agenda, putting the feminist agenda aside, or they are
unable to recognize and challenge their subordination (Espina, 2007). In short, there is consensus
among feminist activists that the new types of women’s organizations do not allow them to take
a critical stance about the patriarchal nature of the state and society thus hindering their ability to
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make proposals that include a gender perspective. “The political-ideological manipulation of the
social programs directed to women has divided the women’s groups since the social programs
cannot be regarded as public policies in the technical sense.”77
These recent developments point to two important factors that impact gender policy
reform during this period. On the one hand, the state has created a new constitution to carry out
changes in redistribution of wealth and the inclusion of the poor and marginalized (where women
are the majority), however, although the social programs can be considered measures of
inclusion of marginalized groups, their creation has not been the result of the law-making
process of the legislature, but presidential decrees. On the other hand, the programs and policies
directed at women lack the creative and independent input of women’s groups (feminists or
grassroots) since they all depend on the president’s agenda and are exclusionary in practice
because the only ones benefiting from them are indeed government’s supporters. In other words,
the centralized nature of decision-making during this period may lead to lack of legal reform on
women’s issues understood as part of the feminist agenda and to the design of public policies
addressed to specific groups of women in detriment of all Venezuelan women.
Additionally, the political polarization among the women’s movement has affected the
way women activist regard the future of the Venezuelan women’s movement and the process of
gender policy reform during this period. Some feminists involved in the process of legal reform
regard this period as unsuccessful (García Ramirez, Rosillo, Valdivieso, 2005; Espina, 2007)
while others think that the rights of women have not been advanced, but reversed (Merz Repem,
2005). Still others activists assert that some women working from the political arena have lost
their capacity to educate other women about women’s rights; have been unable to make
proposals that are different from those of the state, and have ignored the women’s agendas
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(Espina and Rowoski, 2007; Espina, 2008)78. Admittedly, the support of women for the leader
has led to the subordination of the women’s agendas to that of the state (Espina, 2007) as a
consequence of the negative impact of the creation of a personality cult of Chavez’s leadership
(Wilpert, 2005).
On the contrary, Maria León, President of INAMUJER stated that “the constitution had
the face of a woman, as a political achievement, because during the Chavez’s administration
women have made social and political thanks to the current administration.79 During the
celebration of the 9th anniversary of INAMUJER and this time as Ministry of State for Women’s
Affairs, León stated that thanks to the “revolution, led by President Chavez, women’s social and
political recognition has taken place as illustrated by the CNE’s resolution approving 50/50
political participation in electoral lists; the creation of the Ministry for Women’s Affairs, the fact
that four out of five state powers are led by women, and the increasing political participation of
women in the missions (75%) and in the communal councils (70%). But most importantly, the
fact that women’s demands became institutionalized thanks to President Chávez.”80
Also as a result of the polarization of the women’s movement, during this period much of
the work by feminist activists has dealt with the kind of women’s organization that has proved
successful in influencing gender polity reform. Many think that mobilization of women’s groups
has been led by a core group of women activists, rather than a women’s movement, that in
critical moments has been able to mobilize support from other women to act through the
effective alliance made up among women in government, women in NGOs, and women in
academia (Espina and Rakowski, 2002; Garcia Ramirez, Rosillo, and Vaidivieso, 2005; Espina,
2007). In the view of the feminist activists, the core group has been flexible and thus has
attracted women from all ages and walks of life to support change when there has been an
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opportunity. In contrast, others like García Ramirez and Rosillo (2005) think that the pact created
by women in government, women in NGOs, and women in academia was an elitist one that,
even if beneficial for the rest of the Venezuelan women in pushing gender policy reform, it was
not always inclusive of other women outside the pact in the discussion of women’s issues.
As described in Chapter One, during the first period (1970-1988) the core group
mobilized behind the reform of the Civil Code in 1982 motorized by the civil organization
FEVA. Then, during the second period (1989-1998), it gathered 25 NGOs under the CONG
while working on the evaluation of the UN’s Decade for Women to push for the reform of the
Labor Law and the law against Violence against Women and the Family. In 1999, women
gathered again during the writing of the new Constitution to defend all gains and introduce new
ones (Espina, 2007; online interview with Elsi Arellano). While the gains of the first period were
legal, they also included the type that aimed at transforming the patriarchal discourse of political
leaders and to allow for the continuation of the movement (Garcia Ramirez, Rosillo, and
Vaidivieso, 2005). The gains of the second period were legal and political and all within the
framework of international legal instruments that the state has signed and ratified (Garcia
Ramirez, Rosillo, and Vaidivieso, 2005). During this last period, the split among the women’s
groups has resulted in little legal reform on women’s issues, but increased participation of
women in government positions through the appointment of important feminists and political
activists from the past to decision-making posts. However, dependence of women’s organizing at
the grassroots level by the state through the women’s institute INAMUJER and the social
missions directed at poor women is a staple characteristic of this period.
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The Women’s Movement after Polarization
From 2004 to 2006, women gathered again during important events related to women’s
rights and gender policy reform. First, they united forces to reject the formulation of a nullity for
some articles of the 1998 Law against Violence against Women and the Family introduced by
the Attorney General in 2003 and to work on the draft rules of procedure to implement the 1998
Law against Violence against Women and the Family. Second, they started working on the
proposals for the partial reform of the Penal Code (submitted by women’s groups in 2004 before
the National Assembly) and the draft rules of the 2000 Law of Social Security System (Espina,
2007). In the same way, the director of INAMUJER continued pushing the issue of political
participation by calling for replacing the 30% women’s quotas in legislative lists established in
the 1997 Organic Law of Suffrage and Political Participation for 50/50 political participation for
women and men. Finally, organized women called for the implementation of laws that prohibit
the use and abuse of stereotypes of women’s images in advertisements of all sorts.
Since 2004, the meeting place for the core group has been the women research center
CEM at the UCV (Universidad Central de Venezuela) where women inside the core groups meet
with experts, NGOs, women from the National Assembly, the Judiciary, political leaders, and so
on to agree and reach consensus among all of them. Chavistas and non-chavistas 81 came
together as in the past putting partisan differences aside because they realized that what unites
them is democracy and their goal of achieving equality (Espina, 2007:6). Garcia Ramirez et al.
(2005) affirm that women in academic circles in Universidad Central de Venezuela, Universidad
del Zulia, Universidad de Carabobo, and Universidad de Los Andes have lately become
coordinators, facilitators, and generators of reform initiatives of all women committed to pushing
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the feminist agenda regardless of partisan differences (p. 154). The following section describes
the achievements and failure in gender policy reform during the transition.

Gender Equality

In 1999, the 1997 Equal Opportunity Law (LIOM) was reformed in its title VI that called
for the creation of the women’s institute. Consequently, the INAMUJER was created and the
Defender of Women’s Rights was created under the direction of INAMUJER (García, Rosillo,
and Valdivieso, 2005). Alongside the creation of the INAMUJER, a presidential decree
eliminated the representation of civil society inside the women’s institute. According to
Arellano, “it deepened political discrimination among women and violated the right of civic
participation; what we find here is a contradiction between the political discourse of participatory
democracy and the reality of the Venezuelan state.” 82
In 2002 the National assembly started discussions on a Law for Equality and Equity, but
it was delayed until 2008 because of lack of interest of political leaders (García Ramirez, Rosillo,
and Valdivieso, 2005). In July 2008, the National Assembly approved in its first discussion
session the law that will substitute the 1997 LIOM and that Espina (2008) calls the “Marelis law”
(after the name of the woman in the legislature pushing for it).83 Similarly to the previous LIOM,
the new law is going to be hard to implement because it suffers from the same weaknesses of the
LIOM: it lacks the agent and the mechanism to implement it. In the view of Espina (2008)
Venezuelan women are not lacking in laws, but on the implementation of the existing ones.

118
Social Security
As stated in the previous chapter, the government in 1998 decided to mandate the 1997
social security law five vacatio legis84 to avoid its implementation. In December 2000, the
Organic Law of the System of Social Security was promulgated and it derogated the previous
one. This new law seemed consistent with the presidential promises and Article 88 of the 1999
Constitution. Nonetheless, opinion of women interviewed for the study was not optimistic as
many considered the law to be one of those laws that exist only on paper.85 This law creates a
system of social security and regards it as a human right and a social right that must be
guaranteed by the State, which represents a move away from the attempts to privatize the social
security. It calls on the People’s Ombudsman to create the Defender of the Social Security; it
guarantees the right to health and pensions to protect motherhood, fatherhood, sickness,
accidents, and so on. However, the law has not been implemented until this writing. Some
believe that the lack of implementation by the state is the result of a lack of political will that
hides behind the excuse that its implementation is technically impossible (Salcedo, 2008); others
argue it is a law that, although created in response to the constitutional right of citizens to social
security (art. 86), it is impossible to put in practice because of the lack of capacity of the state to
eliminate the old system and create the new one (Combellas, 2003).

In 2004, women’s groups gathered to work on the regulations of the 2000 Law of Social
Security System that grants minimum wage payment to housewives who do not have social
security and who are enrolled in the institute that administers the social security benefits (IVSS)
(Espina, 2007). The proposals were presented to the Permanent Commission of the Family,
Women and Youth in the National Assembly. Nonetheless, women interviewed for the study
asserted that amidst the context of regime change, as political polarization increased, the
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implementation of public policies derived from specific laws become politicized “as the
constitutional right is violated by its implementation through social missions such as Negra
Hipólita for a certain number of women identified with the government and not all the women as
established by the Constitution;”86 the Organic Law of the System of Social Security is an
example of this as the beneficiaries of the 60-80% of the minimum wage must be housewives
appointed by their communities and then evaluated by the Ministry of Popular Power for
Participation and Social Protection in order to obtain the stipend (INAMUJER, 2007). In
addition, parallel social programs have been created to address the needs of poor women as
stated above and such programs, referred to as missions, require that the beneficiary be a
political supporter of the government (Interview with Arellano and also Espina, 2007).

Women’s Political Participation
The major achievement of the 1997 Suffrage and Political Participation Law was its
requirement of 30 percent women’s quotas for all political parties for their legislative slates.
However, failure to implement the quotas in the 2000 and 2004 regional elections demonstrated
an important reversal in the legal advance of women’s rights as this negatively affected women’s
participation in political positions (Merz Repem, 2005). In 2000, the National Electoral Council
(CNE) decided “not to apply” Article 144 of the law arguing that it was contrary to the principle
of equality established in the 1999 Constitution (Merz, 2005). In addition, the Supreme Justice
Tribunal (TSJ) decided to endorse this decision in spite of pressure by women’s groups, and
despite contravening Article 21 number 2 of the Constitution, which establishes the use of
positive measures for disadvantaged or discriminated against groups (p. 130). Women’s groups
organized and introduced an appeal before the Constitutional Chamber of the TSJ against the

120
decision of the Electoral Chamber, (endorsed by the CNE), however, the appeal did not succeed
(Merz, 2005; Heredia, 2006)
Merz Repem’s (2005) study asserts that among the reasons used to explain the lack of
implementation of women’s quotas in 2000 were the lack of resources to create a campaign in
favor of the application of women’s quotas among the political parties, and the impact of
political polarization on the political parties that prevented them from endorsing the women’s
appeal introduced before the TSJ against the CNE’s decision. This author concludes that very
low political will on the part of the leaders of political parties and state institutions to increase
women’s political participation has actually reversed the political participation of women (Merz,
2005). Her measure of “political will” included the application of women’s quotas for all
political parties for their legislative slates and the institutional follow up to guarantee that
equality had been achieved and the systematic presentation of results disaggregated by sex.
The failure of women’s groups to reverse the CNE’s decision in 2000 typifies what
García Ramirez (1999) describes as the quick sand effect of laws or public policies, regional or
national, which seem to change depending on changes in the political leadership, for this reason
women’s rights seem to be advanced and reversed, and in spite of women’s activism, in
Venezuela and the rest of the region, some decisions, taken behind closed doors, go in detriment
of the already (historic) achieved collective gains.
In terms of the direct impact of the failure to apply the women’s quotas in 2000, we find
that in fact in 2002, there were only 2 women governors out of 23 states and no women
ministers. In the regional elections only 12.6% women were candidates and 8.9% were elected,
that is 29 women out of 339 candidates (CISFEM, 2007). Access to power by women decreased
between 1995 and 2000 falling 3.49 points in the index developed by Merz Repem (2005).87
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However, this trend began to change in 2003 with an increase of 4.06 in the index for women’s
participation. In 2003 there were 5 women ministers out of 19 ministries as a result of their
inclusion in the ministerial Cabinet. In this regard, it is important to point out how the trend to
assign women to traditional portfolios has also been changing progressively. Traditionally,
women have been appointed to the state agency in charge of developing women’s policies,
however, they have rarely had the rank of a ministry; they have always been dependent on the
executive. I addition, women have led ministries in the areas of health and education and women
in the family that are considered traditional portfolios for women. For instance, consider the
Minister of State for Incorporation of Women to Development in 1979; the Minister of State for
the Promotion of Women in 1989; the Minister of Family and the Minister of Youth in 1995; the
Minister of Labor and the Minister of Youth in 1998. Interestingly though, the trend seems to
have changed since 2003 with women leading the ministries of labor, health and social
development; but also the environment; and science and technology. In the 2008 report by
Llanos and Sample, part of this is explained by commitment made by states at the Fourth World
Conference on Women (p. 19). Other explanations are “the inconsistent goodwill” of those in
power. 88
In 2005 women’s appeal before the CNE and the Supreme Court was turned down again
and article 144 was not applied again for the 2005 legislative elections. The Supreme Court
ignored the appeal filed by organized women and supported this second time by the director of
INAMUJER and the Venezuelan University Network of Women studies (REUVEM). At the
same time, organized women continued pushing in favor of replacing the 30% women’s quotas
with the 50/50 quotas for women and men alternating in all posts and all lists. In 2005, the
director of INAMUJER (supported by the women’s network REUVEM among others) submitted

122
a request before the CNE to replace the 30% quotas with 50 % quotas alternating women and
men. Espina (2007) argues that the recognition by all women leaders (from both sides, pro- and
against Chávez) that the elimination of the quotas since 2000 had negatively affected them, has
positively influenced the campaign for the inclusion of 50/50 in posts of political representation;
it was more publicized and received more attention from political leaders. However, it is
important to highlight that Espina (2007) states that women present in the discussions about the
electoral lists, actually nominated men and women only as substitutes for other men; they did not
oppose discrimination against women done in the way the lists were traditionally made.
Eventually, three out of five members of the CNE board suggested that the political
parties to include 50% women quotas, alternating men and women, in the parties’. However, as
Espina (2007) states, because it was just a suggestion, women did not even get 30% and even the
ones elected for the National Assembly were so because they were in the lists due to their
political support for Chávez and because the opposition withdrew their candidates.89 In the
opinion of feminist activists, women in the political parties did not perceive themselves as ready
for public office and thus machismo was able to win (Espina, 2007:4).
In spite of the unfortunate impact that the derogation of article 144 has had on women’s
political participation since 1998, women’s political participation in ministerial Cabinets and
state powers (branches of government) increased in 2007 as a result of executive appointments.
In 2007, 3 out of 5 state powers were headed by women: the Judicial, Legislative, and Electoral
powers. Llanos and Sample (2008) argue that this trend has been observed in other Latin
American countries; the inclusion of women in the Cabinet may be a way for candidates to keep
the promises of including more women in key positions or to improve the image of politicians
amidst crisis of legitimacy, “in these cases, women’s participation may be seen as a source of
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innovation or transformation of “old-style” politics (Llanos and Sample, 2008:18). In addition,
18.5% of ministerial posts were held by women in 2007.90 However, Venezuela’s 18.5 % of
women appointed in ministerial positions is considered very low when compared with Costa
Rica (37.5), Chile (36.4), Ecuador (32), and Nicaragua (31. 2) (Llanos and Sample, 2008) in
spite of the perception by some Venezuelan women that there is a remarkable higher number of
women represented in the current administration (Chacon, 2007; Espina, 2007).
It was only in 2008 that Chávez called on the PSUV (the macro-political party created in
2007 to united the political forces that support Chávez) to use the 50/50 quotas for women and
men in the party’s elections; the outcome was seven women and eight men within the party’s
board (Chacon, 2007). Furthermore, in 2008, the CNE issued resolution number 050401-179 in
July 200891 approving the norm of 50/50 quotas for women and men with parity for the regional
legislative and municipal council elections because in past elections only 10.6 % of women had
been elected to all political posts due to the lack of implementation of affirmative measures to
increase women’s political participation.92 Espina (2008) expressed her joy for the measure
achieved after ten years of struggle by women; Tibisay Lucena, long-time feminist activist and
president of the CNE, called it a “historic decision.”93
Notwithstanding the importance of this recent development in Venezuela, it is important
to take into account other considerations that impact women’s political representation in Latin
America in countries with legal quotas (as opposed to voluntary ones). For the quotas to be
effective there must be clear rules on the position that the women would occupy within the party
lists, as well as clear sanctions for the lack of compliance. In the Venezuelan case, article 144 of
the Suffrage and Political Participation Law does not establish a particular position for the
women, but calls on their incorporation to the parties’ lists in a minimum of 30 per cent. In
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addition, although the article establishes that noncompliance will result on the lack of official
inclusion of the party’s list, these sanctions are either not enforced or the women are put at the
end of the list with little possibility to get elected.94 However, with the CNE’s resolution, women
have achieved more than what article 144 of the law calls for, but the resolution needs to be
made into a law.

Violence against Women
As in the previous period, the existence of international declarations, treaties, and
conventions for the protection of human rights and women’s rights, gave the women’s movement
the infrastructure needed to continue the fight for the rights of women in particular and
contributed to making the issue of violence against women more visible (García Ramirez, 1999;
Heredia de Salvatierra, 2006).95 The Law on Violence against Women and the Family was
passed in 1998, but it became effective only in January 1999 García Ramirez (1999). In 2001 the
INAMUJER created a help line to assist victims of domestic violence from 2001 until 2006 it has
received an average of 21.382 until 2006.96
During the period of polarization that affected the women’s movement, the law remained
as it was, but it actually suffered a reversal in its achievements. In 2003, the Attorney General
introduced an annulment for three of the most important articles of the law: suspended the
preventative measures against the aggressor (Article 39); eliminated the possibility of expelling
the aggressor from the house, and reduced the number of legal instances receiving the victim’s
complaints leaving the victims unprotected. Many groups of women including academics,
NGOs, INAMUJER, and the Defender of Women’s Rights made efforts to reverse the decision
before the Supreme Court (Heredia de Salvatierra, 2006), and protested outside the office of the
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Attorney General against the measure that represented a setback in the protection of women and
the eradication of domestic and sexual violence.97 Astonishingly, the Supreme Court delayed the
answer and there was a judicial vacuum until 2006 when there were two modifications of the law
that led to the promulgation of the Organic Law of the Right of Women to a Life Free of
Violence in 2006 (discussed below). For three years, the women protected by the preventive
measure suspended by the Attorney General, were left defenseless and according to Espina
(2007) this is what triggered organized women to propose a new law before the National
Assembly.
Organized women created a coalition that included academics, NGOs, INAMUJER, the
Defender of Women’s Right, and the Public Ministry to work on a draft proposal for a new law
on violence that was introduced to the National Assembly in 2006. The proposal was negotiated
through the Sub-Commission of the Rights of the Women and the Permanent Commission of
Family, Woman, and Youth. In addition to the discussions taking place at the National
Assembly, the debates for the modified law included “street parliamentarism”, meaning
discussions with women on the streets, organized in communal council in neighborhoods, as well
as discussions led and organized by academics in university centers and NGOS (Chacon, 2007).
In 2006, the effort by women working on the modification of the law on violence and the
rules to implement it achieved a success when the Supreme Court included a broader
interpretation of flagrancy that did not require catching the aggressor in the act of violence, but
the evidence of violence was enough to constitute a crime. The 2006 law became the most
advanced law of this type in the world; the law classified domestic violence as a violation of
human rights and defined nineteen (19) types of violence with their respective sanctions,
including the threat of violence.
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In spite of the success at the passing of the 2006 Organic Law of the Right of Women to
a Life Free of Violence, a report by Amnesty International done in 2008 shows that in terms of
its application, the authorities have done little to implement it; it is estimated that one woman is
attacked every 15 minutes in the country. The help phone line received 4.500 calls, but Amnesty
International states that only 1 out of 9 women report abuse. On the side of the INAMUJER,
there were only three women shelters in 2007 and currently there are only two. Critics of the lack
of implementation pointed to the lack of specialized tribunals to deal with the cases, and the lack
of training on gender violence on the part of the public officials in charge of receiving the
complaints. Amnesty International concluded that although the law had the potential to protect
women’s lives, reality depended on the political will and adequate resources to implement the
law.98
As Heredia de Salvatierra (2006) aptly puts it, the issue of violence against women is
more structural than formal, because the law exists, what is lacking though is the infrastructure
and the resources needed to protect women: care centers and shelters, support for (and
coordination with) NGOs working on the issue of violence against women, campaigns on the
rights of women and how to access justice, and education on women’s rights for women and of
gender perspective for those dealing with the victims of domestic and sexual violence.
At the end of 2008, the state agencies through the direction of INAMUJER have started
addressing these weaknesses and began the creation of special tribunals, the education and
training of public officials (judges, policemen, municipal authorities) as well as the realization of
campaigns to educate, prevent and eradicate violence.
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Sexual and Reproductive Rights: The Unresolved Issue of Abortion
The issue of the decriminalization of abortion had been discussed among women’s
groups since the 1970s with a lot of upheaval99 as shown in Chapter Two. Although the issue of
abortion has been framed as a public health issue, its discussion had been plagued by opposition
from conservative sectors of society, but mainly by the Catholic Church and NGOs sponsored by
the Church.100 Organized women have introduced three proposals when there has been revision
of the Penal Code. However, according to Arellano “the influence of the Catholic Church has
been determinant on the issue of abortion as well as on the lack of visibility of other sexual
crimes; the biased position of the Church reinforces the inappropriate definition of such crimes
as ‘crimes against moral values, good manners, and good families.”101
The idea of the proposals presented during this period (1999- 2007), as many women
activists claim, was not to legalize abortion, but decriminalize its practice. The current
Venezuelan Penal Code allows abortion only when the life of the mother is in danger. Therefore,
women fighting for reform of the Penal Code have framed the issue in terms of an “interruption
of pregnancy” (Espina, 2004). When women reunited in 2004, they worked on the proposals for
the reform of the Penal Code; the proposals included the decriminalization of abortion (to be
considered a crime only when performed without the woman’s consent) and the definition of
sexual crimes as established in the Rome Statute. In 2004, the Broad Women’s Movement
(MAM)102 introduced a proposal for the reform of the Penal Code in which the MAM argued that
the penalization of abortion did not solve the problem of women dying because of the practice of
clandestine abortions. The proposals emphasized the need to prevent the death of women who
have abortions because of pregnancies product of incest and rape. The MAM claimed that in
Venezuela, statistics available for 1997-2001 indicated 381.948 (sic) cases of death caused by
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abortion and in 2002, an average of one woman died every week of unsafe abortions, affecting
more poor women and teenagers (Espina, 2004).103
The MAM used the examples of other Latin American countries where abortion norms
had been liberalized because of the implications on the health of women. In addition, it cited the
entire legal international framework for the protection of human rights (and the national legal
instruments) arguing that forcing a woman to remain pregnant was a violation of human rights.
The proposal introduced before the National Assembly to the Commission on Family, Women
and Youth was led by the Director of the CEM in the Universidad Central de Venezuela,
Magdalena Valdivieso, and included most women’s organizations and research centers. It was
supported by more than 10 organizations requesting the National Assembly for the
decriminalization of abortion and adultery.104 Women’s organizations introduced the proposal in
2004 and in 2005 met a female deputy from the political party MVR to request her to introduce
the proposal for the decriminalization of abortion in the discussion of the partial reform of the
Penal Code to be discussed in the National Assembly.
The Catholic Church opposed the proposal of decriminalizing abortion; the president of
the Venezuelan Episcopal Conference (CEV), Monsignor Porras, stated in a press release that the
decriminalization of abortion would entail abandoning “an ethical value fundamental for judicial
and social order.” To the CEV’s statement, the female deputy pushing for the proposals in the
National Assembly replied that the President of the CEV did not have the moral authority to talk
about such an issue since rape and pederasty were crimes commonly committed by priests
around the world, but also in Venezuela.105 In addition, the influence of the Catholic Church in
opposing the decriminalization of abortion and the recognition of sexual crimes was so biased
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that it reinforced the idea that those were “crimes against morality” instead of issues of public
health that affect women’s health.106
Another female deputy pushing for the reform, the president of the Permanent
Commission of Family, Women, and Youth, argued that the proposal was the result of 30 years
of serious work and investigation carried out by many women’s organizations such as the MAM
and the institute of women (now INAMUJER).107 In short, the proposals for the
decriminalization of abortion was framed as an issue of public health that caused the death of
women (especially among poor and teenaged women) and as a right of the state to guarantee the
sexual and reproductive rights of women.108 The proposals were also supported by members of
the Commission on Sexual and Reproductive Rights of the Society of Gynecological and
Obstetric Services. Women’s groups failed in their proposals about abortion and the inclusion of
sexual crimes as established in the Rome Statute (Garcia Ramirez, Rosillo, and Valdivieso,
2005). The partial reform of the Penal Code passed with a simple majority (86 out of 165
votes),109 but the proposals by women did not pass because they did not garner enough support
from all legislators.
Several explanations have been offered for the failure of the women’s movement to
achieve gender policy reform in the area of sexual and reproductive rights of women. The
perception of some of the women involved in the process of reform is that there is lack of
consensus among women’s groups in civil society about the issue of abortion in spite of the
broad support of most women (Espina, 2007; 2008, Álvarez, 2008).Others claimed that at the
time of the proposals there were was a media campaign to divide women into those in favor and
those against abortion and that the media wanted to downplay the nature of the proposals made
by women to reform the Penal Code.110 Moreover, other women’s perception was that during this
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period (2004-2006), the reform of the Penal Code was not a priority of the National Assembly
and therefore the proposals introduced by women’s groups did not seem to advance. For
instance, there was no evidence that the state was promoting the creation of mechanisms to
actually address abortion such as the creation of norms for the Ministry of Health.
Despite the lack of success in advancing women’s sexual and reproductive rights, in
terms of the decriminalization of abortion, women interviewed for the study asserted that in the
third period, due to rifts between the Church and the State, the discussion of women’s issues
became more visible (in fact they regard that coverage of women’s issues in the media increased
in the last years).111 In the view of one interviewee, when the Church and State were allies (from
1970 until 1998), women’s issues were invisible unless they affected the interests of the state or
the Church; in fact, both institutions enforced women’s subordination and discrimination.112
In the course of the three periods analyzed here, gender policy reform regarding the
decriminalization of abortion has been affected by the influence of Catholic Church and its
supporters. As presented in Chapter Two, the first and only discussion of abortion took place
in1974 during the celebration of the First Women’s Congress organized by the COFEAPRE.
Opposition came from the women members of the COPEI party, who left in the middle of the
discussion. However, interest in discussing how to address the problem of deaths caused by
unsafe abortion led to two proposals that were never carried out: a legal one that called for the
reduction of the sanctions to women who underwent abortion and for those assisting them; and
further studies on the problem and the creation of a commission to regulate abortion along with
measures to provide women access to birth control methods in order to control fertility.113 In
contrast with the failure to the decriminalization of abortion, other issues framed as advancing
women’s equality, eliminating discrimination, and protecting the human rights of women have
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not been opposed by the Church. Moreover, contrary to what would have been expected, the rift
between Church and State that characterized the period 1999-2006, did not impact the reform of
the Penal Code in the area of abortion (or adultery), which is the focus of the next section.

Church and State Relationship
Propositions from the literature on the influence of the Catholic Church on gender policy
reform state that Church-State conflict can actually increase the discussion of divisive issues
such as abortion in the legislature, but that Church opposition to issues such as abortion
decreases the chances for its reform. Therefore, it was expected that because of the strained
relationship between Church and State that characterized this period (1999-2007), the open
discussion of abortion in the legislature would increase, and possibly a reform be achieved. In
fact, feminists’ perception of women’s issues discussions in the legislatures is that from the
beginning of 2000 the possibility of discussing the decriminalization of abortion did increase.
Nonetheless, as shown above, the influence of the Catholic Church and a conservative sector of
society (including NGOS funded and supported by the Church) was strong enough to hinder the
advancement of women’s sexual and reproductive rights.
Even after 2004, when women reunited again to push for change and wrote the proposals
for the reform of the Penal Code, Church-State conflict did not open sufficient political space to
change the status of abortion during this period, a point reinforced by women interviewed for the
study.114
In terms of strategies, a common feature of the most recent proposals on
decriminalization of abortion and non-discrimination based on sexual orientation is the fact that
activists have presented such issues, considered controversial in a Catholic society such as
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Venezuela, separated from other proposals that call for the protection of women’s human rights
like the issue of violence against women. Thus, in terms of the strategies used by women to
introduce the issue of abortion, activist women perceive that the idea of disaggregating issues
and presenting the divisive ones separately was a useful strategy to gather support. Thus the
reforms to the Penal Code presented in 2004 and later in 2007 (discussed below) were presented
separately by the MAM and the MAM and the ESE groups, respectively, with the second being
more radical than the first one.
In terms of the framing of the issue, women united behind the issue of abortion presented
it as an issue of public health focusing on the numbers of women who die as a result of
clandestine abortions due to the penalization of abortion and did not refer to it as abortion, but as
“interruption of pregnancy.” The proposal focused on the decriminalization of abortion, not its
legalization; however, the coalition of women to push for the proposals for the partial reform of
the Penal Code failed again.
Interestingly, the influence of the Catholic Church and the lack of political will by
political leaders seem to explain that periods of Church- State conflict did not produce gender
policy reform on the issue of abortion. During Chávez’s regime the relationship between the
State and the Catholic Church deteriorated precipitously with the writing and passing of the 1999
Constitution, however, relations had not always been bad between Chávez and the Catholic
Church. In fact, during the regime transition in 1999, the Church supported the government
programs to end corruption and redistribute resources in a more equitable way among the people.
Moreover, Chávez’s anti-globalization policies and anti-Americanism found echo among the
progressive sector of the Catholic Church. However, during the passing of the 1999 constitution
the Catholic Church expressed dissatisfaction with specific changes in the Constitution that dealt
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with the right to life. The 1999 Constitution states that the State will guarantee “maternity from
conception” and the Church argued that from a legislative point of view the language opened the
door to abortion and other anti-natal policies and in this way the state failed to protect the “life of
the child from conception” as the 1961 Constitution established (Kozloff, 2007). Nevertheless,
the Church made sure that the phrase “from conception” be not removed from the text as some
pro-choice supporters would have preferred (Ferrara-Bardile, 2001).
Later in 1999 the relationship between President Chavez and the Catholic Church turned
bitter around the issues of education and democracy and reached the highest point of conflict
when Chávez stated that some members of the church had allied with the “rancid oligarchy”
linking them to the previous corrupted administrations and calling some bishops evil ( Kozloff,
2007).115 The Church responded in turn describing Chavez’s government a dictatorship and
comparing Chávez with Castro, Mussolini, and Hitler.116 From that point on, members of the
high hierarchy of the Church in Venezuela, especially, Archbishop Porras, became harsh critics
of the administration.
Chávez, in turn, asserted that a small group of the Catholic Church had allied with the
corrupt oligarchy of the previous regimes and that they needed to be exorcised because the devil
had gotten into their robes.117 In fact when a member of the Church hierarchy become more
critical of Chávez, the latter responded with hyperbolic rhetoric, but made clear that he praised
the Pope, but not the small groups of clergymen in Venezuelan who had joined the opposition. In
one of Chávez’s visits to Pope John Paul II they discussed abortion and the Pope recommended
discussing the article in the constitution that dealt with guaranteeing protection of “maternity”
instead of “the child” from conception. In 2005, Chávez traveled again to Rome to meet the new
Pope Benedict XVI. The maximum authority of the Catholic Church had made clear that
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Cardinal Castillo did not represent the Church when he called for civil disobedience, but
expressed concerns that in Venezuela things were turning very authoritarian based on reports
sent to Rome by Castillo. However, during Chavez’s meeting with the Pope, the latter expressed
concerns with the status of religious education in some schools in the country as well as with
maintaining the protection of the right of the child to life “from its inception.” In a demonstration
of Chavez’s intention to turn the page over, he expressed that his conflict with the Church was
directed to a small group of people and that he had decided to let it rest because of his
responsibility to his country and to the doctrine of Christ. Immediately after that, the Church
replaced on of harsh critics of Chavez with an Italian named Giaginto Berlocco, and the new
nuncio was instructed to seek a less confrontational attitude towards the government. Berlocco
distanced himself and the Church form Castillo when the latter called people to delegitimate the
government in an attempt to demonstrate the willingness of the Church to cooperate with a
climate of peace.
In turn, Chávez praised Berlocco’s position on the issue and welcomed the appointment
of others cardinals, Urosa and Savino. By and large, although the relationship Church-State was
bitter for the most part of the period since 1999, the relationship appears to have improved
towards the end of the period in 2006. Some argue that this is in part because of the various trips
Chávez made to the Vatican city to meet the Pope and because the top hierarchy of the Catholic
Church made an attempt at soothing the relationship with the government of a country where 70
percent of its population is Catholic.
In conclusion, the relationship Church-State seems to have reached the point where both
sides have agreed to cooperate with each other. Therefore, if a conflictual relationship did not
move the issue of abortion forward, a stable relationship is less likely to do it. In fact, as Espina
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argued “Chavez does not want to discuss the issue of abortion again because he is done fighting
with the Church and that would mean starting a fight.”118

Women’s Groups’ Recent Proposals for Reform
In 2007 another opportunity for change brought together women’s groups: the
Constitutional reform initiated by President Chávez. Women gathered to work on proposals to
present to the Reform Coordinator and the Peoples Ombudsman. This time the core group
created a new movement -- the Women’s Broad Movement (MAM), which included women,
gays and lesbians, and the group ESE.119 The proposals were discussed by feminists and
members of diverse groups in the CEM. The MAM and the ESE group introduced a proposal
before the Reform Commission and the People’s Ombudsman that included 12 proposals. The
proposals of the ESE group included the implementation of Article 88 of the Constitution (on the
economic value of housework), the decriminalization of abortion, and the modification of article
76 to allow abortion before the third month of pregnancy and shared parenthood for same sex
parents; modification of article 21 to include non-discrimination based on sexual preference,
sexual identity, or sexual expression. However, the members of the MAM were not optimistic
about the inclusion of the proposals despite the support of the president of the Permanent
Commission of Family, Women and Youth, Gabriela Ramírez and the INAMUJER (which
added another agenda for women). The proposals introduced by the ESE groups were considered
radical by some of the women pushing the reform, just as is the past, some women involved in
the process of presenting proposals for reform were not completely convinced of their own
positions.120
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Three main reasons were provided by Espina (2007) for their lack of confidence in the
inclusion of their proposals: a) the political leaders (including women in power) only focused on
the political transformation of the country and the feminist agenda would be left aside; b) the
presidential commission was almost all male; c) opposition from the Catholic Church regarding
abortion and gay/lesbian’s rights would trump reform because Chávez was not interested in
starting another fight with the Church (Espina, 2007). In the end, the only proposal included for
the proposed constitution was the modification of article 21 to include non-discrimination based
on sexual orientation. Nevertheless, the entire Constitutional reform was defeated in a popular
referendum in December 2007 (Espina, 2007).

Analysis
During this period, amidst a climate of change, instability and political polarization,
organized women united to push for and achieved the inclusion of many of their proposals in the
1999 Constitution, protested negative measures affecting women’s political participation and
women’s protection from violence, called for the implementation of existing laws, and
introduced proposals for a new law on violence against women and the reform of the Penal
Code.
The results have varied depending on the type of institutional arrangement and the
strategies used by women’s groups to impact state gender policy reform. In general, women’s
groups were successful in advancing women’s constitutional rights as many of their proposals
were included in the new text. They were also successful in making modifications and achieving
the promulgation of the 2006 Organic Law on the Right of Women to a Life Free of Violence
that classified domestic violence as a violation of human rights.
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However, in terms of women’s political participation and social security for women, the
results have not been satisfactory. In the first case, the derogation of article 144 of the 1997
Suffrage and Political Participation Law establishing the 30% women’s quotas was not reversed
for the 2000 and 2004 legislative elections. In the second case, the execution of article 88 of the
constitution through the implementation of the 2000 Law of Social Security remains delayed as
the implementation of the law has been rendered by many as impracticable. The same fate is
expected for another law being discussed during 2008, the Law on Equality and Equity, pending
the process continues, as its discussion was postponed inside the National Assembly.
Moreover, until this writing, the status of abortion remains unchanged in spite of the push
for reform by women’s groups and the proposals introduced by a broad women’s movement
during the recent process of reform of the Penal Code. So, what explains the different policy
outcomes? What combination of institutional arrangements and women’s strategies leads to
success in gender policy reform? In the next section, I examine the institutional and strategic
variables that may explain gender policy reform during the period of regime transition (19992006) as outlined in Table 3.

Institutional Variables
The political climate after Chávez election was characterized by hope, on the part of civil
society groups and even the Catholic Church that regime change would contribute to the process
of decentralization begun in 1989 and the deepening of democracy. Among the major
institutional changes of this period, the writing of the 1999 constitutions constituted the
opportunity to create a new type of democracy and society. Women’s groups were among the
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groups that benefited the most from the inclusion of their proposals in the 1999 Constitutional
approved by referendum in December 1999.
Table 3. Major Institutional Changes, Women’s Activism and Strategies, and Legal Gender
Reform during Regime Transition
Regime Transition
from representative
to participatory
democracy (19992007)

Institutions
providing access to
the state policymaking process

Women’s Activism

Writing of the 1999
Constitution

Institutionalization
of feminist politics:
creation of state
bodies for women

Women organized
a broad movement
for proposals to the
1999 Constitution

Creation of a
National Assembly
(dissolves Bicameral
Congress)
Centralization of
power around the
executive
Decision-making
closed
Church-State
conflict
Political polarization
affects women’s
movements 20022004

Elected women in
Constitutional
Assembly
Elected women to
the National
Assembly
1999 creation of
INAMUJER as
established in the
1993 Law of Equal
Opportunity for
Women
Appointment of long
time activist as
Director of
INAMUJER
Creation of the
Permanent
Commission of
Family, Women,
and Youth
Appointment of
women to positions
of decision-making

A split opens
between groups:
feminists vs.
popular groups:
issues of strategic
vs. survival
interests emerged
Organization of
grassroots women
done by the state

Women’s Strategies

Gender Policy
Outcomes

Women’s groups
target state; state
bodies and allies in
office

Constitutional
reforms included
in the 1999
Constitution

Femocrats and
political called the
CONG members to
organize for the
proposals to the
1999 Constitution

1999 reform of
the law of equal
opportunity
creates
INAMUJER

Concerted efforts
between women in
academia, political
women, and
femocrats to
maintain the
agencies and
commissions
Creation of meeting
points, networks of
government’s
supporters and
beneficiaries of
state funds
Locus of gender
legal reform:
feminist groups in
universities
Grassroots
organizations
created top-down
Creation of the
Women’s Broad
Movement (MAM):
Proposals to reform
the Penal Code

Reform of 2002
Organic Law of
Social Security
(lack of
implementation)
Creation of social
policies
addressing poor
women’s needs:
missions
Passage of the
2006 Law on the
Right of Women
to a life Free of
Violence
Failure of 2004
proposals for the
reform of the
Penal Code
Failure of 2007
reform for the
Penal Code
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A new chapter in Venezuelan democracy started from 1999 onwards that changed statesociety relations in fundamental ways. In spite of the initial excitement for change, soon after the
convocation of the National Constituency Assembly appointed to write the 1999 Constitution,
many groups from civil society, including the Catholic Church, were concerned about the move
towards centralization and the increased power of the military of the Chávez administration. The
Catholic Church was particularly concerned about the way the new Constitution stated the
protection of maternity and not of the child.
Increased political polarization led to fierce confrontation between the government and
the traditional political parties, the Catholic Church and civil society groups; this in turn led to
the exclusion of many of these groups from the construction of a new “participatory democracy”
by the State. From then on, participation by civil society groups in decision-making positions
such as the INAMUJER (former CONAMU) where many women were active in the past through
their participation in women’s NGOS and as service providers to women, was eliminated IN
addition, redistribution of state resources for women was conditioned on support for the Chávez
political movement which led to the mobilization and polarization of women from civil society
groups. The creation of INAMUJER in 1999 by law constituted the culmination of the process of
feminist institutionalization started in 1974 with the creation of the COFEAPRE. However, this
time, the creation of the women’s institute excluded some women from the policy decisionmaking of the revolutionary “process” led by President Chávez and thus it was regarded as
useful and beneficial for supporters of the “process” only.
In addition, state bureaucracies and commissions underwent substantial changes during
this period that affected the capacity of women to impact gender policy reform by using the
institutionalization of the women’s movement. The budget of INAMUJER was reduced after its
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creation and the Bicameral Commission on the Rights of the Women was eliminated; the
Permanent Commission on Women, Family, and Youth inside the National Assembly was
created to replace the former.
The mission of the new INAMUJER was to formulate, coordinate and evaluate public
policies with a gender perspective that would include all Venezuelan women. However, as an
example of the recentralization of decision-making characteristic of this period, the design of
some of INAMUJER’s public policies directed at women depended on executive initiative in the
form of projects related to the revolutionary process. For instance, the creation of Meeting Points
for organizing women at the grassroots level in communal councils and through social missions
directed to poor women were not demands made by the women’s movement and, as stated
before, excluded women who were not supporters of the “process.”
Nonetheless, the INAMUJER also played an advocacy role by supporting the proposals
of the women’s movement during the writing of the 1999 Constitution, the appeals to reverse the
decisions of the Supreme Court on the cases of lack of application of the women’s quotas and the
elimination of the preventive measures of the law on violence against women. INAMUJER and
The National Assembly’s Permanent Commission on Women, Family, and Youth also supported
the proposals submitted by MAM and the ESE group in 2007 during the Constitutional reform
initiated by President Chavez. The directors of INAMUJER and the President of the Commission
were feminist activists (femocrats) with many years of experience involved in the process of
legal reform.
In general, the women’s commission and institute provided support to the proposals
introduced by women, but advance on legal reform during this period was little compared to the
period from 1989-1998. On the whole, women’s organizing efforts declined as the movement
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split due to political polarization, but in spite of partisan rivalries, women’s groups’ mobilization
did not stop to fight for a feminist agenda as well as new forms or organizations among women’s
groups.
Women’s Strategies
During the period 1999- 2007, examples of alliances created among women’s groups are
noteworthy as strategies used to impact gender policy reform. Based on their past experience of
unification, women created a coalition to push for the establishment of the Institute of Women
(INAMUJER) when the CONAMU was eliminated. Later, women united to present proposals to
the National Constituent Assembly in 1999 to be included in the new constitution. In like
manner, a coalition of women united since 2004, as a response to the introduction of an
annulment on several articles of the 1998 Law on Violence against Women and the Family by
the Attorney General in 2003 to prepare the draft proposal on a new violence law and push for its
discussion and approval by the National Assembly in 2006. All things considered, women’s
success in including their proposals in the 1999 Constitution and the passage of the 2006 Organic
Law on the Right of Women to a Life Free of Violence as shown in Table 3 can be attributed to
the coordination of activities led by organized women that involved the collaboration among
women’s NGOs, women in academia, and women in government’s commissions and agencies.
Nonetheless, the concerted effort of organized women during this period failed at
reversing negative measures of the past as evidenced by the lack of application of article 144 of
the Suffrage and Political Participation Law during the 2000 and 2004 legislative elections. As a
response, a broader women’s movement led by the director of INMUJER mobilized for the
inclusion of 50/50 women and men parity and alternating in the lists of all political parties for
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their legislative slates until finally a resolution by the CNE in 2008 declared it a norm for all
political parties.
Last, but not least important, was the mobilization of a broad women’s movement to
introduce proposals for the partial reform of the Penal Code in 2004 and 2007. In this particular
case, I looked at institutional causes that hinder the decriminalization of abortion by pointing to
the fact that during the period 2002-2006, increased discussion of abortion inside the National
Assembly took place in the context of Church-state conflict. Yet, opposition by the Church and
some conservative factors in society still managed to freeze advances in women’s sexual and
reproductive rights as neither proposal managed to pass and women’s groups were unable to take
advantage of the rifts between the Church and state.
In terms of framing used by women’s groups and coalitions of women throughout this
period, the proposals presented for the 1999 Constitution were informed by important
international documents that prevented discrimination and called for the use of non-sexist
language in constitutional texts (the CEDAW and a UNESCO resolution). Also important were
the use of the 1995 Plan for Action and the Declaration of Belem do Pará for the formulation of
proposals that called for the increased political participation of women as a means to increase
gender equality and the visibility of the issue of violence against women as a violation of human
rights. In the cases where the coalition of women, or the so called Movimiento Amplio de
Mujeres (MAM) mobilized, they used the international as well as the national instruments that
established the importance of achieving social, economic, and political gender equality through
the recognition and protection of women’s rights. In addition, the formal action by women was
reinforced by public campaigns, petition drives, and street demonstrations by women supporting
the proposals.
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In the cases where women have been less successful in their push for the implementation
of the Social Security Law or the LIOM, the explanation seems to be that these efforts have not
mirrored the broad coalition of women that characterized the cases mentioned above that
included the strategy of unification and the use of international treaties to frame the proposals.
Women groups have not organized behind these reforms the way they have for the others
especially because few women know about these two laws as expressed by feminists interviewed
for this study.
All things considered, in spite of the access women have gained to the state through state
bureaucracies and women’s commissions, the inconsistent political will to implement the
existing laws as well as the influence of the Catholic Church in reinforcing social prejudices in
society hinder women’s social and political participation and the ability to make decisions that
positively impact their lives as shown in Table 3 with the lack of implementation the Social
Security Law and the failure of the proposals for the reform of the Penal Code.
Apart from the climate of political polarization that impacted women’s organizing during
the period 2000-2004, the perception of women that the institutionalization of feminists politics
has been co-opted by the government affected women’s capacity to influencing gender policy
reform and created an important divide among the women’s movement. The division resembles
the traditional dynamic between strategic vs. practical interests proposed by Molyneux (2001).
Feminists, on the one hand, criticize the government as designing policies that do not address
women’s legal inequality, violate the constitutional rights of all women by providing social
benefits to government’s supporters only, and are tainted by a populist and demagogic discourse
that in fact increases women’s subordination to the patriarchal state. Women’s supporters of the
Chávez’s administration, on the other hand, argue that the social and political gains achieved by
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women since 1999 are the result of the important changes taking place during the revolution that
especially address women’s issues. In any case, the division among women’s groups is
illustrative of class differences that were not so important in the period of institutionalized
democracy and that first cracked the movement in the late 1990s, and ended up splitting it during
the period of regime transition. Notwithstanding its division, the phenomenon is also instructive
of the ability of Venezuelan women, throughout the three phases of Venezuelan democracy
studied, to unite efforts around common issues when an opportunity for reform is believed to
occur.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSIONS
The focus of this research has been to explain what drives gender policy reform in
general; when and how? To answer these questions I have looked at changes in state institutions
during institutionalized democracy, democratic deinstitutionalization, and regime change that
have provided (or not) access to women’s groups to be able to influence gender policy reform.
Thus, in order to explain when and how gender policy reform is more likely to happen I have
examined different forms of state mechanisms and women’s group’s strategies to assess their
relative strength in the process of gender policy reform.
As evidenced in Venezuela, and confirmed by scholars in other Latin American
countries, during the process of democratic consolidation women’s groups were marginalized
and demobilized by political parties. Therefore, I started with the assumption that during
institutionalized democracy the impact of women’s group on legislative gender reform would be
rather small and largely dependent on the influence of changes in the international context such
as the women’s conferences since 1975 and the United Nation’s decade of women (1976-1985),
human rights international norms, conventions, and treaties on the democratic state to conform to
the demands and goals of these international commitments. In the same way, another assumption
was that the process of democratic deinstitutionalization, mainly characterized by the demise of
the party system, as well as regime transition would increase the impact of women’s groups on
legislative gender reform as the control of the political parties on access to decision-making
decreased and the context of change provided opportunities for women’s groups to effectively
access the state.
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Accordingly, I used the political opportunity approach as a complementary approach to
institutional analysis in order to describe the dynamics between institutional change and
women’s group’s strategies to explain gender policy reform. The institutional approach
emphasized the range of political institutions and the political opportunity approach took into
account the openness of such institutions, the availability of allies for the movement, conflict
between elites, and the impact of political alignments. Therefore, I evaluated women’s group’s
strategies under different institutional arrangements in order to explain gender policy reform.
Through process-tracing across three political stages in Venezuelan history, I examined the
interaction of political structures and women’s strategies for four variables to determine their
relative strength in explaining gender policy reform.
In terms of institutional changes I looked at party bureaus and their ability (or lack
thereof) to incorporate women into the new democratic regime and provide channels of
representation for women’s groups to advance gender policy reform. I also, considered the
impact that state bureaucracies, advisory commissions, appointment of women, and elected
women politicians had on gender policy reform. In addition, I analyzed the influence of changes
in Church-State relationship during the three periods on women’s ability to push for a feminist
agenda inside the legislature. In terms of the political context in which the institutional changes
took place I examined whether the process of decentralization, which attempted to deepened
democracy by opening the political system to diverse groups of civil and political society, would
impact the process of policy reform by increasing women’s groups’ participation in positions of
decision-making. I also observed the impact of the collapse of the party system on women’s
ability to access the decision-making process. Finally, I assessed the impact of the transition on
women’s activism and strategies from the writing of a new constitution onwards.
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I used four propositions derived from the literature that have been used to explain gender
policy reform in many countries. The propositions about the institutional structures included the
following:
1. Access of women’s groups to decision-making processes increases the
likelihood of state gender policy reform. Women’s groups’ access to decisionmaking processes can take different forms: through party bureaus, state
bureaucracies, autonomous commissions, and elected female politicians. Each
form provides space for women’s issues and their strategies; each form provides
different opportunities for policy reform depending on the institutional context.
The likelihood of gender policy reform increases when institutions are more open.
2. Church-State relations directly influence state gender policy reform in the
following ways: Conflict between Church and State is more likely to produce
legislative action on controversial gender issues because it creates room for
reformers (or reformist coalitions) to impact legislation without the state blocking
the reform. On the contrary, periods of Church-State cooperation are less likely
to lead to discussion of (and drive support for) controversial gender issues, and
when discussed they are eventually defeated because of lack of governmental
incentive to support reform and risk the Church’s political ire.
The strategy-related propositions included the following:
3. The disaggregation of women’s issues, the exclusion of divisive issues, and the
use of international legal instruments increase the possibility of policy change.
Proposals made on specific issues (domestic violence) while leaving out divisive
ones (abortion) and based on internationally agreed norms by states promotes the
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participation and support of all women’s groups and public officials and
increases the prospects of gender reform.
4. Greater unity among women’s groups increases the prospects of state gender
policy reform. The influence of a coalition of women’s groups from within and
outside the state to shape state policy proves beneficial in gathering the support
of the groups’ allies in and outside the state for gender reform.

Institutional and Strategic Factors Explaining Gender Policy Reform during Institutionalized
Democracy

During the period of institutionalized democracy Venezuela’s stability was due in part to
an ideal two-party system that was designed to contain conflict. However, the
overinstitutionalization of political parties allowed them to become the only channels of
mediation between state and society as the parties controlled groups of civil society and their
access to the state. Women who had a history of organization before the transition were
marginalized, especially the activists belonging to the parties from the Left, and women’s groups
in general demobilized and fragmented.
One way in which women were incorporated to the state during democratic consolidation
was through the creation of women’s bureaus, especially those in the AD and COPEI parties;
however, these did not allow women to achieve leadership positions and women’s issues were
subordinated to the party’s interests. Because of the rigidity and exclusionary characteristics of
the political parties, women’s groups that formed during this period sought autonomy from the
political parties, but targeted the state for demands. Some professional women went into
academia while others founded women’s organizations and popular organizations.
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Naturally, as the women inside the main political parties AD and COPEI had been
activists in the past and knew the political leaders in power, they sought direct access to the state
through them by using their political alignments with the incumbents. As evidenced during the
period 1970-1988 in Chapter Two, three of the incumbents (two from AD and one from COPEI)
were willing to address the requests made by women in their parties for the creation of an
advisory commission, a ministry for women’s affairs, and a women’s office in return for political
support. The creation of the COFEAPRE, the first women’s advisory commission by President
Pérez (AD) in 1974 accomplished the celebration of the First Venezuelan Congress on Women
in 1975 from which the first women’s agenda emerged as well as the idea of legal reform on
women’s legal status, labor, abortion, and the Civil and Penal Codes. The creation of the
Ministry of the State for the Participation of Women and Development by President Herrera
Campins (COPEI) in 1979 as well as the commitment to legal reform of the appointed female
minister resulted in the organization of a movement for the reform of the Civil Code which was
successfully achieved in 1982. In 1984, the National Women’s Office was created under
President Lusinchi (AD) developing advisory commissions for policy reform on women’s issues
in an effort to coordinate the work of women’s NGOS, women working inside the state, women
from civil society, from the political parties, and from academia.
In addition, another executive appointment of women to state bureaucracies proved to be
a crucial intuitional factor explaining gender policy reform. In 1986, the former director of the
National Women’s Office was appointed Minister of the Family and she transformed the
National Women’s Office into the Directorate of Women’s Advancement as a means to continue
the work with the advisory commission and provide advice to the Minister of the Family. The
successful reform of the Civil Code in 1982 illustrates the importance of the creation of state
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bureaucracies as well as the appointment of women to important decision-making posts during
institutionalized democracy as institutional mechanisms that increase the likelihood of gender
policy reform.
In contrast, women’s access to decision-making processes through the political parties’
bureaus did not provide women space for their issues and interests to be discussed as these were
marginalized to the party’s interests. Nonetheless, it allowed women inside the party bureaus to
get familiar with the policy-making process characteristic of the period of institutionalized
democracy --decisions taken inside the legislature were actually discussed outside among the
leaders of the main parties (cogollos) and the legislature was only the locus of decision
legitimatization-- and shaped their strategy of targeting the state and creating alliances among
women’s groups across parties and class that included the political women, the femocrats, and
the autonomous women from civil society.
In conclusion, in spite of the rigidity and exclusionary characteristics of the political
parties and their bureaus during institutionalized democracy, the state provided alternative access
to women to the state decision-making positions at the request of women allied to the political
leaders of the main parties. Women’s political alignments positively influenced the creation of
state bureaucracies and advisory commissions as well as the appointment of women to decisionmaking positions who pushed gender policy reform from inside the state apparatus, but also
established links with organized women outside the state to achieve legal reform.
However, the state also imposed limits on women’s influence on policy-making;
Church-State cooperation during this period proved to be determinant in the lack of discussion
on the issue of abortion inside the legislature. Therefore, the institutionalization of political
parties and the entrenched interests of the Catholic Church, during periods of Church-State
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cooperation, impeded women’ access to the state policy-making process and the discussion of
women’s issues that clashed with the religious interests of the group or the state’s interest.
Nevertheless, the creation of state bureaucracies and the appointment of women to
decision-making positions can only explain part of the process of gender policy reform during
the period 1970-1988; the other included the organization of women around a woman’s agenda.
The institutional characteristics of this period shaped women’s organizing and strategies as
shown by women’s push for the institutionalization of feminist politics to have direct access to
the state. Nevertheless, women’s participation in international conferences on women sponsored
by the UN informed organized women outside and inside the state apparatus that the creation of
women’s offices and agencies was part of the recommendations and norms being discussed at the
international level as a means to increase gender equality. Thus, women felt their demands were
legitimated by the existence of an international legal framework being developed on women’s
rights and they targeted the state and focused on legal reform at the national level.
The influence of international norms on key areas of discrimination against women,
women’s advances in health, education, and jobs, were used by women’s groups in pushing the
state, especially the incumbents, into adopting new policies in compliance with the state’s
international commitments. Thus, the drafting of the proposals prepared and presented by
women’s groups highlighted the norms agreed to at international and regional meetings and the
treaties signed and/or ratified by the Venezuelan state that included increasing gender equality,
the elimination of gender discrimination, and the protection of women’s social, economic, and
health rights.
However, the impact of international norms alone cannot explain gender policy reform
since norm influence and implementation varies across the region depending, precisely, on
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differences in state institutions and women’s groups’ capacity to influence gender policy reform.
Therefore, women’s strategies also included the coordinated effort among women outside the
state and the allies of the movement inside the state apparatus to produce proposals for the
reform of the Civil Code, the Labor Law, and the Penal Code.
Women used the strategies that they had used before the transition to democracy,
collaboration across parties and class to work around an issue. The first proposals of this period
came out of the First Women’s Congress in 1974 as stated in Chapter Two; proposals were
discussed among all women participants, except for the issue of abortion. After the creation of
the COFEAPRE, the two Ministries and the National Women’s Office, the writing of the
proposals for legal reform was conducted mainly outside the state to be later presented to the
women’s commissions and ministries in order to introduce the petitions in Congress. In addition,
the women’s group built a coalition of women from all sectors of society who supported the
proposals through organizing petition drives, public demonstrations and picketing outside
Congress. As demonstrated, the movement for the reform of the Civil Code illustrates the
alliances among women (the political women, the femocrats, and the women from civil society
organizations) built around the idea of the democracy and the family; a very useful frame to
garner support from all sectors of society. As a consequence of the broad support from the state
and from women, the reform of the Civil Code was achieved in 1982 along with the
promulgation of the approbatory law of the Convention on the Elimination of all Kinds of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
Another strategy used during the period of institutionalized democracy was the creation
of a network of women’s groups to continue working around specific proposals: In 1985, an
umbrella organization was created to coordinate the work of 25 NGOs working on the evaluation
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of the decade of women and on the proposals of important laws in the areas or labor, gender
equality, and violence against women. The process of writing the proposals was similar to
previous efforts at legal reform. They CONG worked outside the state and with the government
through the advisory commissions created by the Women’s Office. In terms of the frames used,
women focused on gender equality and the protection of maternity, issues that would garner
support from all sectors of society.
The eventual success of the proposals afore mentioned, which will be discussed in the
next section, contrasts with the process of reform of the Penal Code which failed to get enough
people on the reform bandwagon as the women’s groups presented the proposals in terms of
allowing abortion if pregnancy was the result of rape, incest, or in cases where the fetus
presented malformations. Opposition by legislators in Congress led the proposal to be filed until
another opportunity came up in 2004. The issue of abortion had caused some controversy among
participant members of the COPEI party in the Women’s Congress in 1974 and until it was
introduced again in Congress in 1985, it had never been broadly discussed. Description of the
process of reform of the Penal Code is scant in the literature on women’s struggle for legal
reform in Venezuela. Apart from the proposals that came out of the 1974 Congress and during
the late 1980s, there is little discussion about it suggesting that women felt that perhaps such as
divisive issue should be left out if they were to advance women’s rights in other areas. In fact,
Espina asserts that “each women’s issues must be discussed separately; otherwise, the issue gets
diluted among the different priorities of the different interest groups with decision-making
power.”121
The failure to pass the proposals on the Penal Code demonstrates that in spite of the
existence of institutional channels of representation of women’s interests and reform proposals
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pushed by women their successful reform is not guaranteed when the interests of women clash
with those of the state or the Catholic Church, or when they lack the support of a majority of
women inside and outside the state. This outcome confirms the propositions derived from the
literature that assert that greater unity of the women’s groups and leaving out divisive issues such
as abortion increases the likelihood for reform. In the same way, the use of frames based on
internationally agreed norms increases the likelihood of reform because they legitimize the
women’s struggle for legal reform but only on issues that do not touch the entrenched interests of
the Catholic Church on the decision-making process of the state. Divisive issues such as
abortion, regardless of the frames used by women and the international norms, trigger the
Church’s, and its supporters,’ opposition and negatively affect women’s groups’ ability to build a
coalition of women behind the process of reform or activate the alliances of women from within
and outside the state.

Institutional and Strategic Factors Explaining Gender Policy Reform during Democratic
Deinstitutionalization

The process of political and administrative decentralization that started in 1984 attempted
to overhaul a system whose legitimacy had been declining since the late 1980s. The process of
decentralization managed to influence state-society relations in significant ways as civil society
groups emerged and mobilized in order to push for decentralization and the deepening of
democracy becoming thus, legitimate actors of civil society. Women were among the groups that
emerged during the period of institutionalized democracy and mobilized, together with other
civil society organizations, to call for decentralization and democracy. In contrast to civil society
groups, the political parties were initially not in favor of the decentralization, and efforts were

155
made by President Lusinchi (AD) to delay negotiations. However, the presidential candidates
changed their positions during the electoral campaigns, and supported the process in the end
when they realized the amount of support of the electorate for the decentralization reform.
The changes in electoral rules affected by and large the party system as well as the
process of decision-making. On the one hand, the parties started to lose control of the access to
the state as new groups were able to further influence the state. Changes in the electoral rules
affected the number of political parties, their cohesiveness, their support base, and the
nomination procedures, thus allowing smaller, fragmented parties to gain representation in
Congress. On the other hand, the legislature began discussing and issuing more laws. When the
women’s issues discussed inside Congress were not considered a threat to the interests of the
Catholic Church, there was no resistance to gender policy reform in the areas of women’s rights,
workers’ rights, and gender equality. However, more than the actual decentralization policies, the
process of reform of the state increased civil society group’s mobilization and participation in the
decision-making processes of the state.
Added to theses changes was the state’s adoption of neoliberal reforms that led to the
transformation of the political and economic model. The period was characterized by social and
political instability as described in Chapter Three. Changes taking place during this period
impacted civil society groups which had become very active during the 1990s in order to fulfill
the gap left by the state inefficiency. Furthermore, the collapse of the party system that began in
1993 increased the loss of legitimacy of the traditional political parties that marked the beginning
of a new era characterized by an active citizenry.
During this period, the creation of state bureaucracies for women’s issues continued and
thus women’s access to state policy-making decision positions was maintained. Among the most
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important changes influencing gender policy reform we find the creation by the state of the
Bicameral Commission for the Rights of Women (1989-1999) whose main role was to improve
existing gender laws, promote new laws, and support the work of NGOs providers of service to
women. Major achievements of the work of this commission were the 1990 partial reform of the
Organic Labor Law in its Title VI, the 1993 Law of Equal Opportunity for Women, the Approval
law of the Convention Belem do Pará, to prevent, punish, and eradicate violence against women
that influenced the passage of the draft project of the Law on Violence against Women in 1993,
the approval of Article 144 in the 1997 reform of the Law of Suffrage and Political Participation,
and the passage of the 1998 Law on Violence against Women and the Family.
In contrast, the COFEAPRE suffered important changes during his period due to the
neoliberal measures adopted by the government to shrink the state and was closed and reinstated,
at the request of organized women’s groups, and finally eliminated in 1992. This demonstrated
that although there had been political will on the part of the incumbents to provide women access
to the state in the form of women’s commissions, the commissions were very fragile because
they were dependent on the commitment of the incumbents. Therefore, women inside the
COFEAPRE pushed for the creation of the Women’s Institute (INAMU) by law to avoid its
dependence on the inconsistent will of political leaders; it implementation did not take off until
1999 though.
Nonetheless, the appointment of an important political woman as Minister of Youth (and
later Family) constituted an important factor in explaining the successful gender policy outcomes
of this period as the ministers created additional advisory commissions on women issues,
organized meetings with women’s NGOS, and created additional space for women from civil
society to access the state decision-making process on women’s affairs. Additionally, the
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creation of a council for women’s issues in 1992, CONAMU, allowed even more access to
women’s groups outside the state who organized to work on the decentralized women’s centers
created by CONAMU at the level of the municipality. In contrast with the first period of
institutionalized democracy, the period of democratic deinstitutionalization was characterized by
a climate of political instability and transformation of the economic and political system in which
the state bodies for women were enlarged and became more rooted inside the state apparatus, as
illustrated by the creation of the Bicameral Commission for the Rights of Women inside
Congress, which oversaw major gender policy reform. Also, the women’s advisory commissions
on women issues created by the female minister and the CONAMU provided access and
consultation to NGOs in civil society thus creating a direct link between organized women in
civil society and women inside the state apparatus.
Therefore, this period was characterized by the convergence of direct efforts by women
in government, organized women in civil society, and women in the Legislative power, the so
called “triangle of power,” that positively impacted gender policy reform This confirms the
proposition that more access to the state by women’s groups increases the likelihood of gender
policy reform, but such access needs to be created and defended by activists.
These institutional changes shaped the type of organizations that emerged during this
period. This is mainly what this study adds to the literature on democratization since it looks at
the deinstitutionalization of the party system and democracy and how it affected women’s
groups’ activism and strategies to access the state policy-making process.
As a result of the institutionalization of a state-civil society partnership on women’s
issues by the female minister, this period is characterized by very active women’s groups in
neighborhood associations, as service providers NGOS, and women’s studies centers, among
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others as well as in the NGOs network, the CONG. Examples of this kinds of associations are the
feminists of the Universidad Central de Venezuela, the activists from the parties of the Left,
professional women from FEVA, and the Popular Feminine Circles, CISFEM, and AVESA.
However, although women’s organizations increased in numbers in the area of services to
women in sexual and reproductive rights, violence against women, and sex education through
training, education, and legal advice to women, collaboration among all women’s groups
decreased during this period. Although no official record exists indicating the reasons for the
decline in women’s groups’ collaboration, an important factor influencing the social movement
seems to have been the economic crisis and the political environment of political instability. This
period was characterized by economic decline, conflict among political elites, and political
instability (public riots and two attempted coups). Consequently, this period witnesses the
divisions among women’s groups and the emergence of divergent interests. A core feminist
group regarded as elitist by women from popular organizations began working more actively in
legal reform while other groups were more focused on providing women services, working for
their communities, or working with the state. It was the feminist organized group that managed
to push the feminist agenda inside the legislature as described in detail in Chapter Three.
Nevertheless, the political women inside the state apparatus took the role of calling on all
women’s groups and NGOs whenever there was an opportunity for legal reform; thus, although
the locus for the struggle for legal reform took place in the feminist circles, at least in its
preparatory phases, the final proposals were later pushed inside the legislature by the political
women and the femocrats. The network of women that started working on the draft proposals for
the reform of the Labor Law and the Penal Code --the CONG, dissolved, but organized women
in women’s studies research centers, women’s NGOs, and other organizations continued playing
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a major role in gender policy reform. Although not as a network, but as individual groups,
women from outside the state were able to work with and influence the women in the legislative
commissions committed with a feminist agenda. Women also used street demonstrations,
petition drives, marches, and the coordinated effort of women from civil society, political
women, and femocrats.
In cases such as the reform of the Labor Law, street protests and picketing in front of
Congress were also useful for the reform to pass although the reform was led only by feminist
activists. In the case of the Law of Equal Opportunity for Women, major support came from the
woman president of the Bicameral Commission on the Rights of Women. Finally; in the case of
the Organic Law of Suffrage and Political Participation, the initiative for the inclusion of
women’s quotas came from organized women in civil society who introduced the proposals and
were supported by the women from the CONAMU and the members of the Bicameral
Commission. In addition, the women’s groups gathered 20,000 signatures to endorse the
proposal.
Finally, this period of activism coincided with important changes in international norms
that legitimized the action women’s groups at the national level and allowed them to put pressure
on the state to implement. The global recognition of the power of the idea of human rights
mainly pushed by the 1993 Vienna World Conference of Human Rights; the recognition of
women’s rights as human rights in the areas of gender equality in power positions, women’s
reproductive and sexual rights, and the access of women to development, were among the themes
discussed in the international forums and the goals of women to get the states to commit to; the
women’s quotas were part of a commitment made by the Venezuelan state at the IV World
Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995.
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In sum, the process of gender policy reform resembles the previous period in terms of the
mechanisms provided to women’s groups to access the state, that advisory commissions,
ministries on women’s affairs, and the appointment of women to important decision-making
positions. However, this period presents an important change in regards to the previous period,
that creation of a special commission inside Congress with expertise on women’s rights. The
influence of the Bicameral Commission of the Rights of Women on the passing of major legal
reform during this period is without a doubt the most important institutional factor explaining
successful gender policy reform. In addition, the existence of alliances among organized women
in civil society organizations and academic centers and women inside the state bureaucracy was
crucial in the successful process of discussion and preparation of the proposals to be introduced
in Congress, and the support of the proposals in the legislature by political women and
femocrats. Finally, the important amount of legal reform achieved during this period was the
result of the effort by women’s groups to unite and use the international legal framework on
human rights.
However, it is important to note that as indicated in the case of the passing of the 1993
Law of Equal Opportunity for Women (the LIOM), support from women’s groups was not
broad, but the congress woman pushing for it managed to gather support from her political party
(AD) to pass the law she held the post of president of the commission. This illustrates how
political alignments can be useful when pushing for important legal reform, but they can also
lead to the passage of some ill-prepared laws, which pass because they are not regarded as
harmful to the interests of the state (nor the Church). However, in terms of their quality, they
become weak legal instruments like the LIOM, which has had no impact whatsoever on
women’s lives, since most women know little or nothing about it and thus it is never
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implemented because of lack of women’s demands for implementation; a fact that begs the
question of the importance of the quality and not the quantity of laws in advancing women’s
rights.

Institutional and Strategic Factors Explaining Gender Policy Reform during Regime Transition
The transition from representative democracy to “participatory democracy” in fact
increased participation of civil society groups in the decision-making process at the beginning.
Women were among the groups that participated and their efforts were rewarded with the
inclusion of many of their proposals in the 1999 constitution. The 1999 Constitution marked the
beginning of a new era; new rules, new players, and a fundamental transformation in statesociety relations. However, in the process of transition, some of the new rules excluded civil
society groups that had become active since the process of decentralization started in 1989.
Furthermore, there was no room for the traditional political parties or the Catholic Church,
considered the culprits of the economic and political crisis that lead to the demise of the Punto
Fijo democracy.
In the process of consolidation of the new regime, the confrontation between the state and
certain civil society groups, the traditional political parties, and the Catholic Church particularly,
was about the perceived centralization of power by Chávez, his authoritarian and inflammatory
discourse, and his moves perceived by some to transform Venezuela into a Cuba-like system.
Therefore, the process of consolidation of the hybrid regime has been characterized by increasing
political polarization.
In terms of women’s access to the state, the state bureaucracies for women and the
advisory commissions were eliminated, reduced, or underwent important structural changes. For
instance, the CONAMU and its advisory commissions were eliminated; however, at the request
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of women’s groups the INAMUJER was created in 1999 by law after changes made to the
LIOM. Nevertheless, the new women’s institute eliminated the participation of civil society
groups inside the board of directors, significantly changing the structure of the women’s institute
and its ability to maintain alliances with women from civil society and excluding important
actors such as the women from the academic centers and women’s NGOs from the decisionmaking process on women’s issues.
Similarly, the Bicameral Commission of Women’s Rights with its expertise on women’s
issues disappeared when the National Assembly was created. The Bicameral Commission was
replaced by another commission inside the National Assembly whose concern was women, but
also the family and youth. The transformation of the institutional mechanism of state
bureaucracies and advisory commissions negatively affected the passage of gender legal reform,
but also demonstrated the state’s attempt to centralize the decision-making process on women’s
issues around those appointed by the political leader and committed to implementing the leader’s
agenda. Likewise, the creation of a Permanent Commission on Women, Family, and Youth
inside the National Assembly illustrated the state’s perception of women’s traditional role in the
family and under the direction of the paternal state.
These developments are examples of important political choices that shaped women’s
activism, strategy, and role in advancing gender legal reform at the beginning of the transition.
On the one hand, the exclusion of civil society groups from the INAMUJER negatively affected
the capacity of women from civil society to access the state and influence gender policy reform
by reducing alliances between women in civil society and women in the state. On the other hand,
the replacement of an expert commission on women’s rights for a commission on women,
family, and youth confirmed the state’s interest in maintaining the discussion of women’s issues
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within the traditional paradigm concerned with the private role of women in the family instead of
the female citizen whose rights need to be discussed among experts on human rights.
Nevertheless, the state appointed long-time activists and feminists to important decisionmaking posts such as the director of INAMJUER, the Defender of Women’s Rights, the
president of the Permanent Commission on Family, and Youth inside the National Assembly,
and several ministries.
As stated above, the 1999 transition was characterized by increasing political and social
polarization which resulted in the fragmentation of the women’s movement as the middle class,
where most feminists groups belonged, united to oppose President Chávez’s increased
recentralization of power and exclusionary moves towards important sectors of civil society.
The broad women’s movement that had been able to unite whenever there was an opportunity for
reform split as a result of the political polarization; class issues emerged creating a divide
between those who favored legal reform and those who favored increasing access to state
resources. Also, new forms of organizations appeared under the direction of the paternal state as
means to redistribute the state resources and include the historically marginalized groups, where
women are a majority. In fact, the regime put in place, through executive decrees, social
programs to benefit poor women and address their needs; examples of these are missions Negra
Hipólita and Madres de Barrio and the women’s bank BANMUJER. It is important to note
though that such policies were not the result of organized women’s demands or discussions in
the legislature, but initiated by the state in a top-down strategy. However, in terms of gender
policy reform which is our focus here, this period was characterized by few achievements and
some reversals in previous gains.
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For instance, the decision of the National Election Council --endorsed by the Supreme
Court-- to ignore article 144 of the Suffrage and Political Participation Law in the 2000 and 2004
elections demonstrated the resistance by political parties to implement affirmative actions that
have a real impact on women’s political participation and the discriminatory attitude of political
male leaders towards women’s political participation. In like manner, the decisions of the
Attorney General (endorsed by the Supreme Court) to eliminate important articles of the 1998
Law against Violence against Women and the Family reinforced the perception of the lack of
political will to advance women’s rights.
Finally, in terms of the sexual and reproductive rights, the women’s movement has been
unable to impact changes on the Penal Code to decriminalize abortion (or adultery) in spite of
organized efforts and the use of strategies that worked for other women’s issues. As evidenced
throughout the three periods, the issue of abortion, absent from public discussion during the first
two periods of Church-state cooperation, became more salient during the last period of Churchstate conflict, but its status was not changed. However, in the context of State-Church conflict
the proposals of the broad women’s movement (MAM) introduced during the reform of the
Penal Code in 2004 and 2007 (along with other groups like the ESE group) were discussed in the
National Assembly, but defeated by opposition from the Catholic Church and conservative
sectors of society.
Although in the opinion of feminists interviewed for the study, the discussion of women’s
issues in the legislature and the media increased during this period, the influence of the Catholic
Church and the lack of political will by the state to incite the Church’s ire, determined the
unchanged status of abortion until this writing. This indicates the power of the Catholic Church
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and its supporters on issues that are considered contrary to the “moral values” of the Church and
the Catholic family.
Notwithstanding the negative impact that political and social polarization had on
women’s groups at the beginning of the transition, women came together to offset several
attempts by political decisions to do away with past gains. First, women defended the women’s
institute created under the Punto Fijo democracy, CONAMU, and called for the creation of the
Women’s Institute and the Defender of Women’s Rights as established in the 1993 LIOM.
Second, women united to present proposals for the writing of the 1999 Constitution and
successfully achieved the inclusion of many of them. Third, women’s groups organized, inside
and outside the state, to formally protest the derogation of article 144 of the suffrage law in the
2000 and 2004 elections because the lack of implementation of the electoral quotas negatively
impacted women’s political participation in positions of decision-making.
Even at the local level, where more women are engaged in social activism, elected
women in 2007 for the posts of mayor and councilwoman was 7.2% and 18% , respectively; a
very low percentage when compared with Chile 12,1% for mayor and Costa Rica 47.6% for
councilwoman. Women’s mobilization finally achieved the 2008 resolution by the National
Electoral Council to include a zebra-list (alternating one woman and one man) for national,
municipal, and parish decision-making positions for that election.
Finally, organized women also protested the annulment of the preventive measures of the
Law against Violence against the Family 2003 and as response women’s groups united behind
the proposals for the draft law of the Organic Law on the Right of Women to a Life Free of
Violence. The effort of organized women, from inside and outside the state, resulted in the
promulgation of the Organic Law on the right of Women to a Life free of Violence. The 2006
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law achieved the recognition of violence against women in the private and public sphere making
the issue more visible and framing violence both as a crime and as problem of public health, and
specifying 19 types of violence. During these four events women managed to form a coalition of
women’s groups, a broad women’s movement in the style of the CONG back in 1985 together
with the women from INAMJUJER to push for the reestablishment and implementation of
existing laws or the creation of new ones
However, the fragmentation of the women’s movement due to the political and social
polarization from 2000 to 2004 is illustrative of class differences that were not so important in
the period of institutionalized democracy and that first cracked the movement in the 1990s
during the periods of political instability, and ended up splitting it during the period of regime
transition characterized by social and political polarization. The new women’s organizations that
emerged were different from the feminist groups, NGOs associations, and popular groups typical
of the previous periods. In contrast with the autonomy of the former, the new women’s groups
were created and organized by the state. In terms of their motivation, the feminist groups focused
on gender policy reform and challenged gender hierarchy and difference. The new groups, in
contrast, were interested in the social and economic programs the state had to offer in exchange
for their political support. And although they challenged gender hierarchy, they were not
interested in challenging gender difference because their loyalty to the leader included
subordinating their needs to that of the “process.”
Feminists groups based in university centers criticized theses programs for their populist
nature and their lack of mechanisms to evaluate their impact or accountability. In the view of
women fighting for legal gender reform, the programs created by the state during this period did
not address women’s legal inequality and made them dependent on the state and subordinated to
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the patriarchy it embodies. In sum, political decisions shaped women’s activism and
organizations; autonomous organizations and some women inside the INAMUJER focused on
gender legal reform, while grassroots state-funded organizations focused on increased access to
state resources.
In terms of the impact that women’s strategies had on gender policy reform, which is our
focus here, the developments described above, in particular women’s collaboration at all levels
to push for the creation of INAMUJER, the inclusion of their proposals in the 1999 Constitution,
the organized protest against the lack of implementation of women’s quotas, and the passage of a
new law against violence against women confirm the existence of alliances and networks among
women’s groups that can still impact legal reform in spite of structural changes undergone by the
INAMUJER and the political polarization that split the movement. In addition, it supports
previous conclusions on the importance of the institutionalization of feminist politics and the
appointment of (feminist) women to political decision-making positions for successful legal
reform. Finally, it demonstrates the limits of women’s unification and framing strategies;
divisive issues such as abortion do not promote the support of a broad coalition of women for
reform due to lack of consensus among women’s groups, opposition by Church and conservative
sectors of society, and lack of political will to put women’s interests on the agenda at the risk of
confrontation with the Church.

More Laws or Better Laws?
Explaining how and when gender policy reform has taken place throughout three political
stages of Venezuelan history implied examining specific institutional configurations that shaped
and were shaped by women’s groups’ activism. The Venezuelan case provided an opportunity to
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assess the relative importance of state institutions and women’s strategies in order to confirm or
refute findings from other cases. In general, the Venezuelan case confirms that gender policy
reform is more likely to happen when there is greater unity among women’s groups in the form
of coalitions or networks of women organized to push for proposals that are supported by a
majority inside the legislature and an organized women’s movement in civil society. Majority
support, in turn, depends on the nature of the issue and on the strategic use of frames by
women’s groups, which are crucial to appeal to supporters, detract opposition, and legitimize the
demands by women. Therefore, the intervening variables referring to the framing capacity of the
women’s groups and greater unity among them seem to be critical elements in explaining of
gender policy reform.
In like manner, in order for women’s demands and interests to be incorporated into the
state decision-making process, the institutionalization of feminist politics proved to be the
mechanism that most likely influenced the passage of gender policy reform. The state created
state bureaucracies and advisory commissions which were in charge of discussing women’s
legislation, working in partnership with NGOs and organized groups in civil society and
providing advice to the President on women’s issues, thus targeting the incumbents directly.
Additionally, the state bureaucracies were staffed with appointed women and were more
independent to introduce the discussion of women’s issues inside the legislature and establish
direct links with organized women outside the state. Therefore, the creation of state
bureaucracies in which appointed or elected women participated in the process of decisionmaking, and promoted and supported the process of gender policy reform proved to be the most
influential institutional variable explaining the successful gender policy reform. In contrast, the
incorporation of women through party bureaus blocked women’s access to the state decision-
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making process during the period of institutionalized democracy when the political parties where
very strong.
In addition, organized women in civil society were very important in preparing most of
the proposals and gathering support from other women’s groups outside the state through street
demonstrations, campaigns, petition drives, and picketing to more effectively push for reforms.
This form of activism was especially significant during the process of reform of the state
initiated with the process of decentralization when many women’s groups emerged and activism
increased in the 1980s. Likewise, women’s mobilization and successful legal reform increased as
the political parties began their deinstitutionalization in 1993. Finally, during the regime
transition in 1998, women’s mobilization and push for legal reform reached one of its highest
points with the inclusion of most of their proposals in the 1999 Constitution. Therefore,
successful gender policy reform increased as the process of decentralization began “thawing” the
Punto Fijo democracy and the political parties began their deinstitutionalization. Finally, the
impact of the beginning of the regime transition provided the women’s movement great
influence on the text of the 1999 Constitution, but less impact on gender policy reform as the
regime moved towards consolidation and recentralization of decision-making power around the
Executive.
Table 4 below summarizes the policy reforms in terms of success or failure in order to
determine the relative strength of the institutional and strategic variables that explain the success
or failure of gender policy reforms during the three political contexts analyzed. The reforms of
the Civil Code in 1982, the Labor Law in 1990, and the Organic law on the Right of Women to a
Life Free of Violence in 2006 can be considered very successful as outlined in Table 4. The laws
correspond to each of the three periods analyzed in which the common institutional variables
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were the existence of state bureaucracies staffed by appointed women with alignments to the
political leaders. Additionally, during the process of reform, organized women outside the state
created alliances with women inside the advisory commissions to push for the reforms; women
also united across class and party lines and organized a broad women’s movement that led to the
creation of networks of autonomous women’s organizations such as the CONG (from 1985 to
1990) and the MAM (since 2004 to the present) with links to the women inside the state. Also,
the process of the reforms coincided with the periods of unification of the women’s movement as
well as the influence of changes in international norms that legitimized the demands of women
based on gender equality at work and in the family and violence against women as a violation of
human rights. The nature of the issues discussed allowed women to draw support from a majority
inside and outside the legislature, even in the face of Church-state conflict. Thus, in spite of the
fact that the relationship between Church and State went from cooperation to conflict, changes in
this relationship did not affect the passage of these gender policy reforms.
In contrast, the failure to decriminalize abortion in spite of similar institutional
mechanisms, that is, state bureaucracies and unity among women’s groups, and periods of
conflict between Church and State, can be attributed to the following factors: a) failure by
women to get the support from all women inside and outside the state in spite of the fact that the
issue of abortion was discussed separately from the others and the women framed the issue in
terms of an interruption of pregnancy and a problem of public health; b) the influence of the
Church on divisive issues such as abortion that clash with the “moral values” of the Church and
the political interests of the state. Therefore, support for a proposal needs to be broad enough to
include civil and political society in order to increase the likelihood of passing as long as the
issue is not at odds with the entrenched interests of the Catholic Church.
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The passage of the Law on Equal Opportunity for Women (LIOM) in1993 and the law of
Social Security in 1997 and later in 2002 can be regarded as successful, but lacking real impact
on women’s lives. On the one hand, the LIOM is plagued by weaknesses; it is program that
outlines the role of the state guaranteeing the equality of women, but is not specific about which
rights need to be protected in order to achieve equality. The only reason why it passed in
Congress was because the female president of the Bilateral Commission on Women pushing for
it garnered the support of her political party. Moreover, the law is not publicly well-known. On
the other hand, the 2002 law of Social Security has the potential to advance women’s rights,
especially the rights of housewives whose work has been recognized as having economic value
even in the Constitution, but the lack of implementation and the creation of parallel social
programs such as the missions to guarantee the rights of the housewives affects its capacity to
advance women’s rights. The shortcomings of these laws can be explained by the fact that
neither process of policy reform counted with the support of a majority of women inside and
outside the state since it coincided with periods in which the women’s movement was polarized
and divide and the proposals did not come from organized women. Accordingly, the passage of
these laws demonstrates that achieving gender equality entails more than just getting the laws
passed, but ensuring that legal equality is transformed into real equality through high-quality
laws and their implementation.
Finally, the passage of the 1997 Organic Law of Suffrage and Political Participation and
the 1998 Law on Violence against Women and the Family are considered partially successful.
The process of reform managed to draw majority support by women’ groups, however, the
capacity of the laws to advance women’s rights in the area of political participation and
protection from violence against women was negatively affected by political decisions that
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reversed the gains established by the laws. On the one hand, the lack of application of women’s
quotas established in article 144 of the 1997 Organic Law of Suffrage and Political Participation
negatively affected women’s political participation in decision-making positions. On the other
hand, the elimination of the preventive measures of the 1998 Law on Violence against Women
and the Family left battered women unprotected for three years until the 2006 Organic Law on
the Right of Women to a Life Free of Violence was finally passed and reversed the damage.
Therefore, the quality of the laws is very good, but the partial reversals by the state make them
laws that are only partially successful as they were easily manipulated by political interests.
In sum, gender policy reform that involves the careful preparation of proposals informed
by changes in international norms on gender equality and counts with the support of civil and
political society, on issues that are not divisive, leads to the successful passage of laws
characterized by their high quality and capacity to advance women rights. In contrast, gender
policy reform that is ill-prepared as a result of lack of information on changes in international
norms on gender equality and lacks support from some sectors of civil and political society leads
to the passage of laws that become weak instruments with no potential to really advance
women’s rights.
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Table 4. Policy Outcomes and Factors Explaining the Passage of the Laws
INSTITUTIONAL

MECHANISMS

WOMEN
STRATEGIES

CHURCHSTATE
RELATIONSHIP

PARTY
BUREAUS

STATE
BUREAUCRACIES

ADVISORY
COMMISSIONS

ELECTED
FEMALE
POLITICIANS

+

+

+

-

Unification/
framing

cooperation

+

+

+

-

Unification/
framing

cooperation

+

+

+

-

--

cooperation

+

--

-

Unification/
framing

cooperation

Only in
1997

+

+

Only in
2002

-

cooperation
and
conflict

+

+

+

+

Unification/
framing

cooperation

--

+

+

+

Unification/
framing

Conflict

Only in
1984

+

+

Only in
2007

--

Cooperation
and conflict

POLICES

1982 Civil Code
(Success)
1990 Labor Law
(Success)
1993 LIOM
(Success)
1997 Organic
Law of Suffrage
and
Political
Participation
(Partial Success)
1997, 2002
Social Security
(Success)
1998 Law on
Violence against
Women and the
Family (Partial
Success)
2006 Organic law
on the Right of
Women
to a Life Free of
Violence
(Success)
1984, 2004, 2007
reform of Penal
Code (Failure)
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Finally, gender policy reform on divisive issues that counts with the opposition of the
Catholic Church and important sectors of political society with decision-making power is likely
to fail even when it counts with the support of organized women’s groups from outside and
inside the state. Accordingly, only three of the propositions derived from the literature can be
confirmed in terms of their effect on gender policy reform, namely:
1. Access of women’s groups to decision-making processes increases the
likelihood of state gender policy reform. Women’s groups’ access to decisionmaking processes can take different forms: through party bureaus, state
bureaucracies, advisory commissions, and elected female politicians. Each form
provides space for women’s issues and their strategies; each form provides
different opportunities for policy reform depending on the institutional context.
The likelihood of gender policy reform increases when institutions are more open.
2. Periods of Church-State cooperation are less likely to lead to discussion of
(and drive support for) controversial gender issues, and when discussed they are
eventually defeated because of lack of governmental incentive to support reform
and risk the Church’s political ire.
3. Greater unity among women’s groups increases the prospects of state gender
policy reform. The influence of a coalition of women’s groups from within and
outside the state to shape state policy proves beneficial in gathering the support
of the groups’ allies in and outside the state for gender reform.
The Venezuelan case also provided an opportunity to generate hypotheses on the process
of gender policy reform. Especially instructive is the case where the divisive issue of abortion
was discussed in the contexts of Church-State cooperation and Church-State conflict. In general,
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regardless of the strategic use by women’s groups of coalition-building and frames based on the
need to address an issue of public health that causes high numbers of deaths, the Catholic
Church’s opposition negatively affected the passage of gender policy reform. More specifically,
the issue of abortion affected women’s groups’ ability to build a real coalition of women behind
the process of reform or activate the alliances of women from within and outside the state and
effectively reduce the entrenched power of the Catholic Church on the state decision-making
process, because some women were divided on this issue.
This in turn, points towards the limits of state-women relationship in that the former
provided access to the process of policy reform, created spaces for women’s activism inside the
state, worked in partnership with women’s groups, and in general institutionalized the feminist
struggle; however, when more entrenched interests as those of the Catholic Church clashed with
women’s interests, the state was unable to offset the Church’s opposition and prioritize women’s
demands. In addition, the lack of implementation of the policy outcomes described as partially
successful in Table 4 indicate that even in the face of reforms, lack of political will by the state to
implement existing laws negatively affects the capacity of gender policy reform to advance real
gender equality.
Thus, three hypotheses generated from the Venezuelan case in regards to the dynamics
between the institutional configurations and women’s strategies are the following:
A. The likelihood of gender policy reform increases when women’s groups have
access to decision-making processes in the form of state bureaucracies, advisory
commissions, and as elected female politicians, especially when institutions are in
a state of flux, such as in the context of democratic deinstitutionalization and
regime transition.
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B. Regardless of the quality of State-Church relationship, the entrenched power
of the Catholic Church in the decision-making process of state legislative reform
decreases the likelihood of gender policy reform on issues whose nature is
perceived as clashing with the interest of the Catholic Church.
C. Although greater unity by women’s groups and the strategic use of
international agreed norms increases the likelihood of gender policy reform, the
ability of women’s groups to effectively impact gender policy reform depends on
the existence of alliances between women inside the state apparatus and women
outside the state and not so much on the degree of opening of state institutions.

So what can the Venezuelan case add to the literature on women’s mobilization and
impact on gender policy reform? Gender policy reform happens when the state not only provides
access to women’s groups to decision-making processes in the form of state bureaucracies for
women and advisory commissions, but when there is a fit between organized women in civil
society, women inside the state, and political will to make women’s interest a priority compared
to other groups’ interests. The generalizability of these propositions ultimately rests on additional
research, however if this case is compared with experiences in other countries, I can affirm that
the success and failure of gender policy reform is not dependent on a unique set of circumstances
particular to Venezuela.

A Comparative Perspective
Through the literature review I have been cognizant of important changes in gender
policy reform in different countries; in this section I provide an institutional analysis of such
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changes as well as women’s responses and strategies to impact gender policy reform in order to
find similarities or differences in the process of gender reform in Venezuela and other countries.
I also reflect on the applicability of the hypotheses derived form this case study to other cases. In
this sense, the case of Venezuela serves as an instance to assess propositions made by previous
studies and contributes to our understanding of what political structures best contribute to gender
policy reform. The process of gender policy reform in Venezuela confirms the findings by Htun
(2003), Drogus and Stewart-Gambino (2005), and Desai (2001), in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile,
and India concerning the direct influence that the institutionalization of feminist politics has had
on legal gender reform (and on the women’s groups) during democracy. Additionally, it supports
studies by Htun (1998), Keck and Sikkink, (1998), and Htun and Jones (2002) where
international norms have been found to be the most influential factor explaining the liberalization
of gender issues in many countries Latin American in the 1980s, but only when the issues are not
divisive or clash with the state or religious (Catholic Church) interests.
Gender policy reform depends among other things on the nature of the issue and on
political clout of interest groups within the decision-making processes. For instance, in regards to
the issue of abortion, the members of the FSLN in Nicaragua were willing to advance women’s
rights when they took power, but they feared a political backlash from organized religious
groups and thus decided to be cautious about women’s reproductive rights by leaving the law
unchanged which remained less liberal than Honduras, Costa Rica, Bolivia and Venezuela where
abortion is allow on social and medical grounds (Molyneux, 2001).
Htun (2003) points to the fact that during periods of Church-State conflict in Brazil and
Argentina, in the 1970’s and 1980s respectively, divorce was legalized because a coalition of
men and women pro-divorce was able to produce policy change by taking advantage of the
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cracks in the Church-State relationship and defeating the Church. In contrast, the antiabortion
movements in these two countries never garnered enough support to defeat the Church and
opposition grew instead.
These examples indicate the lack of political will by political parties to advance women’s
rights by not supporting issues that might risk the political support of important interest groups.
It also shows the inability of women’s groups to form a coalition behind proposals whose nature
are perceived by the Catholic Church as a threat to the moral values and the values of the family.
In fact, as Molyneux (2001) aptly puts it, “abortion has never been a popular issue anywhere in
the world, let alone in societies that are deeply religious or socially conservative in character” (p.
72).
A comparative examination of the role of the institutionalization of feminist politics in
the process of gender policy reform reveals that similar to what has been described in the
Venezuelan case across three political stages of democracy, institutionalized democracy in
Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and India provided access to women activists to the state. During the
period of democratic institutionalization the Venezuelan state created women’s advisory
commissions and council as well as women’s offices and ministries to address women’s issues.
In the Venezuelan case the creation of state bureaucracies was the result of women’s lobby that
proved crucial for gender policy reform. In Chile, the state created by law the SERNAM
(Servicio Nacional de la Mujer) in 1991 to promote an agenda for women in the same way that
CONAMU and INAMUJER did in Venezuela. In Argentina, during democratic consolidation the
state created the National Women’s Directorate within the Ministry of Health and Social Action
and soon after a Woman’s Subsecretariat and appointed a leading feminist as its director. In
Brazil during democratic consolidation the state created the National Council on Women’s
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Rights under the Ministry of Justice and “staffed it with feminists with connections to women’s
groups” (Htun, 2003:118).
The role of the state agencies in all countries was basically the same, to propose legal
reforms addressing women’s inequality. Similarly in India, the state created a rape commission
and later a Ministry of women after a lot of effort by feminist activists (Desai, 2001).
In all cases, women activists outside the state used the state bodies and the allied women
inside the state to push for reform, but they enjoyed limited influence as the necessary conditions
not always met: one condition is that the state is recognized as a place for social justice and with
the capacity to implement and institutionalize reform; the other is that feminists organizations
press for demands inside and outside the state. According to Desai (2001) these two are needed
for successful reform to pass.
In terms of the impact of the political parties, the institutionalization of the political
parties in 1970s in Venezuela negatively affected the participation of women in the decisionmaking process. Similarly, when regional political parties increased their power in Congress in
India in the mid-1980s, women’s rights experienced major setbacks. For instance, the
institutionalization of the Hindu party with a conservative focus on women’s rights and religious
fundamentalist beliefs negatively affected the advance on women rights. Just as the Catholic
Church’s entrenched interests in Venezuela hindered the reform of Penal Code, Hindu
fundamentalism in India affected the advance of women’s rights that clashed with the political
interests of religious groups. Therefore, women’s concerns began to be considered as a matter of
cultural traditions and not as a violation of women’s rights as a result of the lack of political
leadership to oppose religious interest and risk the political support of the most powerful party in
Congress.
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In terms of women’s strategies, in contrast to Venezuela, Indian women formed
autonomous organizations to confront the development state and as a response to the state failure
in reducing poverty in independent India; they demanded land reform, minimum wages for
agricultural work, and micro- credit for self-employment. Similarly to what happened in
Venezuela autonomous women’s groups organized protests and worked with the state through
the national commissions in order to achieve legal reforms in the areas of rape and dowry laws.
Women’s groups used the international framework on women’s rights developed by the United
Nations in order to pressure the state into compliance with international norms (Desai, 2002).
After independence, the Indian state sought to modernize and thus directed its efforts at
addressing inequality through the development of capital-intensive industrialization and
modernization of agriculture. However, the impact of the former policies on increased poverty
triggered the demands of civil society groups, mainly influenced by the Left and the Gandhian
movements. Unlike in Venezuela, middle-class women’s groups organized poor rural and urban
women around issues of survival and gender equality and mobilized them to access state
resources. In response to increased mobilization, the state announced a series of policies to
address increased poverty: distribution of land, provision of interest-free loans to urban poor,
provision of employment at minimum wages. Women were especially active in demanding land
for women, equal minimum wages for men and women, and child care.
However, during this period of state redistributive policies and due to the influence of the
UN’s decade on women, women’s issues, such as violence against women, and subordinated
status became salient and provided women a means to pressure the state to commit to changes in
international norms; women activist who had organized poor women, shifted their attention away
from grassroots activism, just like the Venezuelan feminist did in the early 1980s, and started
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organizing around issues of violence against women and consciousness-rising campaigns. In
both cases, the determining factor on women’s interest was the result of the international focus
on women’s issues promoted by the UN’s decade on women which encouraged feminist groups
to translate international commitments made by the state into national legislation and public
policies. In like manner, women’s demands were directed against the state and the legislative
bodies of the state. In India, an autonomous women’s movement emerged and was able to work
with the state and through state commissions and achieved a series of legal reforms. Women’s
groups were supported by a coalition of lawyers and other groups. Poor women organized the
SEWA to set up a bank for poor women to start cooperatives and other self-employed activities.
In spite of the divergent interests of women’s groups, the Indian case reveals the ability of
women in general to achieve important reforms that translated into women’s improved lives’
conditions.
Interestingly, the current split among women’s movements in Venezuela, resembles the
split that took place among the Indian women’s movement democratic consolidation when the
state designed a series of polices to address the practical needs of poor women. However,
because the Venezuelan recent transition took place in a climate of political and social
polarization, the rifts among the groups in Venezuela, unlike in the Indian case, put in evidence
class cleavages that in the period of institutionalized democracy and deinstitutionalization of
democracy had not impeded the organization of broad, inclusive women’s groups to advance
both strategic and practical interests. At the moment in Venezuela the feminists are critical of the
popular women’s groups because of their inability to challenge gender inequality and patriarchy,
and their top-down organization by the state agency INAMUJER (what Drogus and StewartGambino call the vertical linkages with government). Still, the feminists have continued seeking
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legal reform and have used their ability to networking and have used issue-based alliances to
push for further reform and implementation. On the contrary, grassroots women (mainly
chavistas) have sought individual empowerment through their participation in state-funded social
programs or by taking advantage of social policies addressed to them, but have prioritized
support for the political process rather than the feminist agenda.
In Brazil, during the period of democratic consolidation, grassroots women activists in
Catholic base communities created networks with the feminists groups, mainly in Sao Paulo. For
instance, the grassroots feminist organization AMZOL, an outgrowth of the base communities,
had worked or been trained by feminists organizations; Catholic, pro-choice, feminist
organizations also created links with grassroots activists. In Brazil, the Catholic Church was not
friendly towards feminism so the popular church did not organize women or addressed women’s
issues; in fact, it was silent on women’s subordination. Therefore, grassroots women criticized
the Catholic Church and regarded it as an obstacle to feminist identity. On the other hand,
feminist groups regarded the Catholic Church as supporting an agenda oppressive of women.
Thus, during consolidated democracy in Brazil, the Catholic Church has been more openly in
opposition to the feminist agenda; as a result, the Catholic Church was able to win on the issue of
abortion, but was defeated on the issue of divorce.
In addition, the position of the political parties, for instance the Workers Party, was to
abandon support for feminist women on the issue of abortion in order to get the support of the
allies within the liberationist Church. However, feminists did not blame the Church hierarchy but
rather the attitude of poor Catholic laywomen who refused to even discuss the issue of abortion
or contraception (Drogus and Stewart-Gambino, 2005).
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In Chile, the institutionalization of feminist politics was regarded as a form of co-optation
by the women at the level of the base community. The SERNAM was created by the state and
grassroots women activists in Catholic base communities regarded this initiative as guided by the
interests of middle-class women. There was a clear rift in the women’s movements between the
feminists and the popular groups. The latter regarded the former as too individualistic and a
threat to family values while they defended their traditional values and class and community
solidarity. The issue of the division was class rather than gender in the sense that as the gap
between the rich and the poor widened, class identity overshadowed gender identity (Drogus and
Stewart-Gambino, 2005). So, in Chile, the pobladoras rejected working with the feminists, with
the government or government funded agencies. In fact, they accused the SERNAM of co-opting
women. There was disagreement about the role of feminist institutionalization as some believed
that working inside the state apparatus could put extra pressure on women’s issues while others
believed that autonomy was needed to effect fundamental change. In Chile, the feminist blamed
the Catholic Church for interfering in issues such as the decriminalization of abortion.
Feminist women in NGOs and research centers started working with SERNAM as
international funding decreased after the transition and they became more professional than
grassroots women. On the contrary, grassroots groups did not adapt to changes during
democracy and because they lacked research centers they were included in SERNAM’s
contracts. Pobladoras in Chile rejected the vertical linkages between the state and state funded
women’s organizations. In conclusion, during institutionalized democracy, the women’s
movement was more politicized and radicalized leading to forms of organizing that included
individual empowerment rather than networking and issue-based alliances rather than a broad
feminist agenda (in the same way that the women’s movement in Venezuela during the regime
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transition in 1999). Interestingly, the women’s groups in Chile, pobladoras and feminists had not
only divergent interests (practical and strategic), but different strategies in influencing state
policies. While the pobladoras defended their autonomy from the state, the feminists chose to
work with (and within) the state apparatus. This contrasts with the Venezuelan case where the
opposite in happening: feminists work autonomously from the state (but still maintain the issuebased alliances with the women inside the state apparatus) while the chavistas favor the type of
vertical linkages with the state.
In Mexico, activist women began reading feminist literature and discussing feminist
issues in small groups forming the women’s movement in the 1980s and organizing around a
feminist agenda. Similarly to feminist groups in Venezuela, they shifted their attention from
grassroots organizations and began conscious-raising campaigns and working with the state at
different levels to influence gender policy reform. Their strategies included a coalition of women
activists from the first phase, middle-class professionals, academics, and women from the parties
of the Left, like in Venezuela. They also used the strategy of gathering signatures to pressure
state bodies and organized conferences among women activists to discuss topics on women’s
issues. In the same way as shown in all other cases, the state responded to women’s mobilization
by creating state bureaucracies for women in order to discuss and legislate on women’s issues
and giving the autonomous women’s groups an advisory role in the commissions.
In like manner to Argentina, Venezuela, India, Brazil, and Chile, women activists outside
the state in Mexico used the state commissions and the allied women inside the state to push for
reform. Likewise, their influence on gender policy reform was also limited by the entrenched
interest of the state and the religious groups with decision-making power. In spite of major
setbacks, women continued meeting and discussing women’s issues, but they stopped working
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with poor women on survival issues like they did at the beginning. Like in Venezuela, women
followed changes in international norms on women’s issues and formed networks with women
abroad and at the national level to hold the state accountable at home for advancing women’s
political, social, and economic rights.
In conclusion, during democratic consolidation, women’s movements in different
countries have advocated for and achieved the creation of state bureaucracies by targeting the
state. These state bureaucracies have resulted in successful legal reform. Most groups have used
the institutionalization of feminist politics to access the state decision-making process. Yet, some
groups have decided against working with the state and opted for more autonomous kinds of
organizations. Even where most cases presented here illustrate the focus of feminist groups on
legal reform, while the popular groups are more interested in access to state resources, it is
important to highlight that both feminist and popular women’s groups do create vertical linkages
to the state in order to achieve their goals. The linkages in turn depend on the opportunities that
the women’s groups get or create and on the perception of the state, the political parties, and the
Church as allies or enemies of the women’s movement.
The comparison of the Venezuelan case with the findings of other studies reveals that
class cleavages that produce rifts among the women’s groups do not necessarily stem from their
perception of autonomy from (or dependence on) the state, but on the interests that women’s
groups, which as shown are very heterogeneous, regard as most important to defend. Finally, as
the Indian case shows, women’s demands for access to state resources, as opposed to legal
reform, does not necessarily imply their subordination to the patriarchal state and the lack of
interest in challenging gender difference, but demonstrates the ability of some women’s groups
to push for practical gains for women, while others push for strategic gains, that is legal reform.
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Thus, the three hypotheses generated above from the Venezuelan case in regards to the
dynamics between the institutional configurations and women’s strategies are confirmed by the
Latin American cases, but require some adjustments in countries outside this region as follows:

D. The entrenched power of religious groups in the decision-making process of
state legislative reform decreases the likelihood of gender policy reform on issues
whose nature is perceived as clashing with the interests of the religious groups.

In addition, in comparison with the other cases, the Venezuelan case evidences that
although women’s interests are determined by their class position, the lack of popular
contestation to the patriarchal subordination of the state might be the result of the political
context of social and political polarization where the movements emerged and not necessarily the
beliefs of popular women. What is more, the contribution of both groups to advancing women’s
social, economic, and political empowerment in Venezuela is more important than their
differences, especially during periods of transformation such as the present time when state
institutions are in a state of flux and women’s groups face challenges, but also opportunities for
further reform.
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NOTES
1

Vickers (n/d) operationalizes the “women-friendliness” of democracies in the following terms: 1) equal treatment
of women; 2) removal of discriminatory laws and compensation for their effect; 3) support for care work for women
and men thus facilitating women’s paid and political work; 4) solution to concerns of specific groups of women
(specifically, physical and economic security, and sexual and reproductive health and determination).
2
Divorce was finally legalized in Chile in 2004 after almost nine years of legislative wrangling. Family laws were
established in Chile in 1884 and for years, eighteen bills died in Congress before one managed to pass in 1995 -introduced by a women from the Party for Democracy- where it lingered until it was approved in 2004. The blame
was put on the Church which used television campaigns and lobbied against the bill and even threatened Catholic
parliamentarians in favor of the bill with ex-communication (Ross, 2004).
3
Understood here as men’s cultural dominance over women.
4
The REVM is an academic journal published since 1996 by the Center for Women’s Studies (CEM) of the
Universidad central de Venezuela and index in RENDISE. Otras Miradas is an academic journal published since
2001 by the Gigesex group of the Universidad de Los Andes; this magazine is indexed in LATINDEX and belongs
to the RedalyC Network of Scientific Magazines of Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain, and Portugal.
5
The Trienio (1945-1948) is considered the first democratic experiment in which AD and COPEI dominated the
political arena; it was characterized by a highly polarized, weakly institutionalized political party system (Molina,
2006).
6
The term partidocracia refers to the extreme power exercised by political parties on other political and social
actors and spaces. An equivalent to it in English Partyarchy was first provided by Coppedge (1994) who derived it
from the term polyarchy used by Dahl (1971).
7
The word cogollos is a pejorative term used in Venezuela to refer to the groups made by the leaders of the main
political parties.
8
G. Espina interview with Esperanza Vera, former PCV member and feminist activist. Maracay, 2005
9
Salamanca (2003) documents this event among the first manifestations of civil society emerging in the 1970s.
10
Online interview with Venezuelan feminist activists. See also, Conger Lind (1992), Stoltz Chinchilla (1992), and
Desai (2002).
11
It was in fact at a small meeting of women activists that the idea of having direct representation in the state turned
into this campaign (Friedman’s interview with Isabel Carmona, 2000:135).
12
The MAS party was founded in 1971 when the PCV party split, Argelia Laya was among those, women,
journalists, intellectuals, and students on the left, who joined the MAS because it was regarded as an opportunity of
organizing against the gender-biased of other political parties and with particular attention to women’s issues. See
Friedman, 2000.
13
The Venezuelan Federation of Women Lawyers established in 1956.
14
The Socialist Women, a women’s group founded in 1972 by Argelia Laya with links to the socialist party MAS
had attracted women form the left, journalists, intellectuals, and students identified themselves with feminism and
who attempted to formulate their own views of women’s interests based on the a socialist-feminist ideology. Their
perception of a socialist government included state attention to maternity, infancy, women’s education, women’s
political participation, legal gender equality, and the eradication of a male capitalist ideology. The movement met
opposition from the MAS male-leadership and in spite of continuing effort at organizing, the groups disintegrated as
the MAS party attempted to treat women’s organizations much like the traditional AD and COPEI parties had by
manipulating them (Friedman, 2000:156-157).
15
The Divorce Law was approved in 1904 in spite of the Catholic Church opposition. Among the reasons used to
pass the law were the facts that is was a necessary complement of the existing Law of Civil Marriage of 1873 and
that it would protect women from unwanted relationships and increase gender equality. A deal was reached with the
Catholic Church as the divorce law established legal divorce and separation of bodies, but not dissolution of
marriage (Pellicer and Quintero, 2004).
16
According to Espina and Rakowski (2002), the term “femócratas” (femocrats) is not negative; it simply means a
feminist who works inside the state bureaucracy.
17
(Ibidem) These offer services and advice to community and base groups.
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18

(Ibidem) The autonomous feminists reject identification with any political party or partisan position that is not
feminist; they refuse to being co-opted by any interests group.
19
This organization was created in 1974 to provide education to poor women.
20
The Venezuela legal system is based on written laws, meaning that laws, which are the source of the rule of law;
have to be codified into written. This means that after ratification by the Venezuelan state, the law needed to be
written and promulgated by the legislative power.
21
See Chinchilla (1992); Conger Lind (1992); Desai (2002) on the influence of international norms on liberalization
of gender issues by states.
22
Both Fernández from COPEI and Pérez from AD promised to carry out the process of decentralization if they won
the 1988 elections (Mascareño, 2004:151).
23
Email interview with Gioconda Espina, feminist activist, academic, and founder of the CONG. See also Merz
Repem (2005); Heredia de Salvatierra (2006);
24
A term used by Espina and Rakowski (2002) to refer to a feminist activist who works inside the state
bureaucracy.
25
Reelection was another issue that made incumbent governors more dependent on their performance than on the
coattail of the presidential candidate, in fact, some were re-elected increasingly as time went by and now intra-party
conflict was about the new regional leader and the old party leadership (Monaldi et al., 2006).
26
Available at : http://www.fides.gob.ve/
27
Fundación Empresas Polar. Asociación de Vecinos.
28
This commission later became the Permanent Commission on Family, Woman, and Youth (Comisión Permanente
Familia, Mujer y Juventud) in the present National Assembly
29
ENP refers to the effective number of parties. The lower the number of parties, the less fragmented the system is
(Monaldi et al. 2006).
30
Online interviews with Ofelia Alvarez, president of FUNDAMUJER and Elsi Arellano, member of CISFEMTrujillo.
31
According to Monaldi et al., (2006) what contributed to this was the fact that since 1988 no president had a party
majority in Congress, which increased conflict between Executive and Legislature. This trend was reversed,
however, in the 2004 legislative elections.
32
See Mascareño (2002).
33
See Kelly and Palma (2004)
34
The idea was to reduce the number of ministries and state agencies as part of the stabilization plan imposed by the
International Monetary Fund, an economic package introduced by the Pérez administration called The Great
Turnaround and which sparked the social explosion that culminated in the Caracazo in 1989. The liberalization
experiment of Pérez was an economic disaster with political consequences; real modernization of the state did not
take place. See also Kelly and Palma (2004)
35
Online interviews with Gioconda Espina, Ofelia Álvarez, and Elsi Arellano.
36
Organic Labor Law available at Congreso de la República de Venezuela en la Biblioteca
http://www.analitica.com/Bitblio/congreso_venezuela/default.asp
37
Espina had also been involved in the preparation of the Feminist Assembly in Brazil in 1985 and participated in
the elaboration of the proposals to be brought to the 1985 UN meeting in Nairobi, Kenya after the evaluation of the
decade of women.
38
The magazine La Mala Vida, considered the first feminist agenda in Venezuela, only released 15 numbers
(www.giocondaespina.com.ve)
39
Cuadernos de Gioconda Espina (primera entrega 1984-1985).
40
According to Espina (2007), this includes the guarantee of sexual and reproductive rights such as the right of
women to interrupt her pregnancy and respect for sexual orientation; parity and alternating men and women in
political participation; opposition to women, children and young people in the media; social security for all women.
41
Online interview with Espina.
42
Online interviews with Ofelia Alvarez and Elsi Arellano.
43
Adjective meaning a female member of the political party AD.
44
Online interview with Gioconda Espina.
45
Online interview with Elsi Arellano.
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46

The issue of the use of the pronoun he as the generic subject in legal text has been pointed out by many
Venezuelan feminists; this concern was addressed and fixed in the text of the 1999 Constitution as will be shown in
the next chapter.
47
Online interview with Ofelia Alvarez and Elsi Arellano.
48
This term refers to temporal suspension of the application of a law (Caballenas, 1996)
49
According to Merz Repem (2005), participation is understood as parity in representation of women and men in
positions of political power in government and other political organizations.
50
The presence of women in the Executive Board of AD went from 7 to 11 in the period 1998- 2000 Merz (2005).
51
Most of these organizations have been involved in the issue of violence against women and are still very active in
Venezuela.
52
Online interview with Ofelia Alvarez and Elsi Arellano.
53
Online interviews with Ofelia Alvarez and Elsi Arellano.
54
The use of frames by social movements in order to organize experience, guide action, and mobilize support is
discussed by Goffman (1974); Snow and Benford (1988) in Snow and Benford (2000).
55
The CEM of the Universidad Central de Venezuela (UCV) is the off-spin of the Cátedra Libre Manuelita Sáenz;
created in 1992 by women professors at the UCV. The GIGESEX of the Universidad de Los Andes was also the offspin of the Cátedra Abierta Mujer formed in 1989 and the Area de Estudios de la Mujer formed in 1990; the
GIGESEX was then created in 1997. Both research groups/centers also play the role of service providers for women
victims of gender violence.
56
http://www.avesa.org.ve
57
www.plafam.org.ve
58
www.fundamujer.org.ve
59

Nonetheless, as pointed out by some feminists (García Ramirez, Rosillo, and Valdivieso, 2005) it is important to
point to the fact that state commissions and women’s agencies are very fragile institutional factors since they depend
on changes in the Executive Power (meaning also Executive commitment to women’s issues)

60

Many women who were part of the CONG left it to form new NGOs while others became what Espina and
Rakowski call femocrats (Espina and Rakowski, 2002:6)
61
See for example AVESA, PLAFAM, FUNDAMUNJER, CESAP, CEM, and GIGESEX, among others.
62
Femocrats are women who were either elected or appointed to government posts by the incumbents or his
ministers. Some femocrats, once out of office, formed new NGOs, joined international NGOs, or went back to
academia where they are still active feminist in the struggle for women’s rights and the family (Espina and
Rakowski, 2002:6).
63
Agenda Venezuela was an economic plan pushed by Caldera in 1993 imposed by the International Monetary Fund
that included liberalization of the economy, prices, and employment as well as the privatization of state companies,
especially the opening of the state-owned firm (PDVSA) to private investment. Criticized by the left but praised by
the traditional parties and the private sector as common sense. In attempted to contained social explosion by creating
social programs directed at alleviating poverty (Petkoff, 1997; Kelly and Palma, 2004)
64
An autonomous institute that concentrates and administers the economic resources to fund social programs
created to implement public social policies through the coordinated action of state and non-state agencies
(http://www.fus.gov.ve/). This was regarded by civil society organization as a populist measure to manipulate the
poor.
65
The role of the military in the new regime has always been controversial, (Kozloff, 2007). Apart from the Catholic
Church’s criticism of Chávez military policy, Scholars find that Chávez’s dismantling of the institutions of civilian
control of the military, threatens regime stability and increases the chances of civilian-military conflict (Trinkunas,
2002)
66
See Salamanca (2004) for more on the way civil society was defined and the requirements to have access to the
state.
67
Article 88 of the 1999 Constitution establishes that “The State guarantees the equality and equitable treatment of
men and women in the exercise of the right to work. The state recognizes work at home as an economic activity that
creates added value and produces social welfare and wealth. Homemakers are entitled to Social Security in
accordance with law.” However, this article has not yet been put into practice for the majority of women.
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68

In Spanish the article states that “El Estado garantizará asistencia y protección integral a la maternidad, en general
a partir del momento de la concepción, durante el embarazo, el parto y el puerperio, y asegurará servicios de
planificación familiar integral basados en valores éticos y científicos.” Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela. Published on December 30th, 1999, Official Gazette number 36.860. Available at
http://www.constitucion.ve/constitucion.pdf
69
Due to the fact that Spanish distinguishes gender in adjectives/ pronouns referring to job title, etc, the 1999
Constitution makes a reference in both the masculine and feminine version of the adjective/pronoun used.
70
UNESCO resolutions 14.1of 1987 and 109 of 1989.
71
For more on the function of language, see Salas. (2005). One of her thesis is that violence against women is
promoted by linguistic violence)
72

Article 21 states that “all persons are equal before the law and consequently: No discrimination based on race,
sex, creed or social standing shall be permitted, nor, in general, any discrimination with the intent or effect of
nullifying or impairing upon the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on equal terms, of the rights and liberties of
every individual.”
73

Proyecto Venezuela and Convergencia were two new political parties. The civil association Primero Justicia, later
became a political party.
74
Press release by INAMUJER “Inamujer Inicia Plan De Formación De Féminas (12-11-2006)
75
Executive decree 4.342, Official Gazette 38.404, March 23, 2006.
76
Executive decree 4210 of January 2006 and Executive decree 5.616, Official Gazette 38.776, September 25, 2007
77
Online interview with Elsi Arellano
78
papers published on her website: www.giocondaespina.com.ve
79
Leon’s statement during the celebration of the 7th anniversary of the creation of INAMUJER. Inamujer Celebra
Séptimo Aniversario (21-10-06). RNV
80
Leon’s statement during the celebration of the 9th anniversary of the creation of INAMUJER. Ministra León:
Revolución Reivindica a la Mujer Venezolana. (25-10-08) RNV
81
The term chavista refers to supporters of president Chávez. Here the chavistas do not included the newly created
grassroots organization, but rather the women supporters of Chávez who work in women’s NGOS, the government
and the research centers.
82
Online interview with Elsi Arellano.
83
Similarly, the 1997 LIOM was proposed by an adeca legislator in spite of the weaknesses and obstacles for its
implementation.
84
This refers to the period of time between the publication of the law and the enforcement of the law, a sort of
temporal suspension of the enforcement of the law (Caballenas, Guillermo, 1996)
85
Online interviews with Espina, Alvarez, and Arellano.
86
Online interview with Elsi Arellano
87
The index used by Merz (2005) shows that between 1995 and 2003, women’s representation in political positions
was almost the same; 13% in 1995 compared to 13.63% in 2003, thus showing a stalling in women’s political
participation in a period of eight years.
88
IDEA 2008 report (p. 20).
89
The opposition withdrew from the legislative elections in 2005, 48 hours before the elections; there was a 75.5 %
abstention (Espina, 2007). For the author, this reflects the importance given to the presidential elections, which she
regards as a demonstration that Venezuelans are more interested in “who is the man behind the public power (p.4).
90
In 2007, women made up 24 per cent of Latin American Cabinets (IDEA, 2008).
91
News available at www.cne.gob.ve/noticiadetallada.php?=4489
92
Luigino Braccia Roa (2008) Mundial, July 21.
93
Idem
94
Other considerations refer to the size of the district and the type of list. In the first case, if the district is small only
few slates are won by the party and because women are usually at the end of the lists, they do not get elected. In the
second case, if the lists are not closed, the electorate can alter the lists instead of voting for the entire list (Mujeres en
el Parlamento, Dossier Informativo available at www.parlamento.gub.uy
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95

The UDHR of 1948, the Latin American Convention of Human Rights of 1969, the Convention Belem do Pará of
1994, the CEDAW Declaration of 1979.
96
www.inamujer.gob.ve
97
Online, 2003
98
In July 2008, the state was working on the creation of the first Violence tribunals (giocondaespina.com.ve)
99
Online interview with Ofelia Alvarez
100
Ibidem.
101
Online interview with Elsi Arellano
102
The Movimiento Amplio de Mujeres included the following women’s organizations: CEM, GIGESEX, Colectivo
de Mujeres Manuelita Sáenz, Movimiento de Mujeres de la UCV, AVESA, CISFEM, Círculos Femeninos Populares
(CPPS), among others.
103
http://giocondaespina.com.ve
104
Frente Amplio de Mujeres available at http://www.debatecultural.net/Acciones/FrenteAmpliodeMujeres2.htm
and http://www.mujereshoy.com/secciones/3238.shtml
105
Statement by deputy Iris Varela, Vice-president of the Commission on Internal Affairs of the National Assembly.
Available at http://www.fmnoticias.com/noticias.shtml and http://www.mujereshoy.com/secciones/3238.shtml
106
Online interview with Elsi Arellano.
107
Statement by deputy Flor María Ríos. Available at http://www.mujereshoy.com/secciones/3238.shtml (20-072005)
108
Another issue in the proposals was the elimination of Chapter V which sanctions adultery when committed by
women and men are only punished if adultery is committed in public. The women’s groups argued that adultery was
not to be penalized at all. In addition, the proposal asked for the elimination of the article that exempted a rapist or
pimp when he married the victim.
109
http://infovenezuela.org/cap4_es_2.htm
110
In this regard, Valdivieso, Director of the CEM and a leader of the women’s groups involved in the process of
reform asserted that the issue of reform of the Penal Code wanted to be politicized. Available
http://www.mujereshoy.com/secciones/3238.shtml The actual proposal is on available at
http://giocondaespina.com.ve/GIOCONDA/mven/PDF/04.pdf
111
Online interviews with Espina, Arellano, and Alvarez
112
Online interview with Arellano.
113
Friedman (2000).
114
Online interview with Espina, Alvarez, and Arellano.
115
Referring to Cardinal Castillo Lara
116
To make things worse, Chávez met Archbishop Porras, in 1999 who made public after the meeting that the
government had decided to cut traditional government subsides to the Church up to 80 percent (Kozloff, 2007)
117
See Kozloff’s Hugo Chávez’s Holy War (2007)
118
Poleo (2007). Interview with con Gioconda Espina.
119
The ESE group was created in January 2007 and is coordinated by Gioconda Espina.
120
The 1999 Constitution enshrines social right that positively impact women, among these are motherhood, for
example, which is protected from “the point of conception,” meaning that pre-natal care is guaranteed, but making
abortion more difficult (Wilpert, 2003). What Espina argues is that women did not push for its elimination in the
face of opposition form the Catholic Church.
122
Online interview with Gioconda Espina.
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Appendix
INTERVIEW USED IN VENEZUELA (IN SPANISH)
ESTUDIO SOBRE LA CALIDAD DE LAS LEYES VENEZOLANAS DE MUJERES
La siguiente entrevista tiene como objetivo evaluar la calidad de las leyes para la mujer
(reformas a leyes o decretos) aprobadas desde el año 1970 hasta el 2006 en Venezuela.

1. ¿Considera usted necesario la división en los temas de mujeres (aborto, violencia
familiar, participación política) debido a que cada tema recibe una respuesta diferente y
tiene más (o menos) oportunidad para que se lleve a cabo una reforma?
•

Si

•

No

2. ¿Dónde se discuten (o se han discutido) los siguientes temas?:
A. aborto
B. igualdad de la mujer
C. violencia doméstica
D. participación política de la mujer
3. Debido a que las leyes en América Latina tienen un contenido normativo, cuál cree usted
que es el impacto de las leyes que regulan los temas de la mujer en la sociedad y en el
individuo (por ejemplo la ley de igualdad de oportunidades o la ley sobre la violencia
contra la mujer y la familia)?
4. Podría clasificar las leyes a continuación de acuerdo su importancia para alcanzar la
igualdad de hombres y mujeres en Venezuela y la protección efectiva de los derechos de
la mujer:
A. Convención sobre la Eliminación de todas las formas de Discriminación contra la
Mujeres.
B. Ley sobre la Violencia contra la Mujer y la Familia (Ley Orgánica sobre el derecho
de la mujer a una vida libre de violencia).
C. Reforma del Título VI de Ley del Trabajo para proteger a la trabajadora embarazada.
D. Reforma de la Ley del Sufragio para establecer una cuota del 30%.
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E. Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades.
F. El decreto presidencial que creó el Instituto INAMUJER y eliminó la representación
de la sociedad civil organizada de mujeres de la Junta Directiva del Instituto.
G. La nueva Ley de Seguridad Social y la inclusión del Artículo 88 y el derecho de las
amas de casa a recibir seguridad social.
H. La creación del banco de la mujer BANMUJER.
5. ¿Que opinión le merece la implementación de cada una de las siguientes leyes, decretos o
reformas (puede nombrar algún resultado positivo):
A. Convención sobre la Eliminación de todas las formas de Discriminación contra la
Mujeres.
B. Ley sobre la Violencia contra la Mujer y la Familia (Ley Orgánica sobre el derecho
de la mujer a una vida libre de violencia).
C. Reforma del Título VI de Ley del Trabajo para proteger a la trabajadora embarazada.
D. Reforma de la Ley del Sufragio para establecer una cuota del 30%.
E. Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades.
F. El decreto presidencial que creó el Instituto INAMUJER y eliminó la representación
de la sociedad civil organizada de mujeres de la Junta Directiva del Instituto.
G. La nueva Ley de Seguridad Social y la inclusión del Artículo 88 y el derecho de las
amas de casa a recibir seguridad social.
H. La creación del banco de la mujer BANMUJER
6. Cuál ha sido la influencia de la Iglesia Católica en le proceso de reforma de leyes sobre la
mujer?
7. Cómo describiría la relación Estado-Iglesia en Venezuela desde un punto de vista
estructural antes de 1999? Como afectaba la discusión de la despenalización del aborto?
8. Cómo ha afectado el cambio de la relación Iglesia-Estado durante la administración de
Chávez al debate sobre los temas de la mujer? Cómo ha afectado la discusión de la
despenalización del aborto?
9. Cuál es su opinión sobre la influencia que ejerce la Iglesia Católica en el proceso de
formular y preparar políticas publicas? (especialmente en temas de mujeres)

208

10. Cómo ve usted la situación actual de la mujer en términos de participación política
considerando la Ley del Sufragio actual? Cuáles son los obstáculos para la participación
política de la mujer? Algún resultado positivo?
11. Considera usted que la cobertura de los temas de la mujer en los medios de comunicación
venezolanos ( desde 1970 hasta 2006) ha
a. aumentado
b. disminuído
c. permanece igual
12. Puede decirme qué estrategias utiliza su grupo (en caso de que pertenezca a un grupo de
mujeres) o los grupos de mujeres venezolanas para formular los temas de la mujer de
manera de hacerlos más atractivos para conseguir apoyo?
13. Cuál de los siguientes considera usted que ha tenido más influencia en la transformación
de los temas de género, desde el más importante al menos importante?
A.

Influencia de normas internacionales (por ejemplo, Convención sobre la

Eliminación de todas las formas de Discriminación contra la Mujeres)
B.

Distintas configuraciones en el estado venezolano (instituciones más

abiertas o más cerradas como las de Punto Fijo antes y después del proceso de
descentralización de 1989 y durante la administración de Chávez, 1999- 2006)
C.

El deterioro de los partidos políticos (más acceso al Estado por parte de la

sociedad organizada, nuevos partidos, nuevos grupos de sociedad civil organizada).
D.

Cambios en las élites del Estado (durante Punto Fijo y durante la

Revolución Bolivariana)
14. Cuál ha sido el proceso de reforma de leyes sobre los derechos de la mujer?
15. Dónde se han llevado a cabo las discusiones para la reforma a los códigos (civil, penal)?
16. Cree usted que los grupos de mujeres están unidos por sus intereses de género o por otros
intereses?
17. Cree usted que el movimiento de mujeres ha escapado a la politización y polarización del
contexto actual de Venezuela (desde el 200 hasta el 2006)?
18. Está de acuerdo con la creación de una nueva red de organizaciones de mujeres? Quién
debería coordinarla? Debería ser autónoma o del Estado?

209

19. Qué oportunidades y desafíos presenta el contexto político, económico y social actual
para avanzar los derechos de la mujer?
20. Podría mencionar algunos casos en los que las mujeres no hayan logrado la aprobación de
leyes por las que hayan luchado a lo largo de estos años? A qué cree usted que se debe la
falta de éxito? (considere por ejemplo la despenalización del aborto).

Muchas gracias por su colaboración.
Inés Rojas

